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INTRODUCTION
TO METAPHYSICS
Paul Gerard Horrigan
This webpage contains part
one of the book (chapters 1-8). Parts two and three of the book (chapters 9-19)
can be found at: www.phorrigan.fcpages.com/metaphysics2and3.htm
Other
e-books by Dr. Paul Gerard Horrigan:
Introduction to Philosophy: www.paulhorrigan.0catch.com
The Existence of God: www.horrigan.angelcities.com
Philosophical Anthropology: www.phorrigan.fcpages.com/philoanthropology.htm
A Short History of Philosophy: www.granada.012webpages.com/historyofphilo.htm
Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant: www.horrigan.angelcities.com/descartestokant.htm
Philosophy of Knowledge: www.horrigan.angelcities.com/knowledge.htm
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS
PART ONE: THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF BEING
1. Being (Ens)
2. The Principle of Non-Contradiction
3. Substance and Accidents
4. The Categories
5. Act and Potency
6. Essence (Essentia)
7. Act of Being (Esse)
8. The Supposit and the Person
PART TWO: THE TRANSCENDENTALS (www.phorrigan.fcpages.com/metaphysics2and3.htm
)
9. The Nature of the Transcendentals
10. Transcendental Unity
11. Transcendental Truth
12. Transcendental Goodness
13. Transcendental Beauty
PART THREE: CAUSALITY
14. Causality
15. Material Cause
16. Formal Cause
17. Efficient Cause
18. Final Cause
19. Interconnection Between Causes
For
a long time Aristotle scholars held that the term “metaphysics”[1]
(from the Greek meaning literally “after the physics”) originated from a mere
“shelving accident” by Andronicus of Rhodes (first half of the first century
B.C.). It was commonly believed that Andronicus first gave the title “the books
which follow the physics” in his re-ordered edition of the opera omnia
of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), where he placed the Stagirite’s fourteen books of
first philosophy after those concerned with physics, simply because he was
unable to properly name and classify them. However, in the middle half of the
twentieth century this position came under fire with the publication of
scholarly studies by Paul Moraux,[2]
Hans Reiner,[3] and
Anton-Herman Chroust.[4] The last of these scholars, A. H. Chroust of
the University of Notre Dame, maintains that the designation attributed by
scholars to Andronicus of Rhodes “which owes its origin to a library cataloguing
reference and, hence, to a mere accident born out of embarassment and practical
necessity…this fanciful story…borders on the incredible.”[5]
Chroust
mentions that both Nicholas of Damascus (flourished 2nd half of the first
century B.C.) and the illustrious historian Plutarch (c. 45-c. 120 A.D.)
utilized the term “metaphysics” to describe Aristotle’s fourteen books of first
philosophy. Then, Chroust lists Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Commentary to
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, written around 200 A.D., where we find Alexander
explaining that the Stagirite himself described his books on first philosophy
as “metaphysics,” for as regards our noetical process this subject matter comes
after the physics (it belongs to a higher level of abstraction). It is true
that first philosophy (metaphysics) by nature (in itself) comes before the
physics (by reason of its sublimity), but with reference to our limited minds
which start from what is accessible to the senses, physics comes before metaphysics.
Another
source that Chroust gives us is the Commentary of Asclepius (6th century
A.D.),[6]
which is, to a great extent, reliant on Alexander. In his commentary, Asclepius
says that Aristotle himself called his work “metaphysics,” for it systematically
follows the books of the Physics.[7]
Chroust goes on to maintain, along with Asclepius, that the term “metaphysics,”
“to be sure, may have had its origin in the sequence of the Aristotelian works,
but this sequence is by no means an external or accidental ‘order of shelving’
– an incident in the techniques used by librarians. It is rather a deliberate
and necessary sequence that is decisively determined by the ‘order’ – the
‘prior’ or ‘posterior’ – of our noetic process. And this noetic process reverses
the natural process or order. This fact, according to Asclepius, determines the
didactic sequence which definitely calls for a Physics-Metaphysics
sequence. Aristotle himself, Asclepius concludes, has planned this vital
sequence. Hence the ‘order of shelving’ merely follows the ‘topical order.’[8]
Chroust believes that the term “first philosophy”[9]
that the Stagirite utilized to describe metaphysics expresses that which is
first in the order of nature, while the term “metaphysics” proceeding in a
reverse order, expresses that which is last “according to us,” that is,
according to our cognitive processes.
Chroust
then proceeds to give us a fourth source: Themistius (4th century A.D.), in his
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, also states that “as far as we are
concerned, the Metaphysics comes after the Physics, but according
to nature the order or sequence is reversed. That which is prior is prior in a
dual sense. First in relation to us, and, secondly, in relation to nature. In
relation to us that is prior which is better known to us and which we
understand more readily…In relation to nature that is prior which according to
its substance is the more simple (or uniform)…and, hence, the order is reversed
here. Because in discursive reasoning we proceed from the composite to the
simple or uniform which, according to nature, is the prior.”[10]
Chroust
also mentions a fifth source: an anonymous scholion to the Metaphysics
which reads that “the title metaphysics is derived not from the nature
of the subject but rather from the order in which it should be read (or
studied), because it [the Metaphysics] contains the first principles of
physics.”[11]
The Role of J. G. Buhle. Where, then, did this “fanciful story” of a
“shelving accident” involving Andronicus of Rhodes originate from? Apparently,
from Johann Gottlieb Buhle, as Owens explains: “Toward the end of the
eighteenth century, a German philologist and historian of philosophy, Johann
Gottlieb Buhle (1763-1821), published at the early age of twenty-five a forty-two
page discussion on the authenticity of the Aristotelian Metaphysics.[12]
In the course of that examination Buhle eliminated from the unity of the Metaphysics,
mostly on grounds of obvious failure to satisfy internal coherence, seven of
its fourteen books. In his final paragraph (pp. 41-42), as though by way of
afterthought, he asked how such alien documents found their way into the group
of Aristotelian treatises on first philosophy, and replied that this became
clear from the history of their transmission. Repeating the traditional account
he went on without any change in style to narrate, as though part of the
tradition, some further details that purported to round off the story:
Andronicus of Rhodes, the first century B.C. editor of the Aristotelian treatises,
arranged the Physics as the last in order according to his own
systematic plan; but Andronicus still had a number of treatises left over that
he did not know how to classify, and hence he appended them to the collection
under the general title of ta meta ta physica, understood in the
editorial sense of treatises placed after the physical ones!
“Buhle
offered no evidence or reasons or arguments for this assertion. Actually, there
were none to offer.[13]
But his fantastic statement was taken up by encyclopedias and textbooks as it
stood, and was universally accepted almost without question until the middle of
the present century. Today it continues to be repeated, even though it is
rejected unhesitatingly on historical grounds by scholars who have carefully
considered the evidence.[14]
It is an explanation that would render the term ‘metaphysics’ as doctrinally
meaningless as the heading ‘appendices’ over a nondescript group of documents
unable to be absorbed into the regular sequence of a book.”[15]
Metaphysics. Meaning “after the physics,” the term metaphysics, as was
already mentioned, had been traditionally attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes
due to “a shelving accident,” by him, but a number of twentieth century scholars
have attributed the term to early Peripatetics utilizing the term to describe
Aristotle’s fourteen books of first philosophy. The term was meant to
have a didactic significance, namely, that, according to our limited mode of
cognition, metaphysics (which has as subject being in general, gotten through
the negative judgment of separation) comes after the physics (which is easier
to grasp by the mind of man), but in itself metaphysics is prior in importance
to physics. The later Peripatetics continued this tradition of naming our
subject matter “metaphysics” and with the passing of time the term became
widely used, especially by medieval scholastic philosophers, for, hovering
above physics and the other particular sciences with its third degree of abstraction
(properly called separation), it is able to go beyond the sphere of the
corporeal world studied by physics into the realm of the immaterial.[16]
First Philosophy. Aristotle called our subject matter “first philosophy” since it
considers the first principles and first causes of all things and also because
it gives these first principles (e.g., non-contradiction, causality, finality)
to the other sciences, which presuppose them.[17]
“As directive knowledge metaphysics is called first philosophy. The name
does not refer to the chronological order of learning but to the priority that
metaphysics enjoys with respect to other human sciences. Metaphysics has
priority over other sciences because it, as the science of indemonstrable
principles of being, is the guardian of the first principles of other sciences.
In addition, metaphysics, as natural theology, is able to direct other sciences
toward God, who is the origin and end of all things.”[18]
Metaphysics
is “first philosophy” since it is the highest and most important part of
theoretical or speculative philosophy, as well as being the highest part of the
theoretical sciences (were are here speaking of metaphysics in the general
sense which includes its three parts, namely, general metaphysics, gnoseology,
and philosophy of God). The weakness, however, with this designation is that it
does not give us the object of the science of being.
Divine Science. Aristotle also called the science of metaphysics the “divine science.”
Though metaphysics is rightly deemed a divine science since it delves into the
first principles and ultimate causes of things, explaining principles that are
utilized in the demonstration of the existence of God and in the explaination
of His nature and attributes, God, however, is not the proper object of general
metaphysics but rather its final term as the affirmation of the existence of
God is the principal conclusion which the science of metaphysics establishes.
Natural theology or philosophy of God is more properly called “divine science”
than metaphysics, but, strictly speaking, the “divine science” is sacred
theology.
Wisdom.
The Stagirite also called metaphysics “wisdom” (sophia). Metaphysics
truly is wisdom, a knowledge of the ultimate causes and first principles of all
reality: “The special sciences deal with the particular causes of kinds of
being. Metaphysics, however, deals with being precisely as being in its most
universal causes and principles. This kind of science is called wisdom. St.
Thomas observes: ‘Wisdom is a certain kind of science insofar as it has this in
common with all the sciences, namely, that it demonstrates conclusions from
principles. But since over and above the other it has this property that it
judges all others, not only as to conclusion but also as to first principles,
it is therefore a more perfect virtue than science.’[19]
Wisdom (sapientia) is the knowledge of things in the light of their
highest causes. It is more perfect than a special science (scientia)
which considers secondary principles, as biology treats the principles of
living things, because wisdom is concerned with the highest principles of all
things. It is more perfect than understanding (intellectus) because
understanding gives us the knowledge of the immediate truth of self evident
principles, as the principle of non-contradiction, but metaphysics gives us a
deeper knowledge of the first principles, judges their truth and defends their
validity.[20]”[21]
Ontology. During the seventeenth century the term “ontology,” as a substitute
for metaphysics, began to make its appearance in the works of the Marburg
logician Rudolph Goclenius (1547-1628)[22]
and the German Cartesian philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665),[23]
but it was popularized by the philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754), a
rationalist, who profoundly influenced the pre-critical period of the
transcendental idealist Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). “Ontology,” a term derived
from the Greek present participle ontos of the verb “to be” einai
and the noun logos signifying “science,” means the “science of being.”
Though rationalist philosophers have a history of preferring the term
“ontology” over “metaphysics,” both are valid terms and can be used
interchangeably to describe our philosophical science in question.
Metaphysics
is the philosophical science that studies the ultimate causes and first
principles of all things (or all reality). It studies the ultimate causes
of things (the four causes, namely material causality, formal causality,
efficient or agent causality and final causality, as well as the First Cause of
all things, namely, God). Thus, metaphysics is different from the particular
sciences (like biology, chemistry, physics) which study the proximate causes of
things, which produce in an immediate manner certain specific effects (i.e.,
the heart is the organ that causes blood circulation). Metaphysics also studies
first principles, like the principle of non-contradiction (wherein we
find that being is not self-contradictory), causality (in all its various
formulations like “that which is moved is moved by another,” “that something
which begins to be has a cause,” “everything contingent requires a cause,” and
“if something possesses a perfection not derived from its essence, that
perfection must come from an external cause”), as well as the constitutive
principles of being, like act and potency, substance and accidents, and essence
and act of being.
Metaphysics
is defined as the science of being as being.[24]
Science here is not understood in the reductionistic and positivistic
sense as referring solely to the experimental particular sciences, like biology
and chemistry, but in the classical sense of “certain knowledge through
causes.” What is metaphysics’ material object and formal object?
Its material object (that is, its subject matter) is being. Its formal
object (or the particular point of view or aspect in which the subject
matter is studied) is being as being (ens inquantum est ens). Now,
sciences are defined and differentiated from one another by reason of their
formal object, and metaphysics is thus defined as “the science of being as
being.”[25]
Concerning metaphysics as that science which treats of being qua being,
St. Thomas Aquinas writes, in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
the following: “Because a science ought to investigate not only its proper
subject but also the latter’s essential attributes,[26]
Aristotle says that there exists a science which takes as its subject being
precisely as such, and ‘those things which belong to being in virtue of its own
nature,’ namely, being’s essential attributes. Aristotle here uses the
expression ‘being in so far as it is being’ because the other sciences, which
treat of particular beings, do indeed consider being, for all the subjects of
sciences are beings, yet they do not consider being as being, but as this sort
of being; for example, number, line, fire, or something of the kind. Aristotle
employs the phrase ‘and those things belonging to being in virtue of its own
nature,’ not simply ‘those things which appertain to or exist in being,’ in
order to point out that it is not the office of a science to consider those
things that exist in its subject accidentally but only those that are present
in it essentially. Thus, geometry is not concerned with the question whether a
triangle is made of copper or of wood, but only with its absolute nature,
according to which it has three equal angles.[27]
It does not, therefore, appertain to the science whose subject is being to
consider all that exists in it accidentally, since it would then be taking into
account accidents which are investigated in all sciences. For although all
accidents exist in some being, not all accidents exist in a being inasmuch as
it is being. Thus essential accidents of an inferior or a subordinate thing are
accidental accidents in relation to the superior; for example, accidents
essential to man are not essential to animal.[28]
“The
necessity of this science of metaphysics, which contemplates being and its essential
attributes, is manifest; such things ought not to remain unknown because it is
upon them that knowledge of other things depends, for on the knowledge of
common or universal things hinges the knowledge of proper or individual things.
That this science is not a particular science, Aristotle shows by the following
argument. No particular science considers universal being as such, but only
some part of being cut off from its other parts, and of this separated part it
examines the essential attribute. The mathematical sciences, for instance,
investigate a particular kind of being, namely, the quantitative,[29]
whereas the common science, metaphysics, considers universal being as being.
Therefore it is not to be identified with any particular science. No particular
science treats of being as being, that is, being-in-common, nor does any
particular science treat of any particular being, simply as being. For
instance, arithmetic does not consider number as being, but as number. It is
the office of the metaphysician, however, to consider any and every being,
precisely as being.[30]
And because it pertains to the same science to consider being as being, ‘and,
concerning being, what it is,’ namely, its essence (for every thing has actual
existence through its essence), so it is that the particular sciences…are not
concerned with the problem of determining what being is – its quiddity or
essence and its definition, which signifies the essence. Rather, from the
essence such sciences proceed to other matters, using the presupposed essence,
as if it were an already demonstrated principle, in order to prove other
things. Just as no particular science determines the essence of its subject, so
none of them says regarding its subject, that it is or is not. And
understandably so; for it belongs to one and the same science to settle the
problem of existence and to discover the essence…It is proper to the
philosopher, to him who studies being as being, to consider both problems. But
every particular science presupposes concerning its own subject both that it is
and what it is, as Aristotle states in the first book of the Posterior
Analytics. And this shows that no particular science treats of being as
such, nor of any being precisely as being.”[31]
Describing
the material object and formal object of metaphysics and relating this to
wisdom (sophia), Wallace writes: “In its material object, or the number
of things it studies, metaphysics is all-inclusive, extending to everything and
every aspect of whatever is or can exist, whether of a sensible, material,
physical nature or of a higher, non-material nature. Its formal object is being
precisely as being (ens qua ens), i.e., according to the relation that
any thing or aspect of things has to existence, rather to one of the particular
aspects treated in the other branches of philosophy. The unity of this point of
view, centered on what is most fundamental to all reality, enables metaphysics
to investigate the way in which the many are interrelated to the one in the
deepest ontological sense. Further, since things are reflected in knowledge, it
enables metaphysics to order and evaluate the various types of speculative and
practical knowledge, on which account it is also called wisdom.”[32]
To
sum up, the material object of metaphysics is being (all being), that
is, all reality. The formal object of metaphysics is, from the nature of
the abstraction which this science demands (which is separation), being as
being (ens in quantum ens).[33]
Metaphysics does not restrict itself to some particular aspect of being but
rather treats of what is common to all beings, such as its constitutive
principles or components, its properties and attributes, its divisions and its
causes.
The
method of a science is the way in which it renders its object intelligible.
Metaphysics utilizes both induction and deduction[34],
not deduction exclusively nor induction exclusively, though induction is used
principally.[35]
Metaphysics
(we are speaking here of general metaphysics) has a three-part structure: it
studies the metaphysical structure of being (act and potency, matter and
form, substance and accidents, essence and act of being), its properties (or
the transcendentals of being, namely thing, something, one, truth, good, and
beauty), and causality (material, formal, efficient, and final
causality).
Metaphysics
Operates at the Third Degree of Abstraction (Properly Called Separation)
The level of abstraction that metaphysics operates at is not the first level (which concerns the physical sciences), nor at the second level (which concerns mathematics), but at the third level (properly called separation).[36] The three levels of abstraction are described as “degrees of abstraction” in the sense of a progressive elevation above matter. St. Thomas writes about the three levels in his Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, stating: “There are some things whose being depends on matter, and which cannot even be defined without matter. Other things, while not being able to exist except in sensible matter, do not include sensible matter in their definition… Lastly, there are things which do not depend on matter, whether in their being or in our manner of understanding them – either because they are never found in matter (like God and the other spiritual substances) or because they are not found in matter always (like substance, act and potency, and being itself). These realities constitute the subject matter of metaphysics. Mathematics deals with those realities that depend on matter as to their being but not as regards our manner of understanding them. Physics deals with realities that depend on matter both as regards their being and as regards our manner of understanding them.”[37]
The First Degree of Abstraction. As regards the first degree of abstraction (pertaining to the physical sciences) the intellect abstracts from matter so far as it is the principle of individuation, therefore, from individual matter (also called signate matter or materia signata). However, matter is still retained in so far as it is the basis of sensible qualities. It thus retains sensible or common matter (materia sensibilis vel communis). Regarding the first level of scientific knowledge which employs the first degree of abstraction, Koren writes: “On the first level, scientific knowledge ‘terminates in the senses,’ for ‘the properties and accidents of the thing which are shown by the senses sufficiently express the nature of the thing. In this case, the judgment of the intellect concerning the truth of the thing must be conformed to that which the senses reveal about the thing.’[38] The science which is concerned with this level of knowledge is called physical or ‘natural science, i.e., we judge of natural things according as they are revealed by sense experience…and whoever disregards sense experience with respect to the realm of nature falls into error.’[39] Hence the conclusions of physical sciences must always be open to verification by sense experience. From this it follows that physical sciences must retain something which is subject to sense experience; for otherwise no verification by means of the senses would be possible.
“It is clear, therefore, that scientific knowledge on this level may make abstraction only from so-called ‘individual matter,’ i.e., from the differences which distinguish this man from that man, this sample of sodium from that sample of sodium, etc.[40] But it must retain the common ‘sensible matter’ which enters into the definition of the things it considers. By sensible matter is meant matter ‘insofar as it is subject to sensible qualities, such as being hot or cold, hard or soft, and such like.’[41] Common sensible matter refers to those sensible qualities which are found in individuals insofar as they belong to a certain group or class. That common sensible matter is retained in physical science should be clear. For questions referring to such matter are meaningful in physical science. For instance, it makes sense to ask questions about the temperature, hardness, density, etc. of a physical object.
“Knowledge on this level is said to be on the first degree of abstraction. The intellect considers such things as water in general, man in general, plants in general, or a certain type of water, man or plant, etc., without being particularly interested in the individual as such. The object is always something which can neither exist nor be understood without sensible matter.[42] Experimental sciences, such as physics, chemistry, biology, experimental psychology, etc., belong to this level of scientific knowledge.[43]
The Second Degree of Abstraction. The second degree of abstraction proper to
mathematics abstracts from common sensible matter, but keeps under
consideration the material substance as quantified, which is called
intelligible matter (materia intelligibilis).[44]
“Intelligible” in this context refers not so much to the intellect as to the
imagination, so much so that one could speak here of “imaginable matter,” which
is matter as terminating in and known by the imagination, an internal sense
faculty, in contrast to matter as terminating in and known by the external
sense.[45]
Koren writes: “On the second level, scientific knowledge ‘terminates in
the imagination,’ for ‘when abstraction is made from the sensible conditions of
a thing, there still remains something imaginable; so that with respect to such
objects judgment must be made according to what the imagination shows.’[46]
This ‘something imaginable’ is quantity, i.e., extension and number, which are
abstracted from all sensible qualities. A simple consideration will make this
clear. If a man inquires about the temperature of a triangle or the softness of
number ten, the listener will conclude, no doubt, that the fellow must have
escaped from an asylum, because such questions do not make sense. The reason
why they are meaningless is precisely that quantity abstracts from all sensible
qualities. The study of mathematics belongs to this level of scientific
knowledge. ‘In mathematics the judgment of knowledge must be terminated in the
imagination and not in sense experience because a mathematical judgment exceeds
the apprehension of the senses.’[47]
The lines, figures, numbers, etc. considered in mathematics are not objects of
sense experience but exist only in our imagination, although it is true that
sense-perceptible representations of them on paper or a blackboard may be used
to aid our imagination. Hence verification by sense experience is not possible
with respect to mathematical objects.
“Scientific
knowledge on this level is said to be on the second degree of abstraction
from matter. It abstracts not only from individual matter, but also from common
sensible matter, and retains only quantity, which ‘can be understood in a
substance before there is understanding of the sensible qualities by which
matter is called sensible; hence according to its proper nature, quantity does
not depend upon sensible matter, but only upon intelligible matter.’[48]
By ‘intelligibile matter’ is meant ‘substance insofar as it is subject
to quantity.’[49]
Intelligible matter has to be retained because numbers, dimensions and figures
‘cannot be considered unless the substance which is their subject is
considered.’[50] The object
of scientific knowledge on this level ‘depends upon (sensible) matter
for its existence, but can be understood without it because sensible matter
does not enter into its definition.’[51]
All mathematical sciences belong to this level of scientific knowledge.[52]”[53]
The Third Degree of Abstraction (Properly Called Separation). Separation is the proper
level of abstraction in which metaphysics operates wherein metaphysical
concepts correspond to certain aspects of things understood without sensible
matter, and which are also encountered in beings without matter. Such
metaphysical notions (i.e., act, potency, substance, accidents, essence, act of
being) are intelligible aspects of beings that sometimes are in matter (for
example, a rock is composed of act and potency, substance and accidents, and
essence and act of being), but which can also exist separated from physical
matter (for example, an angel, also called the separated substance, which is
wholely without matter, has a composition of act and potency, substance and
accidents, and essence and act of being). Even if material beings exist, being
does not necessarily entail being in matter. Koren explains that “On the third
level, scientific knowledge ‘terminates in the intellect,’ for ‘there are
things which transcend both that which falls under the senses and that which
falls under the imagination’[54];
not that we obtain knowledge of these things independently from sense
experience and imagination, but rather that ‘the judgment of knowledge must not
be terminated in either imagination or sensation.’[55]
On this level, knowledge abstracts not only from all individual matter, as in
experimental sciences, and from common sensible matter, as in mathematics, but
from all matter. Thus we reach the highest or third degree of
abstraction from matter. Scientific knowledge on this level considers
‘either things which never exist in matter, such as God and angels, or things
which in some cases exist in matter but not in others, such as substance,
quality, potency and act, the one and the many, and things of this sort,’[56]
or in general ‘separate (i.e., immaterial) substances, and whatever is common
to all beings’[57] and
therefore most universal. In other words, the object of scientific knowledge
here is ‘wholly independent from matter, both as to its existence and as to
its understanding.’[58]
Science on this level is called metaphysics.”[59]
Even
though metaphysics operates at the highest degree of abstraction, this does not
mean that it is a science that has nothing to do with reality (as it would deal
only with abstractions, the metaphysician being lost in the ivory tower of his
immanent consciousness). In fact, metaphysics deals pre-eminently with the
real, and the metaphysician is, above all, a realist: “The word ‘separation’
must not,” says H. D. Gardeil, “lead us astray in another direction. When, in
other words, metaphysics is said to be the science of the ‘separate’ or, if one
prefers, of the ‘abstract,’ this does not imply that its object is divorced
from real existence but only from the material conditions of existence. It
could not be otherwise. Indeed, we shall see that the object of metaphysics is
eminently real and concrete; so that far from being out of touch with reality,
the metaphysician is in the full sense of the word more a realist than any of
his fellows in the fraternity of scholars and scientists. And this is true
whether he considers, under the aspect of being, the totality of things
material and immaterial or whether, sectoring his horizon, he fixes attention
on what is real above all because immaterial above all: pure spirits, that is,
and infinitely above them, God.”[60]
Separation
is an operation performed, not by the first operation of the mind (simple
apprehension), but by the second operation of the mind, that is, judgment;
it is a negative judgment wherein we discover being as being, the subject of
metaphysics. John Wippel explains that, for Aquinas, “separation is the process
through which one explicitly acknowledges and asserts that that by reason of
which something is recognized as being need not be identified with that by
reason of which it is recognized as enjoying a given kind of being, for
instance, material being, or changing being, or living being. It may be
described as a negative judgment in that through it one denies that that by
which something is recognized as being is to be identified with that by reason
of which it is a given kind of being. It may be described as separation because
through this judgment one distinguishes two intelligibilities, and denies that
one is to be identified with or reduced to the other. One distinguishes the
intelligibility involved in one’s understanding of being from all lesser and
more restricted intelligibilities. Thus one negates or eliminates restriction
of being to any given kind from one’s understanding of being. One judges that
being, in order to be realized as such, need not be material, or changing, or
quantified, or living, or for that matter, spiritual. Hence one establishes the
negatively or neutrally immaterial character of being, and prepares to focus on
being as such or as being rather than on being as restricted to this or that
given kind.
“Through
separation one does not deny that beings of this or that kind also fall under
being. On the contrary, by denying that being itself must be limited to any one
of its actual or possible kinds, one opens the way for considering these,
including the differences which are realized in each, within the realm of
being, and as being. Even purely material beings can be studied not only
insofar as they are material and changing as in physics, but simply insofar as
they share in being. This kind of study, of course, will not take place in
physics, but in metaphysics, the science of being as being.”[61]
The
Difficulty of Metaphysics
Precisely because it operates at the third level of abstraction, metaphysics is the most difficult to learn of all of the human sciences, that is, of all the sciences discoverable by the light of human reason alone. For this reason, one should undertake this noble science only after having studied, for example, logic, cosmology, and the philosophy of animate nature. Metaphysics is usually grasped when one has reached a certain level of dominion over the passions (which cloud the understanding), developed a good habit of intellectual contemplation, and attained a sufficient level of intellectual maturity. Consequently, most young people who study metaphysics in their youth have only a superficial knowledge of the principles of the science of being as being. Aquinas explains that “As far as wisdom is concerned, he (Aristotle) adds that young persons do not believe – that is, do not understand with their mind – the objects of wisdom or metaphysics, although they may speak them with their lips. But regarding mathematical entities, their essences are not hidden from them, because the definitions in mathematics concern things that are imaginable, whereas objects of metaphysics are purely intellectual. Now young people can easily grasp what falls under the imagination. But they cannot understand with their minds what transcends sense and imagination, because their intellects are not trained to such consideration owing to the shortness of their life and the many changes of their nature. Consequently, the fitting order of learning will be the following: first, boys should be instructed in logic, because logic teaches the method of the whole of philosophy. Second, they should be instructed in mathematics, which does not require experience and does not transcend the imagination. Third, they should learn the natural sciences, which although not transcending sense and imagination, nevertheless require experience. Fourth, they should be instructed in the moral sciences, which require experience and a soul free from passions. Fifth, they should learn metaphysics and divine science, which transcend the imagination and demand a robust intellect.”[62]
Metaphysics
as Wisdom
Metaphysics
is wisdom, theoretical or speculative wisdom. In his Metaphysics,
Aristotle explains that the truest characteristic of wisdom is that it is the science
of ultimate causes and first principles. Metaphysics, which the Stagirite calls
“First Philosophy,” studies the ultimate causes and first principles.
Therefore, metaphysics is wisdom, a purely human wisdom, wisdom gotten by the
light of natural reason alone.
Is
there a theoretical wisdom superior to metaphysics? Yes. Sacred Theology, the
theoretical wisdom par excellence. In the Summa Theologiae, the
Angelic Doctor writes that sacred theology is “wisdom above all human wisdom;
not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise
man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the
light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who
considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building he
who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to
the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: As a wise
architect I have laid the foundation.[63]
Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch
as he directs his acts to a fitting end: Wisdom is prudence to a man.[64]
Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,
namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the
knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says.[65]
But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause – not
only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him
– That which is known of God is manifest in them[66]
– but also so far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others.
Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.”[67]
Is
there a wisdom higher in the hierarchy of wisdoms than these two theoretical
wisdoms, namely, metaphysics and Sacred Theology? Yes. Infused wisdom (gift of
the Holy Spirit): “By infused wisdom the soul judges in the light of connatural
knowledge, connatural by grace with God’s knowledge; its foundation is the love
that is charity (in the gospel sense), and its object is God as He is in
Himself but attained through a suprahuman mode of acting, or rather of being
acted on.”[68] Maritain
explains that “theology is theoretical wisdom, par excellence the wisdom
which knows God by the intellect and its ideas, that is to say, by the normal
processes of human knowledge. There is another wisdom of a still higher order
which is a gift of the Holy Spirit, and enables us to know God experimentally
and by means of charity. It enables us to judge of divine things instinctively,
as the virtuous man judges of virtue (per modum inclinationis), not
scientifically as the moralist judges of virtue (per modum cognitionis).”[69]
Finally, is there a highest wisdom, a wisdom above all other wisdoms? Yes. God
who is Wisdom Himself.
It
belongs to the office of the lover of wisdom to know how to direct and order
things to their proper ends; aside from functioning as a negative rule with
respect to the particular or secondary sciences, rejecting as erroneous any
theory that contradicts its own principles (for example, a scientific theory
that maintains that only matter exists will be judged to be false by the
metaphysician), metaphysics has a regulative or directive function in relation
to these sciences. It governs the other sciences; the particular or secondary
sciences are indirectly subordinated to ontology or metaphysics. “Since the
laws of one science are subordinate to the laws of a superior science, it
clearly follows that it is the office of the superior science to govern the
inferior. But since the principles of philosophy (the first philosophy or
metaphysics) are the absolutely first principles of all human knowledge, they
possess an authority over the principles of all other human sciences, which are
in a certain sense dependent upon them. That is to say, philosophy (the first
philosophy or metaphysics) governs the other sciences.
“Since
the principles of philosophy (the first philosophy or metaphysics) are the
absolutely first principles of all human knowledge, the principles or
postulates of all human sciences are in a certain sense dependent upon them.
They do not, it is true, depend directly on the principles of metaphysics, as
the truth of a conclusion depends on the truth of its premises. They are
self-evident by the light of natural reason (principia per se nota). But
they are not absolutely speaking (simpliciter) first principles.
Therefore, although they carry conviction independently of metaphysics,
nevertheless they presuppose in fact the principles of metaphysics and can be
resolved into them. They can be known without an explicit knowledge of the
principles of metaphysics, but they could not be true, unless the latter were
true. And in this sense they are indirectly subordinate to the latter. For
instance, the mathematical axiom, two quantities which are equal to a third
quantity are equal to one another, can be resolved into the metaphysical
axiom of which it is a special case: two beings identical with a third are
identical with one another. It is for this reason that all the sciences are
said to be indirectly subordinate to metaphysics. Moreover, they are
obliged on occasion to employ the universally valid principles of metaphysics.
In this sense they are said to be subordinate to metaphysics in a particular
aspect or relatively (secundum quid).”[70]
Aside
from being able to order things to their ends, the lover of wisdom also has a
number of other characteristics, namely: “(1) he is one who knows all things at
least in broad outline, though he may not know all things in the individual
detail; (2) he is one who understands difficult things over and beyond the
ordinary understanding of men; (3) he is one who has greater certitude than
most men possess; (4) he is one who better understands the causes of things;
(5) he is one who is more educated in the liberal arts, because he prizes
knowledge as a goal in itself rather than as an instrument for something else;
(6) he is one who has greater dignity because he is able to direct others.
These are the characteristics that belong to the metaphysician and to the
science of metaphysics.”[71]
A Short
History of Metaphysics
While
the pre-Socratic philosophers (Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus) are
more properly called cosmologists (or philosophers of nature) rather than
metaphysicians, Parmenides (c. 540-470 B.C.) is said to be the first
metaphysician, since he placed being on center stage. After Parmenides being
lost its preeminence in philosophy, mainly because of the anthropocentric,
anti-metaphysical relativism of the Sophists. Socrates (470-399 B.C.) combatted
the Sophists and sophistry, affirming the existence of absolute truths and
moral values, but he was more interested in ethics or moral philosophy than in
theoretical metaphysical speculation. Being was to regain its preeminence with
the thought of Plato (427-347 B.C.), but Plato erred in his doctrine of Forms,
believing that the universal really existed in reality as universal (he was an
exaggerated realist or so-called ultra-realist, a position which tends to
identify logic and the mathematical method with metaphysics). Hence, though
metaphysics recovered its ground as the queen of the human sciences, Platonism
was a defective metaphysical system. Plato’s errors were to be corrected by the
moderate realism of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who was the first systematizer of
the science of metaphysics. It was he who defined metaphysics as the science of
being as being and described in great detail the principles of first
philosophy. The fourteen books of the Metaphysics is his master work on
the subject of metaphysics, a work which was to be commented upon by later
generations of philosophers like Avicenna, Averroes, and Aquinas. St. Thomas
Aquinas (1225-1274) adopted much of the metaphysical thought of Aristotle but
he went further and perfected it with his doctrine of transcendental
metaphysical participation and his elucidations on the central role of esse in
metaphysics, the act of being as act of acts and perfection of perfections;
whereas Aristotle stressed the primacy of the form, Aquinas stressed the
ultimate metaphysical foundation of all things in the act of being (esse).
With the nominalism of William of Ockham (c. 1290-1349), and his negation of
abstraction, the science of metaphysics begins its gradual decline towards
skepticism. An attempt to resurrect the science was made by the Jesuit
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), whose work, the Metaphysical Disputations,
had a great influence in universities and seminaries throughout Europe. Nevertheless,
Suarezian metaphysics is, in a certain sense, a return to the essentialism of
the ancients. He also committed the error of denying the real distinction
between essence and act of being, a central doctrine of authentic realist
metaphysics, which would contribute to the growth of rationalist, and even
pantheist, metaphysical systems after his death.
With
the advent of Rene Descartes (1596-1650), metaphysics begins its steep decline;
Cartesian rationalist philosophy basically substitutes metaphysics for its own
deductive mathematical method, that is, the mathematical method basically becomes
first philosophy. This corruption of metaphysics, which should be realist and
operate at the third degree of abstraction, has its roots in immanentism, which
makes thought prior to being. It maintains that what is known in the first
instance can only be that which is within human consciousness (i.e., ideas,
sensations), which is different from realism, which holds that the object which
is known in the first instance is the transsubjective thing in reality. Once
the cogito starting point of Cartesian rationalism is accepted and
immanentism upheld, gnoseological, and then ontological, transcendence is
eliminated, and what one ends up with is merely a thought-of reality. In short,
immanentism traps one within the subjective prison of the mind. The history of
modern philosophy from Cartesian rationalism onwards is a sad testament to this
voluntary imprisonment.
Immanentism
is really the great adversary of metaphysics, as is manifested, for example, in
the immanentist systems of Humean phenomenalism and Kantian transcendental
idealism, both of which asserting a noumenal agnosticism. At the end of his Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, the radical empiricist David Hume
(1711-1776) dismisses metaphysics altogether as sophistry and illusion, the
unhappy result of his reduction of knowledge to mere sense knowledge,
eliminating the intellectual, abstractive knowing essential to the science of ens
qua ens. The transcendental idealism of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) “was
intended as an attempt to pass beyond empiricism and ‘dogmatic’ rationalism by
the critical method, which was meant to reveal the conditions of possibility of
an authentic scientific knowledge. This ended, however, in a theory of
knowledge which tried to go beyond empiricism by a subjective idealism
and rejected the possibility of metaphysics as science. To use understanding
metempirically, that is, to exercise intelligence beyond the field of
phenomenological data, in that of pure ideas, offered no guarantee against
“transcendental illusion.” Kant, then professed a metaphysical agnosticism…”[72]
Nineteenth
century pantheistic (and crypto-atheistic) absolute idealism (Fiche, Schelling,
Hegel) discarded the thing-in-itself and made mind the positer and creator of
its own object. There is an identification of metaphysics and logic,
notoriously represented in the panlogicism of Hegel. In the monistic idealism
of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), “the abolute Self or absolute Subject
becomes conscious of itself in setting up the Non-Self, to which it is opposed
as to its proper limitation, and beyond which it unceasingly tends to go in
virtue of its own essential dynamism. The Non-Self has no subsistence in its
own right. It is in and for the Self, with nothing to do save provide the Self
with an obstacle to overcome.”[73]
The aesthetic absolute idealism of Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854)
“sought out to complete and correct the work of Fichte, but modified his own
system more than once, leaving it incomplete. From the earliest phase of his
thought he emphasized the Non-Self and professed an objective idealism,
which he contrasted with the subjective idealism of Fichte. Later he put at the
origin of all things an Absolute from which Nature and Spirit, the world of
matter and that of consciousness, emanate in parallel.”[74]
For the most famous and influential of all the absolute idealists, namely,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), “being and thought are identical and
the law of reality is the law of the mind (panlogism). The law which
orders the evolution of mind is the dialectic of thesis, antithesis, synthesis.
The measure in which thought advances is thus the measure in which reality
develops. Pure Idea comes to be in two parallel orders, that of Nature (Idea
alienated in unconsciousness) and that of Mind (Idea integrated into
consciousness). In Mind, or Spirit, itself, subjective Spirit (freedom in
essence) and objective Spirit (freedom expressed in law, morality, etc.) can be
distinguished. The synthesis of subjective and objective Spirit is absolute
spirit, expressed in art, religion and philosophy.”[75]
Nineteenth
century Positivism dismissed metaphysics as illusory and detrimental to the
advancement of the positive sciences (e.g., Comte’s three stages), while
twentieth century Neo-Positivism or logical positivism, with its principle
of verification (which maintains that all meaningful propositions should be
verifiable, either directly or indirectly, by sense experience), likewise
dismisses all metaphysical enunciations as meaningless. Logical positivism
castigates metaphysics as “nonsense because its sentences ‘fail to conform to
the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant,’[76]
namely, sensible verification. Its statements belonged to the category neither
of the true nor of the false, but of the meaningless. Linguistic analysis
distinguished it sharply from science, regarding it either as a diseased
intellectual condition to be cured by the therapy of the linguistic analyst, or
as a group of problems that inevitably arise from the use of natural language
and that are to be solved by linguistic elucidation.”[77]
The logical positivists dismissed metaphysics as “an emotional outpouring that
should use poetry as its medium, but instead used didactic language in an
affort to represent itself as objective truth.”[78]
The
problem, of course, with the Neo-positivist or logical positivist principle of
verification is that the principle itself is unverifiable in sense
experience, it being a metaphysical principle grasped not by the senses but is
given in intellectual knowledge, something which the philosophers inspired
by empiricist phenomenalism deny, since, for them, knowing is reduced to sense
knowing. If immanentist phenomenalism reigns, metaphysics as a science is
destroyed, for being qua being, substance as substance, and the
principle of causality, are all grasped by the intellect and not understood by
the senses. Thus, there is an urgent a need for a return to a methodical
philosophical realism that makes being prior to thought, is respectful
of both gnoseological and ontological transcendence, and does not subordinate
metaphysics to any one of the merely particular human sciences discoverable by
the lumen of reason alone.
PART ONE: THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF BEING
Being (Ens)
Being
(ens) is that which is. It is that which has the act of being
(esse). The notion of being (ens)
implies a composition of a subject (that “something” which is and is the real subject to which the act of being belongs), and
an act (the very act of being of that “something”).[79]
Every finite being (ens) has a real distinction between essence (essentia)
and act of being (esse).[80]
With God, the Infinite Being, on the other hand, essentia and esse are
identified. God’s Essence is To Be. Essence is that which makes a thing to
be what it is, while act of being (esse) is that which makes a
thing to be. We will take up a more detailed study of these two
metaphysical principles of being, essence and act of being, later on in
separate chapters.
Being
cannot be strictly defined. The reason for this is that a strict definition
consists of the genus of a thing and a specific difference which is not
actually contained in the genus. The strict definition of man, for example,
would be “rational animal” (this is his metaphysical essence, in contrast to
his physical essence which is “hylemorphic composite of body and soul”)
“Rational” would be his specific difference and “animal” would be his genus.
Being, however, is not contained in a genus for whatever would be named as a
genus would fall under “being” and thus could not possibly be its genus. Bittle
explains that “‘being’ admits of no strict philosophic definition. Such a
definition would demand a proximate genus and a specific difference. The
proximate ‘genus’ includes within its comprehension all the essential elements
of the genera above it and therefore includes all the beings that are cognate
or similar in nature to the thing which is to be defined. The ‘specific
difference,’ on the other hand, brings in the distinctive element which
separates this thing from all others of a similar nature, by showing in what
manner it is different from all others with which it might be erroneously
identified.
“Take
as example ‘man.’ Man is defined as a ‘rational animal’; ‘animal’ is his
proximate genus, ‘rational’ is his specific difference. The proximate genus
‘animal’ includes within its comprehension all the essential elements of the
genera above it, because an ‘animal’ is a ‘sentient, living, corporeal
substance’; and this shows all the beings which are in some way similar to man
– brutes, plants, inanimate bodies, substances. The specific difference
‘rational’ is the one distinctive essential element which distinguishes ‘man’
from every other ‘animal’; it thereby makes him a species of his own and
separates him from every other ‘animal’ and also from every other genus or
species, including plants and inanimate bodies.
“It
will be noted that the generic idea must always be wider in extension
than the idea to be defined; and the idea expressed by the specific difference
must always be something not already contained in, but extraneous to,
the generic idea. A definition, therefore, if it is to be a real and strict
one, must be made up of two objectively different ideas – one wider and one
narrower than the thing to be defined, so that the combination of both gives
the exact designation of the thing. This, however, can never be the case in a
definition of ‘being.’ ‘Being’ is the supreme idea, the widest and simplest and
most indeterminate which the mind possesses; there can be no wider idea than
‘being.’ Consequently, the mind can find no idea which could, in any strict
sense of the term, serve as a true genus for ‘being.’ The most we can attempt,
then, is a descriptive definition, and even that will not elucidate the
idea, since none of the ideas which could be employed will be clearer and
simpler than ‘being’ itself. As was pointed out above, ‘being’ is the first
idea in the logical order, and no other idea is intelligible without a previous
understanding of the idea of ‘being.’”[81]
Being
cannot be strictly defined for in order to define being one would need a more
general concept within which being can be included. But no such concept exists
since being encompasses the whole of reality. So, instead of a strict
definition of being we can give various descriptions of being as “that which
is” (ens est id quod est), “that something which is,” “that thing which
exists.”
Being
is not a genus for a genus is contracted to a certain species by the addition
of differences which are not actually contained within the genus. Now, as being
actually contains all the differences of its inferiors it follows that it
cannot be in any way a genus. “A genus is a notion which is applied equally and
indeterminately to various things because it signifies only the characteristics
which are common to them all and leaves out the features which differentiate
them. The notion ‘animal,’ for instance, is a generic notion which is
indistinctly applied to all beings which have sensitive life (e.g., man, horse,
dog). In order to pass from a generic notion, such as ‘animal,’ to a more
particular notion, such as ‘man,’ we need to add to the former new
differentiating aspects which are not contained in the genus, namely, the
differences which we left out in order to form the generic notion (e.g.
‘rational’ or other distinctive properties of the various species of animals). The
notion of being is not a genus, since no differentiating elements can be added
to it, which would not already be contained in it. The notion of animal
does not include the differences which distinguish one animal from another. The
notion ens, however, indicates not only what things have in common, but
also their differentiating aspects; the latter (the differentiating aspects)
also are, and are therefore included in the notion of ens.”[82]
Common
sense tells us that a real being (ens reale) is a being that
really exists in transsubjective reality (i.e., the tall oak tree that exists
out there in reality, that real dog that is barking in front of me). The tree
that we are looking at, a real being that exists apart from us, has its own act
of being (esse) that makes that tree to be. Now, when I know that
tree and form a concept of “tree” in my mind, abstracting the universal essence
from the individual concrete thing existing in reality, the mind leaves aside
the act of being (esse), that is, it does not take in the esse of
the tree that exists in reality. Therefore, when the intellect apprehends the
concept of a certain thing, it is not entitled to affirm its existence (one
would have to experience that thing in reality or find some evidence of its
existence). Existence is never deducible from a mere definition of something.
A possible
being is a being that does not actually exist but is capable of existing.
Thus, a possible being, as such, exists in the order of thought and not in the
order of reality.
Being of Reason (Ens Rationis)
Strictly
speaking, an ens rationis or being of reason[83]
is to be understood as that which exists in thought but is incapable of
existing as such in the real order. A fictitious character that my imagination
conjures up is an example of a being of reason. The logical entities studied in
logic such as genus and species are also examples of beings of reason. Owens
explains that beings of reason are “produced only in human reason. Human reason
is able to combine notions each taken separately from reality, even though
their combination in a real thing is impossible. A square circle, for example,
cannot exist in reality. It is a combination of two notions, each taken from
the shapes of real sensible things, but each of which negates the other. If a
thing is circular, it is not square, and vice versa. The combination can exist
only when human reason joins the two concepts in a way that is extrinsic to and
contrary to their own natures. A centaur, likewise, is half man and half horse.
It implies a nature that is simultaneously rational and non-rational. Either feature
negates the other. Similarly, express negations like nothingness have no
being in reality, yet they are given being in human thought when they are
considered and discussed. Privations also, like blindness, when taken in
themselves, and certain relations like identity, can have being only in human
reason. They are not things that can exist as such in the real world. They are
beings, but only beings of reason. In that sense they may legitimately be
called things, even though they cannot exist in reality. Accordingly,
nothingness, or a square circle, is something that can be reasoned about
and discussed.”[84]
Even
though these beings of reason exist only in the mind, they are not nothing;
they have a certain actuality which consists in their being thought of by the
mind. Now, an ens rationis can either be a first intention being
of reason (either a negative being of reason or a positive being of reason,
also called a ‘relation of reason’) or a second intention being of
reason (a type of relation of reason), which is the object of the science of
logic. Sanguineti explains that “some beings of reason are conceived by the
mind when it understands reality directly. When I see the perfection of
eyesight in a subject, for example, I also understand the nature of the
privation of that perfection (blindness). Similarly, when I understand what
‘being’ means, I understand its negation (‘non being’). These beings of reason
are called ‘first intention’ beings of reason since they are born of the first
movement or intention of the mind when it knows reality. They include privations
(blindness), negations (non-being) and many kinds of relations of
reason (e.g., the relation between the left and the right side of a column,
the relation of self-identity). Some of them, like the irrational numbers in
mathematics, form part of the subject matter of scientific study.
“There
is another kind of being of reason, conceived when the mind, in a second
movement or intention, looks at its own ideas in order to study their different
properties. These beings of reason (called ‘second intentions’ because they are
the result of logical reflection) are the logical properties which
constitute the object of the science of logic. Such are, for instance, the
universals and the syllogisms. It is important to note that beings of reason
always have some proximate or remote foundation in reality.”[85]
Elucidating
upon first intention beings of reason (negative and positive) and second
intention beings of reason (the object of logic), Henri Renard writes: “A being
of reason can be considered as something positive or negative. If negative, it
is either called a ‘negation’ or ‘privation.’ A ‘negation’ is the denial of a
perfection in a being whose nature has no aptitude or need for such a
perfection. The fact, for instance, that a man has no wings, is a mere
negation. A ‘privation’ indicates a little more: it is the lack of a perfection
for which the subject has real capacity (potency), perhaps a real need, as, for
example, blindness in a man is lack of sight for which man has a real capacity.
“If,
however, ‘being of reason’ is considered as something positive, it is called a
‘relation of reason’; for only a ‘relation,’ as we shall see later, can
indicate something positive even when that something has no objective reality.
And the reason is that the essence of a ‘relation’ is ‘order to’ (esse ad);
and this ‘order to’ must be considered by the mind as something positive, even
when it is not something outside the mind. ‘We may consider,’ explains the
Angelic Doctor, ‘that in relations alone is found something which is only in
the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus;
forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper
meaning signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper
meaning signifies only what refers to another.’[86]
There are, however, two kinds of relations of reason. For instance, we may
speak of the right and left of a column. Now this is undoubtedly only a
relation of reason, for the column has neither right nor left, but we conceive
an ‘order to,’ a relation, in reference to the position of one facing the
column.
“Such
concepts are evidently not erroneous, since we can find a foundation for them
in the object. In the first place, it is clear that the reality of the object
which lacks a perfection, whether that perfection be due or not, is a
sufficient foundation for my concept of ‘privation’ or ‘negation.’ The reason
for a ‘relation of reason,’ however, is a more subtle one. It is found
primarily in the weakness of the human intellect, which, in its effort to
understand ‘being’ in all its various aspects, needs to establish diverse
‘orders to’ and the relations of reason in order to acquire a more complete
knowledge of the object.
“Besides
these relations just mentioned, there is another sort of relation of reason
which is the object of logic. It is generally called ‘second intention.’ The
second intention is a certain relation which the mind places between natures
which have been conceived, and in so far as they are understood, that is, in so
far as they are in the mind. In other words, the relation is not understood to
be between the concept and the object (res naturae), but between two or
more concepts of natures. For example, the nature of animal as
conceived is understood to be related as a genus to the nature of man and
beast as conceived. These relations are ‘beings of reason’ in the
strictest sense. The words of St. Thomas are extremely helpful to an
understanding of this difficult relation: ‘Being of reason is properly said of
those intentions, which the mind finds in the natures it has considered,
as, for instance the intention of genus, species, and the like, which are not
found in the things of nature but follow the consideration of reason. And such
a being of reason is properly the subject of logic.’[87]”[88]
Intentional being (or cognitional being), is any object in so far as it is known,
consisting in the presence to awareness which an object has in the mind when
known. This intentional or cognitional being is either sensible or
intellectual. The sense image that I have of my dog Snoopy, for example, is an
intentional being, and so is the intellectual idea of “dog” that I have in my
mind.
Analogy
Equivocal Terms. Equivocal terms are terms used with entirely different meanings. In
univocal terms the same term, in at least two occurences of the term, has
meanings completely different from one another. Examples of equivocal terms: 1.
“Pen” as in the writing instrument, and “pen” as in pig pen which houses
animals ; 2. “Bill” as in a piece of paper from a company showing what you owe,
and “bill” as in the parts of a bird’s jaws ; and 3. “Seal” an emblem or figure
used as evidence of authenticity, and “seal” the sea mammal that feeds on fish
and has limbs reduced to flippers. The Angelic Doctor writes: “In the case of
equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely
different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog (canis),
inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species
of animal.”[89]
Univocal Terms. A term is univocal if it signifies exactly the same concept, or
essence, in (at least) two occurrences of the term. Univocal terms have one and
only one meaning. They are constantly used in an identical sense. For example,
when I say “A dog is an animal,” and “A cat is an animal,” “animal” in both
propositions is univocal. Aquinas writes: “In the case of univocity one term is
predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for
example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox,
signifies a living, sensory substance.”[90]
Analogical Terms. Terms are analogical[91]
when the term, in at least two occurences of the term, has several meanings
which are partly the same and partly different. Analogical concepts are
predicated of their subjects in a way that is partly the same and partly
different. Analogical terms share in the same perfection but have a diversity
in the manner of possessing that perfection. For example, there is a difference
between a good rock, a social good, and a good person. The metaphysical
foundation of analogy lies in the different ways various subjects possess the
same perfections. Different manners of being results in different manners of
signifying. Now, an analogical term may be based either on the analogy of
proportionality or on the analogy of attribution (of which there are
two types, namely, the analogy of extrinsic attribution and the analogy
of intrinsic attribution).[92]
Analogy of Proportionality. In the analogy of proportionality, the analogous
term is applied to unlike things because of some proportion or resemblance
existing between them. A concept is predicated with the analogy of
proportionality when several subjects possess a common perfection in ways that
are not exactly but only proportionately the same. There can be an analogy of
proportionality in the mathematical order, for example, with the proportion
between quantities such as the double proportion obtaining in 2:1, 4:2, 8:4 and
so on. These ratios are proportionately equal so we are able to say that 2:1
equals 4:2 equals 8:4. Though it is true that four is not equal to eight,
nevertheless, the relation 4:2 is identical with the relation 8:4. Such an
equality is termed a proportional equality. We also see the analogy of
proportionality working in other fields such as that of philosophy. We can say,
through a similarity of relations, that matter is to form as potency is to act.
In
the analogy of (proper) proportionality “the nature signified by the concept is
formally and intrinsically realized in each of the analogates
according to a proportional similarity. Let us explain this definition: In the
first place, the nature signified by the concept is intrinsically realized in
each of the analogates. An example to the point would be the concept of life as
predicated of plants, animals, man and pure spirits. Obviously, the life of
plants, animals, man, and pure spirits is very different; yet the perfection
signified by the concept of life is found in each of them.
“In the second place, the nature signified by the concept is formally realized in each of the analogates. This feature distinguishes analogy of proportionality from metaphorical analogy, in which only one of the analogates realizes this nature formally. Life, for instance, is found in plants, animals, and man in a formal sense, and not merely as a figure of speech.
“In the third place, the nature must be realized in the analogates according to a proportional similarity. This characteristic distinguishes analogy of proportionality from univocity. A nature can be realized formally and intrinsically either in exactly the same manner or according to a proportional similarity. If it is realized in exactly the same manner, the concept cannot be analogous, but is univocal because it does not vary. But a perfection can be realized also according to a proportional similarity. By this term we mean that in each of the analogates there exists a proportion or relation between two perfections or notes, and that these proportions or relations are similar. Hence it is no longer a question of one analogate being related to another, as is the case in analogy of attribution, but of a relation in one analogate being similar to a relation or proportion in another analogate. When, for instance, we predicate the term ‘living’ of plants, animals, and men, we do not consider the relations which these forms of life have to one another, but the fact that man’s nature is proportioned to the human mode of life as an animal’s nature is proportioned to a sentient mode of life, and the nature of a plant is proportioned to a vegetative mode of life. Thus in each of the analogates the concept of life is realized formally and intrinsically, but the content of this concept varies according to the subject under consideration.
“It should be clear that such an analogy is possible only in concepts which express a nature indeterminately, in such a way that the concept can be determined from within.[93] This determination takes place when the concept is predicated of one of the analogates. The concept ‘living,’ for example, implies a nature which is proportioned to self-movement, but it does not determine the kind of self-movement. But as soon as we predicate this concept of particular living things, we are referring to a definite type of self-movement, so that our concept undergoes a determination which makes it unsuitable for predication of another type of self-movement without being readjusted.”[94]
Metaphors
are a type of analogy of proportionality (albeit improper). We say that hikers
begin their adventure at “the foot” of the mountain, “foot” because of its
resemblance to the position of the foot with regard to the human body. Graphic
comparisons and parables also employ the analogy of improper proportionality.
Metaphorical
analogy is called an analogy of improper proportionality wherein “the
nature signified by the term is realized formally and intrinsically
in one of the analogates, and in the other or others intrinsically and
virtually, i.e., only with respect to a secondary characteristic, such as
the activity, proper to this nature. Take for example, the term ‘lion.’ The
nature signified by this term is realized formally and intrinsically only in
the animal which we call a lion. We cannot call a man a lion in the formal
sense, for a lion is essentially irrational, whereas man is essentially
rational. However, it is proper to the nature of a lion to act courageously in
the face of danger, or at least we consider this to be so. Hence we may fix our
attention upon this secondary aspect of the nature of a lion and predicate the
term ‘lion’ of a man who is courageous. In doing so we merely want to convey
the idea that in the face of danger this man acts in the same way as a lion is
supposed to act. Hence we say that he is a lion because of his resemblance to a
lion in the order of activity. As far as the predication of the term ‘lion’ is
concerned, it is clear that only a certain type of brute animal formally and
intrinsically realizes the nature expressed by this term. Hence in predicating
‘lion’ of a man we have to keep in mind the subject of our predication and to
make an adjustment in the predicate. Again, however, this adjustment is rather
in the term than in the concept; for the nature signified by the term is
realized formally and intrinsically only in the animal. Nevetheless, pure
equivocation is avoided because we see a basis for predicating the same term of
both animal and man. This basis lies in a similarity of both subjects in a
secondary aspect of the nature ‘lion,’ namely, in the order of activity. It
should be clear that it is impossible to define ‘lion’ as predicated of a man
without the primary analogate (the brute animal) being taken into
consideration. For the reason of the predication is precisely some aspect
flowing from the nature of the primary analogate.”[95]
Analogy of Attribution. In the analogy of attribution the analogous term
is applied in an absolute sense to one thing and is then attributed to other
things because of an intrinsic relation which they have towards the first.
While analogy of proportionality merely compares different proportions, the
analogy of attribution goes further, pointing to one of the terms of comparison
as the principle of the rest. A perfection is predicated with the analogy of
attribution if, among several subjects of a common perfection, there is one
which possesses the perfection in all its fullness, while the rest possess it
in derived manner or by what is called participation. In the analogy of
attribution there is always a central and primary meaning by which the rest
depend, and the analogical term is predicated beforehand of the subject (called
the principal analogate[96])
of the principal meaning. With regard to the other subjects, called the
secondary analogates, the analogical concept is predicated only posteriorly.
The analogy of attribution involves the predication of a concept or term
primarily to the principal analogate, and its posterior attribution to the
other subjects by derivation. Now, the analogy of attribution can either be
extrinsic or intrinsic.
Extrinsic Analogy of Attribution. In this type of analogy of attribution only the
principal analogate properly and formally possesses the analogical perfection;
the secondary analogates possess it only in an extrinsic and improper manner.
Take, for example, the term “health.” Medicine is deemed “healthy” because it
restores health. Climate is termed “healthy” because it is conducive to health.
Food is termed “healthy” because it sustains health. Exercise is termed
“healthy” because it promotes health, and complexion is said to be “healthy”
because it indicates a healthy constitution. Medicine, climate, food, exercise,
and complexion are said to be healthy only in an improper sense for they are
the external causes of a healthy body.
Intrinsic Analogy of Attribution. This type of analogy is the most important as it
is of capital importance in describing the relation between God and His
creatures. In the intrinsic analogy of attribution the analogical concept is
properly predicated not only of the principal analogate but also of the
secondary analogates because the former really is the cause of the perfection
of the latter. For example, we say that creatures “are” and God “Is” ; being is
said principally of God, the Supreme Being, for His Being is His Essence.
However, being is properly predicated of created beings inasmuch as they
received their being from the Supreme Being. Creatures “have” being by
participation, while God “Is” being. The fundamental basis of the intrinsic
analogy of attribution is the relations of causality among beings. It is based
on the imperfect similarity or likeness of the effect to its cause. Sanguineti
gives us some observations regarding this point: “a) Since one cannot give what
one does not have, at least some perfections of the efficient cause will
necessarily be reflected in its proper effects. The efficient cause is,
therefore, also an exemplary cause of its proper effects. It follows that by
studying the latter, we can, using the analogy of attribution, arrive at some
knowledge of the former. It is in this way that we arrive at an analogical
knowledge of the nature of God on the basis of the manifold perfections we find
in creatures; b) Consequently, analogy of attribution implies both similarity
and dissimilarity. The analogical concept is predicated per prius
of the cause, and per posterius of the effects. It is partly attributed
to the effects inasmuch as they are similar to the cause ; but it is partly not
attributed to them since they are also unlike the cause. Hence, the universe
is, at one and the same time, like God and unlike Him; c) The foundation of the
analogy of attribution is not an abstract idea but a real cause, the cause of
the participated likenesses of the perfection in the secondary analogates. For
example, if being is common to God and the world, it is not because the
abstract notion of being is found in both of them, but because the being of
the world points to the Being of God as its principle and cause. It
would be an error to establish the foundation of this analogical community of
being on the most abstract concept of being-in-general (esse comune),
which is necessarily univocal; d) The ontological priority of the principal
analogate does not always mean gnoseological priority, for sometimes it is only
through their effects that we acquire a knowledge of the causes. This is the
case with our knowledge of God, the principal analogate of being. Though first
in the ontological order, God comes after creatures in the noetical order since
it is the latter that we first know and apply names to. In the order of
knowledge, therefore, the meaning of our notions of being, goodness
and truth applies primarily to creatures.”[97]
When
we say that “God is Being” and that “man is a being”, being
here is predicated of their subjects analogically. Not equivocally as
many of the nominalists and atomistic empiricists maintain. Nor univocally as
Parmenides held, for “if being were to be understood in a univocal
manner, then all reality would be deemed to be in the same manner, which
would ultimately lead to monism. Everything would be seen as identically one,
and therefore, there would be no difference between God and creatures
(pantheism). Taking into account the analogical notion of being, however,
we can speak about God and creatures as beings, maintaining at the same time
the infinite distance between them. By way of analogy, created being
leads us to the knowledge of the divine being and its perfections. That
is why this question is of utmost importance for metaphysics and theology.”[98]
To sum up, we say that being is analogical by an analogy of proper
proportionality and an analogy of intrinsic attribution.
CHAPTER 2
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CONTRADICTION
The First of All Principles
A
principle is that from which something else proceeds.[99]
Now, the first of all principles is the principle of non-contradiction.[100]
All other principles are founded upon this first of principles. St. Thomas
writes that “what falls first under our apprehension is being, the
understanding of which is included in anything whatsoever that a person may
apprehend. And therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that there is no
affirming or denying at the same time, which (principle) is founded on the
notion of being and non-being; and on this principle all others are founded.”[101]
Though
the first metaphysician Parmenides of Elea (c. 520-440 B.C.) gave what was to
be the first formulation of the principle of non-contradiction, he understood
this principle in such a rigid way so as to exclude all relative non-being,
ending up in a univocal monism. It was to be the greatest of the ancient
philosophers, Aristotle of Stagira (also known as “the Stagirite”), who gave
the world the first adequate formulation of this principle.
Koren
explains that the principle of non-contradiction is the first of all principles
for: 1. it flows immediately from the notion of being; and 2. it is the
foundation of all the other principles: “With regard to the first point, it is
clear that the first principle will have to express a relationship of the
concept of being to another concept. For by its very nature a complex principle
must be concerned with the relationship of two concepts. Now from the concept
of being the intellect derives immediately the concept of non-being as its
contradictory. Upon apprehending these concepts the intellect sees at once that
one is not the other, that being is not non-being. Hence the principle of
non-contradiction flows immediately from the concept of being.
“The
second point, that the principle of non-contradiction is the foundation of all
other principles, follows from the first. For if the principle of
non-contradiction flows immediately from the first concept, it is clear that no
other principle is prior to it. Moreover, any other principle either
presupposes the principle of non-contradiction or is merely a different formula
of the same.”[102]
As
being is the first notion that our intelligence grasps, and which is implied in
any consequent notion, there is also an intellectual judgment (the second
operation of the mind) that comes naturally first and which is presupposed by
all other consequent judgments: “It is impossible to be and not be at the
same time and in the same respect.” This first judgment is called the
principle of non-contradiction for it expresses the most basic condition of
things, that is, that they cannot be self-contradictory. Such a principle is
founded upon being and expresses the consistency of being and its opposition to
non-being. There is a radical incompatibility between being and non-being, for
the act of being (esse), act of acts and perfection of perfections,
confers upon being (ens) a real perfection that is absolutely opposed to
the privation of that perfection.
Why
do we say “at the same time” in our formulation of the first principle? Because
it is not at all contradictory, for example, for the leaves of a tree to be
green in one season and yellow in the next. Therefore, we should say: “The
leaves of the tree are green today, in this fifth day of the month of June.”
Why “in the same respect” in our formulation? Because it is not at all
contradictory, for example, for a student to be learned in algebra and ignorant
in English literature. If we affirm that the student is learned, we must
specify what particular area he is learned in.
There
are different ways of expressing this first principle. It is above all a
judgment that concerns reality itself; it regards what is. Hence, the more
profound formulations of the principle of non-contradiction are metaphysical in
nature. For example, the Stagirite states in the fourth book of his Metaphysics
that “it is impossible for one and the same thing to be and not to be,”[103]
and further on, that “it is impossible for a thing to be and at the same
time not to be.”[104]
The
principle of non-contradiction is the supreme law of reality (the order of
being or the ontological order) and not just a simple postulate or axiom of our
mind. But, since the mind of man is geared to know reality as such, it is, in a
derivative way, the first and supreme law of logic. Violate this supreme law
and one collapses into a state of mental anarchy. Since the first principle of
reality is also the first principle of thought we are able to say that “we
cannot both affirm and deny something of the same subject at the same time and
in the same sense” as well as to say that “contradictory propositions about the
same subject cannot be simultaneously true.” The human mind is subject to the
principle of non-contradiction: it cannot know being as
self-contradictory precisely because being cannot be self-contradictory.
If our mind attempts to deny this principle our reasoning falls into
absurdities.
The
Objective Validity of the Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Order of Being
and Its Denial by the Philosophers of Contradiction
A
number of Ancient Greek philosophers have denied the principle of
non-contradiction, such as Heraclitus of Ephesus (550-480 B.C.), the Sophist
Gorgias (c. 483-375 B.C.), and the Skeptic Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-270 B.C.).
Heraclitus maintains that all is change and flux (panta rei), that there
are no stable natures in things. The nihilist Gorgias, the most radical of the
Sophists, presents the following three theses: “First: nothing exists. Second:
if anything existed, it cannot be known by man. Third: if it can be known, it
cannot be transmitted and explained to others.”[105]
Pyrrho skeptically maintains that one cannot know anything whatsoever about
reality, and therefore has recourse to an absolute silence, abstaining from all
judgments so as to achieve a perfect indifference to all things (ataraxia).
The
principle of non-contradiction is not just an internal, subjective, law of
logic but is based on reality itself. The German transcendental idealist
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) taught that the first axiom principle of
non-contradiction was at the foundation of all analytic judgments, and that
this principle was itself an a priori analytic judgment that has nothing
to do with synthetic judgments that are formed on the basis of experience.
Consequently, he mistakenly held, against the realist position, that the
principle of non-contradiction was valid only in the logical sphere, not in
reality; it would only be a negative logical condition for correct thinking.[106]
The transcendental “Thomist” Joseph Maréchal, S.J. (1878-1944) not only
corrupted realism, adopting the Cartesian point of departure, but, following
Kant, taught that the principle of non-contradiction was but the subject’s
expression of a subjective necessity. The prolific author Karl Rahner, S.J.
(1904-1984), a disciple of Kantian and Heideggerian thought and Marechal’s
“transcendental Thomism,” also held that that the principle of
non-contradiction was to be found only in the subjective order of our minds and
not in the objective order of reality.[107]
Henri
Bergson’s (1859-1941) vitalist evolutionism also erroneously denies the
objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction in the name of becoming.
For him, there are no concrete individual things but rather actions, real being
defined as not that which is, that which exists, but rather that
which becomes and continuously is in flux. He writes: “There are no
things, there are only acts; things and states are merely modes of thinking,
which our mind derives from the idea of becoming.”[108]
Consequently, there can be no real distinction between “a glass of water,
water, sugar, and the process by which sugar is dissolved in water.”[109]
Such reasoning is tantamount to affirming that a dog is a dog and no dog at all
since it is in constant flux and therefore has no proper nature. Everything
would be in everything. Edouard Le Roy (1870-1954), a follower of Bergson,
likewise denied the objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction in
the name of becoming: “the principle of non-contradiction is not as universal
and necessary as has been believed; its application is limited; it is
restricted and circumscribed in meaning. Being the supreme law of speech, but
not of thought in general, its influence extends merely to what is static,
morcellated, immobile, in a word, to the things endowed with identity.
But just as there is identity in the world, so also there is contradiction. Such
are those fugitive fluxes, as becoming, duration, life, which of themselves are
not of the rational order, and which speech transforms so as to incorporate
them into contradictory schemata.[110]
For Le Roy, our mind merely objectivates the universal becoming that is reality
for the needs of speech and for the practical needs of everyday life; in such a
way does the mind pretend to submit all that is real to the principle of
non-contradiction. The consequences of this type of reasoning, this manner of
violation of the principle of non-contradiction, particularly in the field of
morality, is disastrous. Morality becomes immorality for there is no more a
distinction between objective good and evil than there is a distinction between
being and non-being. Jean Weber, himself of the Bergsonian school, gives us the
moral consequences of accepting the views of Bergson and Le Roy: “Morality, in
planting itself on a terrain from which invention grows in all its vigour,
immediately and full of life; in manifesting itself as the most insolent
encroachment of the realm of the intellect upon spontaneity, was fated to
encounter the continual contradictions of that undeniable reality of dynamism
and creation which is our activity…Confronted with these morals of ideas, we
outline morality, or, more correctly, the unmorality of the act…We call ‘good’
whatever has triumphed. Success, provided it is fierce and implacable, provided
the vanquished are completely defeated, destroyed, abolished beyond hope –
success justifies everything…The man of genius is profoundly immoral, but for
anyone to be immoral is not the proper thing…‘Duty’ is nowhere in particular,
and yet it is everywhere, for all actions possess absolute value. The repentant
sinner deserves all the anguish of his contrite soul, because he was not strong
enough to transgress the law, and unworthy to be a sinner.”[111]
The
absolute idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) attempted to deny
the objective reality of the principle of non-contradiction as is attested to
here in a passage from his book Logic[112]:
“The distinction between Being and Nothing is, in the first place, only
implicit, and not yet actually made: they only ought to be
distinguished. A distinction, of course, implies two things, and that one of
them possesses an attribute which is not found in the other. Being, however, is
an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nothing. Hence, the distinction
between the two is only meant to be; it is quite a nominal distinction, which
is at the same time no distinction. In all other cases of difference there is
some common point which comprehends both things. Suppose, e.g., we speak of two
different species: the genus forms a common ground for both. But in the case of
mere Being and Nothing, distinction is without a bottom to stand upon: hence,
there can be no distinction, both determinations being the same bottomlessness…
Nothing, if it is thus immediate and equal to itself, is also the same as Being
is…In Being we have Nothing, and in Nothing Being…In Becoming the Being which
is one with Nothing, and the Nothing which is one with Being, are only
vanishing factors; they are and they are not.”[113]
In the light of realism, such reasoning, a flagrant violation of the first of
all principles, is simply absurd and destroys the foundations of all knowledge,
whether scientific or philosophical.
Jean
Weber, of the school of Bergson, sums up Hegel’s denial of the objective
validity of the principle of non-contradiction in the name of the very idea of
being: “Being is the most universal of all notions, but for this very reason it
is also the poorest and the most negative of notions. To be white or black, to
have extension, to be good, means to be something; but to be without any
determination, is to be nothing, is simply not to be. Pure and simple being
is, therefore, equivalent to not-being. It is at one and the same time
itself and its contrary. If it were merely itself, it would remain immobile and
sterile; if it were mere nothingness, it would be synonymous with zero, and in
this case also completely powerless and infecund. It is because it is the one
and the other that it becomes something, another thing, everything. The
contradiction contained in the notion of being resolves itself into becoming,
development. To become is at the same time to be and not to be
(that which will be). The two contraries which engender it, namely, being and
non-being, are rediscovered, blended and reconciled in becoming. The
result is a new contradiction, which will resolve itself into a new synthesis,
and thus the process will continue until the absolute idea is reached.”[114]
The
great 20th century French Thomist Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964)
objects to such fallacious reasoning, writing: “To perceive the sophism
contained in this argument, we need only to cast it into syllogistic form: Pure
being is pure indetermination. But pure indetermination is pure non-being.
Therefore, pure being is pure non-being. The middle term, ‘pure
indetermination,’ is used in two different senses. In the major it means the
negation of all determination, generic, specific, or individual, but not the
negation of (ideal or real) being, which transcends the generic determinations
of which it is susceptible. In the minor, on the other hand, pure indetermination
is not only the negation of all generic, specific, and individual
determination, but also implies the negation of any further determination of
which being is capable. Therefore, the argument amounts to this: that pure
being is undetermined being; but undetermined being is pure non-being. The
minor is evidently false.”[115]
Garrigou-Lagrange also adds: “Besides, there is no apparent reason why becoming
should emerge from this realized contradiction, this identification of
contradictories. On the contrary, we must hold with Aristotle that ‘to maintain
that being and non-being are identical, is to admit permanent repose rather
than perpetual motion. There is in fact nothing into which beings can transform
themselves, because everything includes everything’(IV Metaph., c. v).”[116]
Frederick
Wilhelmsen (1923-1996) explains that Hegel’s panlogicism was a serious attempt
to deny the objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction: “Hegel
identified the orders of thought and existence. Being functions the way
thinking functions, taught Hegel, because being is a ‘concretization’ of
absolute spirit. In thought, said Hegel, every proposition has its
contradictory. Posit any judgment and you thereby posit its opposite. On this
point, Hegel merely repeated a truth known to logicians since the time of
Plato. Aristotle systematised this law of the mind in his well-known Square of
Opposition: The proposition ‘every cow is black’ is contradicted by ‘some cow
is not black’; ‘no academician is a fool’ is contradicted by ‘some academician
is a fool,’ and so forth. Hegel pushed this opposition of judgments to the
order of being itself. ‘Being is being’ is contradicted by ‘being is
not-being.’ Given the first proposition, the second automatically follows.
Therefore being contradicts itself, and this contradiction is the most
fundamental law of the spirit. If we grant Hegel’s identification of spirit and
reality, his position makes good sense. It was the only way he could account
for progress in the universe, for change. If the real is basically the same
thing as the rational, one of two conclusions follow: either the real is given
once and for all or it is not. If we grant the first supposition, we must
conclude – with Hegel – that spirit never gets anywhere at all; spirit does
nothing but analytically dissect an order already given at the outset, an order
of ideas and laws to which nothing new is ever added. Refuse the first
supposition because of the fact of change in the world and it follows that
reality could only advance by contradicting itself. Begin with a given – call
it A – and assume that only A is given. How do we get from A to B, when B is
not given? We move from A to B only if A contradicts itself. Fundamentally, B
is nothing but A’s negation of itself; B is non-A. In this fashion we can move
from one point in the real order to another. We can account for change, for the
advance of spirit. If we refuse Hegel’s identification of spirit and reality,
if we judge his position in the light of realism, we can easily see that his
error consisted in treating the metaphysical order, the real order, as though
it were the logical. But the whole point about being, in reality, is that it
is being. The contradictory to being, not in the order of ideas but in the
order of things, would be non-being. But in reality there is no such
‘thing’ as an existing non-being. A man does not need an armory full of logical
and dialectical weapons to understand this; all he needs is some existing thing
which he can contemplate for a short time. Concentrate for a moment on the
piece of paper before your eyes; formulate the proposition, ‘the paper exists’;
now contradict the first proposition with ‘the paper does not exist.’ The two
judgments contradict each other in the logical order, in your mind. The
contradiction exists mentally because the two judgments can be entertained as
logical opposites. Now return your attention to the piece of paper itself, not
as it exists in a proposition in your mind, but as it is in itself. What is the
contradictory of the existence of the paper in the order of being? In that
order, the order of things as they exist beyond your thinking of them, there
simply is no contradictory to the piece of paper. The non-existence of
the paper that exists is a metaphysical zero. To see this is to see that Hegel
confused the two orders.”[117]
For
Garrigou-Lagrange, “this absolute intellectualism of Hegel is no less
destructive of all knowledge than is the anti-intellectualism of Heraclitus and
Bergson. All reasoning presupposes that every idea employed in the process
represents a reality, the nature of which remains the same; but for
Hegel, the principle of identity (non-contradiction) is merely a law of
inferior logic, of the mind working with abstractions, and not a law of
superior logic, of reason and reality. ‘From this it follows,’ as Aristotle
remarked (IV Metaphy., c. iv), ‘that one can with equal right affirm or
deny everything of all things, that all men tell the truth and that all lie,
and that each one admits that he is a liar.’ For the rest, Hegel himself
acknowledges ‘that if it is true to say that being and non-being
are one and the same, it is also true to say that they differ, and that the one
is not the other.’[118]
It follows from this that, according to Hegel, nothing can be affirmed and
everything can be affirmed. If this attitude does not destroy all science, it
cannot at least be said to have more than a relative value, and hence to
possess nothing more than the name of science.”[119]
For
Hegel, reality is not grasped in its concreteness, in its substantiality.
Rather, substance and essence is negated in favor of contradiction and
becoming. The fundamental principle of the Hegelian dialectic is that the
essence of being is contradiction. For him, the antinomical dialecticism of
contradiction is not something by which change is realized in a substance,
respecting, of course, the concrete individuality of substance, nor is it a
simple function or law of thought; rather, it is the very essence of reality
itself and also of thought itself. Hegel not only makes the dialectic a law of
thought; it also becomes a metaphysical principle of reality. He identifies
metaphysics with logic and makes logic metaphysics itself. Each thing – a dog,
rat, a cow, for example – is and is not itself; in fact, its true being
is becoming.
Neo-Positivists
(or logical positivists), like Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), Rudolf Carnap
(1891-1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889-1951) neo-positivist “first period”
(also known as the “First Wittgenstein”), dismiss the principle of
non-contradiction maintaining that this principle cannot be validated by the
principle of verification, which states that all meaningful propositions must
be verifiable in sense experience. Thus, the principle of non-contradiction
would be, in their eyes, meaningless. The problem with the principle of
verification is that the principle itself cannot be verified in sense
experience, it being a metaphysical principle transcending sense knowledge.
Regarding this matter Wilhelmsen writes: “Although Hegelian contradiction is
still maintained by the Marxists, a more popular attack on the principle of
non-contradiction has come from the school of logical positivism. This
school maintains that the principle of non-contradiction is meaningless. The
principle is discarded for a new first principle which the positivists call
‘the principle of verification’ or ‘verifiability.’ For the positivists, all
thought is nothing but the way in which we order our sense experiences: There
are no ‘things’ in a realist sense of the term; there are only ‘facts’ which
are the data given sensation. Scientific law and all other ‘meaningful’
discourse rise out of man’s attempt to order his experience for the sake of his
practical mastery over life. A statement has meaning, makes sense, only if it
can be reduced to some sense experience with which it is directly or indirectly
identifiable. Positivists do not mean merely that all human knowledge begins in
sensation which alone confronts existing things; they mean that every
affirmation and negation making sense is composed of a subject and a predicate
which symbolize some sensorial data experienced or capable of being
experienced. But the proposition ‘being is being,’ while including sensible
being, transcends the material order; it does not point to sensations or to
‘data,’ but to the truth that things are, that they exist. Therefore, say the
positivists, it is meaningless: not false, not true, just gibberish.
“Through
this attack on the primacy of being, the logical positivists sweep away all
metaphysical and religious discourse. The belief that there is a God is not
condemned as false; it is just dismissed as nonsense, along with the atheist
contention that there is no God. In this way, positivism cuts beneath the great
debate about the final meaning of human existence that has engaged civilized
man since the day he discovered he had a soul. Positivism is a far more popular
philosophy today than idealism…
“If
all propositions must be verified in sense experience, then why not the
principle of verification itself? The principle is a complex of meaning, no
element of which is identified with sense experience. ‘Every meaningful
proposition is verifiable in sense experience.’ The predicate, ‘sense
experience,’ is not sensible; it is an abstract, intelligible content; it is
not identified with any given sense experience. ‘Meaningful’ is not a sense
experience. What is the ‘meaning of meaning’? Whatever it might be, it cannot
be identified and understood simply by pointing at something and punching it.
The whole proposition might be said to stand for the totality of sense
experiences and thus to symbolize them all. If this is so, then there is a
‘meaning’ beyond experience, and this ‘meaning’ is meaning itself.
“The
amusing thing about positivism is that it proceeds to deny the intelligence by
using the intelligence denied. It sets up an elaborate criterion to destroy the
intellect, and the criterion turns out to be highly intellectual in structure.
Positivism is, therefore, self-contradictory, self-destructive, a system that
dissolves from within once it is seen to be what it is.”[120]
The
principle of non-contradiction is naturally and spontaneously known by all men
through experience. It is self-evident to all. Since it is the first judgment,
this first principle cannot be demonstrated by means of other truths prior to
it. When a truth is self-evident, it is neither necessary nor possible to prove
it; only something which is not immediately evident requires proof. That the
principle of non-contradiction is not demonstrable because of its self-evidence
is not a sign of its imperfection; rather it is a sign of its perfection. Koren
explains how the principle of non-contradiction is an analytic
principle,[121] writing:
“The question may be asked as to how we know that the principle of
non-contradiction is true.[122]
At first sight it is clear that it will be impossible to offer any direct
demonstration of this principle. For in a direct demonstration we derive
the truth of a conclusion from certain premises, i.e., from truths known to us
prior to the truth of the conclusion; now no truth can be prior to the first
principle; hence a direct demonstration of the principle of non-contradiction
is not possible.
“It
is likewise impossible to demonstrate the principle indirectly. For in
an indirect demonstration we show that the denial of a proposition implies a
contradiction, i.e., is against the principle of non-contradiction. Hence any
indirect demonstration presupposes that the principle of non-contradiction has
already been admitted.
“However,
demonstration is not the only way in which we can be certain of the truth of a
judgment. Sometimes a judgment may reveal itself to the mind as true by a mere analysis
of its terms. To be certain of the truth of such a judgment, we only have to
understand its subject and predicate, and our intellect is no longer able to
doubt or reject it. Take, for example, the judgment ‘the whole is greater than
its parts.’ Once we understand the meaning of the terms used in this
proposition we cannot escape the judgment that the whole is greater than any of
its parts. Hence an analytic principle is self-evident.
“That
the principle of non-contradiction is such a self-evident principle should be
clear. Once we understand the meaning of the terms ‘being’ and ‘non-being,’ our
intellect sees at once the truth of the statement that one is not the other. Moreover,
it would be impossible to doubt or deny the principle of non-contradiction. For
if I say ‘I deny or doubt the principle of non-contradiction,’ I admit that to
deny or to doubt is not the same as not-to-deny or not-to-doubt, and thus my
very denial or doubt shows that I admit what I deny or doubt. For this reason
this principle has been appropriately nicknamed ‘the boomerang principle,’[123]”[124]
In
the Metaphysics, Aristotle replies to those who would be so foolish as
to negate the principle of non-contradiction, writing that “in order to deny
this principle, one has to reject all meaning in language. If ‘man’ were the
same as ‘non-man,’ it would not, in fact, mean anything at all. Any word would
signify all things and would not, therefore, denote anything; everything would
be the same. Consequently, all communication or understanding between persons
would be impossible. Thus, whenever anyone says a word, he is already
acknowledging the principle of non-contradiction, since he undoubtedly wants
the word to mean something definite and distinct from its opposite. Otherwise,
he would not even speak….Anyone who rejects this first principle should behave
like a plant, since even animals move in order to attain an objective which
they prefer over others, as when they seek food.”[125]
“Besides, denying this principle in fact implies accepting it, since in
rejecting it, a person acknowledges that affirming and denying are not the
same. If a person maintains that the principle of non-contradiction is false,
he already admits that being true and being false are not the same, thereby
accepting the very principle he wishes to eliminate.”[126]
Garrigou-Lagrange
summarizes for us Aristotle’s eight principal reasons for defending the
necessity and objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction: “(1) to
deny this necessity and this validity would be to deprive words of their fixed
meaning and to render speech useless; (2) all idea of the reality of an essence,
or thing or substance as such, would have to be abandoned; there would be only
a becoming without anything which is on the way of becoming; it would be like
saying that there can be a flux without a fluid, a flight without a bird, a
dream without a dreamer; (3) there would no longer be any distinction
between things, between a galley, a wall, and a man; (4) it would mean the destruction
of all truth, for truth follows being; (5) it would destroy all thought,
even all opinion; for its very affirmation would be a negation. It would
not be an opinion which Heraclitus had when he affirmed that contradictories
were true at the same time; (6) it would mean the destruction of all desire and
all hatred; there would be only absolute indifference, for there would be no
distinction between good and evil; there would be no reason why we should act;
(7) it would no longer be possible to distinguish degrees of error, everything
would be equally false and true at the same time; (8) it would put an end to
the very notion of becoming; for there would be no distinction between the
beginning and the end of a movement; the first would already be the second, and
any transition from one state to another would be impossible. Moreover,
‘becoming’ could not be explained by any of the four causes. There would be no
subject of becoming; the process would be without any efficient or final cause,
and without specification, and it would be both attraction and repulsion,
concretion as well as fusion.”[127]
SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENTS
We
initially arrive at a knowledge of substance from the observation of accidental
changes in nature. A father’s face, for example, gets red because his son
bumped his favorite car. The passage from the father’s originally white face to
a red face to a white face again does not obviously destroy the individual
being that is the father. He doesn’t turn into a frog or into a chair.
Therefore, this accidental modification that he undergoes without destroying
his being an individual man reveals a substratum that remains in essence the
same throughout the accidental changes. There is revealed, in the accidental
alteration that we have observed, a stable, permanent substantial core, called
the substance,[128]
and certain secondary changeable perfections, called the accidents.
Substance
Like
being, substance cannot be strictly defined. But substance may be broadly
defined as that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by
itself and not in another subject. Now, since the substance is the core of
a thing that weathers the various accidental modifications, it is the most
important element in each thing. There are two basic aspects of substance: 1.
The substance is the substratum, the subject, that supports the
accidents; and 2. Substance is something subsistent. This means that it does
not exist in something else but is by itself, not needing to inhere in another
like the accidents do. A dog, for example, is a substance since it subsists,
having its own being distinct from the being of anything else. The brownness of
the dog, however, doesn’t subsist in itself but needs to inhere in a subject.
We say “This brown dog.” The broad definition of substance is taken from this
second fundamental aspect of substance. Psychologically, substance as the
“substratum of the accidents” is prior to substance as “something whose nature
or essence it is to be by itself and not in another subject.” That is, we
initially arrive at a knowledge of the substance through its function of
supporting the accidents. However, metaphysically or ontologically, that is, in
the order of reality, substance as “something whose nature or essence it is to
be by itself and not in another subject” is prior to substance as the “support
of the accidents,” because in order for substance to act as the support of the
accidents it must first of all “be by itself and not in another subject,” that
is, it must be capable of supporting itself. If substance is capable of having
an essence or nature to be by itself and not in another it will be capable of
supporting the accidents. Being capable of supporting the accidents is a
property of the substance whose real nature or essence is to be by itself and
not in another subject. This is why the broad definition of substance is taken
from the second of our aspects of substance.
Classification
of Substances
Substances
are classified into the following groupings: 1. incomplete substance and
complete substance; 2. material substance and immaterial
substance; 3. simple substance and compound substance; and 4.
primary substance and secondary substance.
1. Incomplete
Substance and Complete Substance. An incomplete substance is one
whose nature demands that it be co-joined with another substantial co-principle,
so as to be able to constitute a single complete substance. Matter taken by
itself and form taken by itself are examples of incomplete substances. A human
soul taken in itself is an incomplete substance, and a human body taken in
itself is an incomplete substance. The human soul and the human body taken
together constitute the single individual human person, a complete substance,
that rational suppositum. A complete substance is one that
does not need to be co-joined with the another substantial co-principle so as
to constitute a single individual substance. It exists in such a manner
that its nature does not demand a further union with a substantial
co-principle. A dog, a rat, a horse, and an apple are all examples of complete
substances.
Now,
an incomplete substance may be incomplete either in the line of
‘substantiality’ or in the line of ‘specific perfection.’ An animal or brute
‘soul’ (substantial form of the animal body) is an example of the former type
of incomplete substance, while the human soul regards the latter type of
incomplete substance. Bittle explains that a substance is incomplete “in the
line of substantiality, when it cannot perform any functions of the
complete substance alone; it must always be united with its substantial
co-principle. In this way, the brute soul and plant soul cannot exist outside
the matter which they inform and cannot, therefore, be active in any manner
unless united with matter; the functions of these types of being are such that
they are dependent on matter at all times for their existence. Matter, the
other co-principle, is incapable of performing any activity of its own, because
it is altogether indeterminate and cannot exist except in conjunction with a
substantial form or soul. Matter and form are the two substantial co-principles
which unite to constitute a bodily substance; and in every bodily substance
below the level of man these substantial co-principles are incomplete in the
line of substantiality.
“A
substance is incomplete in the line of specific perfection, if it can,
when alone, perform some but not all activities proper to the
complete substance. Thus, the human soul, being spiritual (as will be shown in
rational psychology), can survive the dissolution of the body and in this
disembodied condition perform some functions proper to man, for instance,
thinking and willing. This is possible because such functions are spiritual and
as such intrinsically independent of matter. Other operations, however, like
nutrition and sense-perception, demand the participation of bodily organs and
cannot be performed by the soul alone. Man, as man, though, must be able to
perform all three types of activities – vegetancy, sentiency, and rationality.
Hence, man’s soul is complete in the line of ‘substantiality,’ because it is
independent of the body in its existence; but it is incomplete in the line of
‘specific perfection,’ because it cannot perform all human operations
independent of the body.”[129]
The reason, of course, why the human soul can continue in existence after the
dissolution of the human body is because it has the act of being (esse)
of its own given to it by God, Pure Act of Being.
2. Material
Substance and Immaterial Substance. A material substance is a
substance that is either composed of matter or dependent intrinsically, for its
being and activities, upon matter. A substance which is matter is called a
“bodily” substance or simply a “body.” That substance which is not matter but is
intrinsically dependent upon matter is properly called a “material” substance.
A rock, a tree, a dog and a horse are all examples of material substances. An immaterial
substance, on the other hand, is a substance which is not composed of
matter (either in whole or in part, since it is simple, having no parts) nor
intrinsically dependent upon matter for its existence and proper operations.
Human souls, as well as the separate substances (the angels), are all
immaterial substances.
3. Simple
Substance and Composite Substance. Complete substances are either simple or
composite in nature. A complete substance is simple when it does not consist of
entitatively distinct substantial parts. Examples of simple substances: the
angels and God. These simple substances are called pure spirits. A
composite substance, on the other hand, is a complete substance consisting of
incomplete substantial parts, entitatively distinct among themselves in such a
way that their union results in a single unified nature. A human person, for
example, is a composite substance, made up of a human body united with a human
soul (which is the substantial form of the body).
4. Primary
Substance and Secondary Substance. According to Aristotle, a primary
substance (also called first substance) is the individual thing
existing in extra-mental reality. That real dog Fido, for example, as he
exists as an individual concrete being in reality, is a first or primary
substance. A secondary substance (or second substance), on the
other hand, is the universal notion of the existing thing, that substantial
reality, as conceived by the mind. It is a universal and not the individual
existing thing in reality. For example, the universal notion “dog” as a mental
word that grasps the essence of dog, is a second or secondary substance.
Erroneous
Views Regarding Substance
Descartes
on Substance.
Descartes erroneously defined substance as “a thing which exists in such a way
that it does not need any other thing to exist.”[130]
But this can apply only to God since it deals with an absolutely independent
substance. He does say that this applies to God only, but then contradicts
himself by maintaining that there are finite substances which require God’s
power to exist. He reduced corporeal substances into res extensa
(extension), thus reducing a substance into an accident. Regarding man,
Descartes believed that he was of two substances, namely res extensa
(extension) for the human body, and res cogitans (thought) for man’s
soul. Again, these two “substances” that he is talking about are really two
accidents. Though he speaks of “man” as consisting in two substances, res
cogitans and res extensa, the “human person,” for Descartes,
consists in his soul, but this soul, in turn, is identified with res
cogitans or thought. Realistic philosophical anthropology, instead,
maintains a strict difference between the soul, a substance (albeit incomplete,
but having its own act of being), and thought, which is an accident (the
product of our operative power of intellect, another accident, which is an
immaterial faculty of the rational soul, substantial form of the body). The
Cartesian human person is thus reduced from being initially two accidents to
one accident (self-consciousness). Gone is the realistic view of man as an hylomorphic
composite of body and soul, two incomplete substances, but together forming the
one complete compoite substance of man, the indvidual substance of a rational
nature.
Spinoza
on Substance.
Spinoza writes that “by substance I understand that which is in itself and is
conceived by itself; in other words, that whose concept does not need the
concept of any other thing from which it must be formed.”[131]
He takes Descartes’ definition of substance as a given, which would apply only
to God, and concludes that there is really only one substance, the Divine
Substance, which is God or Nature (Deus sive natura), all that is not
God being but modes of the one Divine Substance. This position is obviously
pantheistic.
Critique
of the Spinozian Monistic Conception of Substance. Contrary to Spinozian
monism, God is not identified with Nature; He is infinitely distinct from the
world, whose finite and imperfect beings merely participate in the act of being
given to them by the Infinite Being, the Pure Act of Being, in whom esse and
essence are identified. To say, as Spinoza does, that there is only one
Substance (Deus sive Natura), does violence to the testimony of common
sense. Everyday experience shows that there are many things in the world,
distinct from one another because of their specific essences, and those of the
same form (apple, horse, cat, etc.) are many because their form is received in
different parcels of matter (matter is the principle of individuation[132]).
If the world were identical with God, the world would necessarily be a single
being, for God is Himself supremely one, undivided and indivisible.[133]
But such a position blatantly contradicts both the testimony of the senses and
of reason. At the foundations of Spinoza’s substantialistic pantheism lie the erroneous
notions of substance and subsistence (which he inherited from Descartes), and
his failure to understand the real distinction of essentia and esse
in creatures (finite beings, diverse in essence, only participate in esse;
they merely have esse by participation). Hart explains: “But whether a
substance (an ens per se) is also an Ens a Se, that is, a being
in whom existence is intrinsic and proper to its nature or essence, will be
quite a distinct problem from that of the constitution or nature of substance
as such. It will involve the question as to whether the substance or essence is
in potency to an act of to be received into this substance (and thus at the
same time a principle of limitation and therefore multiplication), or whether
it is a substance or essence identical with its act of to be (and therefore not
a principle of limitation and multiplication). The substances of our immediate
experience are all of the former character, namely, principles of limitation.
This accounts for their multitude. They are therefore finite predicamental
substances. They also point to the necessity of inferring the existence of a
substance which is not a principle of limitation but is identical with its act
of to be and without which the limited substances could not exist, since they
must receive their respective acts of to be which are not intrinsic to their
substances, if they are to exist at all. This substance which does not limit
its act of to be and whose existence must be inferred is therefore not only a
being existing in itself (ens per se), but it is also a Being that
exists of itself (Ens a Se). This however is not necessarily a note of
substance as such. Its demand for existence in itself may be met either by
caused or uncaused being. Its substantiality as such does not include the
question of the source of existence in itself. Every substance requires that it
exist in itself. Only Infinite Substance also exists of itself; that is, only
the Infinite Substance is necessarily Self-Existing. What makes all this clear
and permits a sound doctrine of substance which involves no such error as the
pantheism of Spinoza is the understanding of the real distinction of essence
and act of being in all beings of our experience, that is, their participated
character. It is this principle which permits Thomism to anticipate and refute
the error of the substantialistic pantheism of Spinoza, in whose philosophy no
such insight into the true nature of being is possible.”[134]
Leibniz
on Substance.
Leibniz mistakenly defined substance as an “independent power of action,” thus
confusing substance with one of its properties and, consequently, reducing
substance into an accident. Leibnizian substance would essentially consist in a
simple and unextended active force without a subject of action, called a monad.
This monad’s essence would consist in the power of resistance (or
impenetrability), which is merely an active tendency having an immanent effect;
consequently, there would be no possibility of transitive action between unit
monads.
Locke
on Substance.
The empiricists essentially reduce knowing to the level of sense knowledge and
doing so cut off one’s access to substance (substance either becomes that
“unknown substrate” or is simply negated as a metaphysical illusion). The
empiricist John Locke held that, though substance does exist, we could never
know anything about the reality of substance except that it is the substrate or
support of the accidents. In reality, substance would be, for him, that
“unknown substrate” supporting the accidents. He writes: “If anyone will
examine himself concerning this notion of substance in general, he will find
that he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows what
support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us;
which qualities are commonly called accidents.”[135]
As conceived by the mind, substance, for Locke, would be a “complex idea,” a
combination of simple ideas which represent distinct particular things subsisting
by themselves. How are the ideas of substances conjured up by the “mind,” which
in this case, would mean, for Locke, the imagination? Locke replies: “The mind
being furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the
senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own
operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go
constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words
being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are
called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are
apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a
complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how
these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose
some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result,
which therefore we call substance.”[136]
In keeping with his empiricist phenomenalism, Locke teaches that the substance
of a cat or dog or rat, to give examples, is merely a collection of a number of
simple ideas of sensible qualities which we utilize to give unity to that which
we call cat or dog or rat. The result of the imagination’s combination of these
simple ideas (which really should be called sense impressions) into “substance”
is Locke’s “complex idea.”
Hume
on Substance.
The radical sensist empiricism of David Hume led him to disregard substance
altogether; he claimed that there was no need for the idea of a real support of
mental phenomena, i.e., of ideas or states of consciousness. “Substance,”
whether material or spiritual, is merely a name (a term, a word) we give for a
collection of actions without any subject of these actions. He writes in his A
Treatise of Human Nature that “the idea (sense impression) of substance as
well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas (sense
impressions) that are united by the imagination and have a peculiar name
assigned to them by which we are able to recall either to ourselves, or to
others, that collection.”[137]
Hume maintained that the idea of substance was nothing but a metaphysical
fiction created by the imagination and ought really to be dismissed or
abandoned.
Kant
on Substance.
Kant made substance not anymore a real individual being, a real support of the
accidents which inhere in their real subject, but rather an a priori
subjective category of the mind, as the principle which unites phenomena in the
mind. “Substance,” for Kant, would be one of the twelve a priori
categories of the human mind, endowed with innate organizing principles of
understanding. The Kantian category of substance, like the other categories of
the mind, are imposed upon the organized sense data (sense stimuli coming from
the noumenal world being initally molded by the two a priori forms of
sensibility, namely, space and time, which are purely subjective) for further
and ultimate organization of the initially molded data. When imposed upon the
intuitions of sensibility, the category substance gives the effect of
persistence of any object that we see in time, as well as the effect of
permanence and stability for subjects of passing sensations or phenomena. Do
substances exist in extra-mental reality, as is the position of realism? Kant
answer is that, though the noumenal world really exists, we do not know
anything about it; therefore, he maintains that we do not know if substances
really exist in noumenal reality (as is the realist claim), for the “substance”
we utilize in thinking is merely a subjective categorical imposition upon
initally molded sense data in order to endow this sense data with the
characteristic of persistence, permanence and stability.
The
error of Kant regarding substance is ultimately traced to his transcendental
idealist epistemology, which does great violence to the certainties of common
sense and is the great adversary of methodical realism and realist metaphysics.
The task of refuting this type of idealism, however, belongs to the
philosophical science of gnoseology (also called philosophy of knowledge or
epistemology), and therefore, we shall pass on to deal with the nature of
accidents.
Accidents
An
accident is defined as that reality to whose essence it is proper to be in
something else, as in its subject. If what is most characteristic of the
substance is to be by itself and not in another, that which is most
characteristic of accidents is to be in another, that is, to be in the
substance. Take for example a cat. The substance here would be the substance
cat, while its accidents would be the various perfections inhering in the
substance cat (a substance that, though modified by its accidents, nevertheless
remains in essence or nature unchanged), accidents such as its shape, size,
colour, fluffiness of its fur, etc.
It
is to be observed that the definition of accident includes the subject. The
nature of the accident is to demand inherence in another. As the substance has
a nature or essence to which subsistence is fitting, and which situates the
subject within a determinate species, accidents also have their own essence by
which they are differentiated from each other, and to which dependence on the
being of their subjects is fitting. The essences of accidents are naturally
imperfect for they demand the support of their subjects.[138]
Rather than simply being, an accident is said to be something belonging to
being.[139] Accidents
cannot be said to “become” or be corrupted; rather it is the subject that
becomes through the accidents.[140]
It is for this reason that an accident cannot be defined without the subject as
a quasi-part of the definition.[141]
“No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a
subject but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it
implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and
terminates in the subject: for whiteness is that whereby a thing is white.
Accordingly, in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject
as though it were the first part of the definition, viz., the genus; but we
give it the second place which is that of the difference: thus we say
snubnosedness is a curvature of the nose. But if we take accidents in the
concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident:
for a white thing is something that has whiteness. Accordingly, in defining
this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first
part of the definition; for we say that a snubnose is a curved nose.”[142]
As
we have already seen, Descartes made what was merely accidental, namely,
thought and quantity, into substances, thereby mistakenly ‘substantializing’ them.
Thought, for him, is immaterial substance, while quantity was material
substance, yet illogically, his definition of substance would only apply to
God.
Descartes
negated, in fact, the real distinction between substance and accidents. In keeping
with his rationalistic mechanism, he denied that there were absolute accidents
in a substance, really distinct from that substance (like extension, qualities
and action, that confer upon a subject a real perfection), and sustained only
relative accidents determining the substance (that is, accidents that have
their being in a subject only because of the bearing which a certain thing has
to another; in short, he explained all other accidents, as, for example, the
absolute modal accident position, as relations).
The
denial of absolute accidents in favor of merely relative ‘determining’
accidents is, of course, erroneous as it goes counter, for example, to our
internal experience and real capacity for knowledge, as Bittle explains:
“Certainly, many accidents are merely relative; for instance, those of
‘similarity’ and ‘equality’ between two individual substances. The mere fact
that two persons or trees are five feet and ten inches tall, does not give to
either of them any positive and new perfection or entity beyond what they
already possess; their ‘equality’ in height consists entirely in this ‘point of
comparison’ or relation. The same applies to the ‘similarity’ between a horse
and a cat, because they resemble each other in this that both are ‘white’ in
color. But not all accidents are of this kind. There are absolute accidents.
In proving this statement, we will restrict ourselves to facts revealed by our
own internal experience, because no philosopher can doubt this evidence without
destroying the ultimate possibility of all valid knowledge. Our internal
experience testifies to us that there are various modifications within us,
like thinking, willing, seeing, hearing, feeling, walking, working, and various
kinds of productive activity. To deny these activities is to make an illusion
of our internal experience as a source of knowledge. These activities are a reality,
distinct from our fundamental essence or substance. They are present for a time
and then disappear; we exert ourselves to increase or decrease their intensity;
we are actively engaged in bringing them forth or stopping them. These
activities confer a new perfection and entity upon us which was not there
before. Would anyone assert seriously that a blind and deaf person does not
lack something which one who sees and hears possesses through the activity of
sight and hearing? Or, that a healthy person does not possess a perfection and
entity which a critically ill person has lost? If so, then there is no real
distinction between blindness and sight, deafness and hearing, health and
illness; but that is obviously false. However, while these activities come and
go, we still retain our essential identity as an abiding and permanent
reality throughout the origin and passing of these transient modifications. But
this proves that we are a substance, while these acts are a positive
perfection and entity consisting in something more than the mere relation of
one thing to another; more, for instance, than the relation of ‘similarity’
between the light of an electric lamp and the light of a star. Knowledge,
too, is more than an accidental relation. If it were nothing real supperadded
as an entity to the mind, then the mind with knowledge would not be really
different from the mind without knowledge. Ignorance and knowledge would really
amount to the same thing for a mind. But the mind undergoes a change,
when it passes from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge, as our
consciousness clearly testifies. Change, however, implies that something is
actually acquired (or lost) in the process. Reversely, when we forget or are
victims of amnesia, we realize that we have lost something definite in the line
of a perfection for our mind; not the mind itself, of course, because that we
still possess, but something that the mind had and now is deprived of. If
knowledge were not a real perfection, we would acquire nothing when we
learn, and we would lose nothing when we forget; there would then be no
real distinction between the erudition of a great thinker and the vacuity of an
idiot. Hence, knowledge is something that can be acquired and lost, an
accident that is a reality distinct from the mind. The effort we put
forth in order to learn proves the same thing. It takes no effort on our part
to be similar to another in the color of our complexion or equal to another in
our size. But to acquire a knowledge similar or equal to that possessed by
another, demands distinct effort and labor. And this proves that knowledge is
more than a mere relation or relative accident; it is an absolute accident.”[143]
There
is a three-fold relation between substance and accidents[144]:
1. The substance is the substratum or
the subject of the accidents, the “subject” here the bearer and that which
underlies, and it indicates the metaphysical dependence of all the accidents on
the substance. The substance is also the substratum
of the accidents inasmuch as it gives them the act of being (esse); 2. The substance is to accident
what potency is to act, because the accidents perfect the substance. The
substance has a potency or passive capacity to receive further perfections
conferred to it by its accidents, called accidental forms. For example, the
operations of acts of free will are accidents which are a kind of perfection to
which a substance is in potency; and 3. The substance is related to the
accident as cause is to effect. The substance is the cause of the accidents
which arise from it and the accidents come into being because of the substance.
There
is a real distinction between a substance and its accidents, as is seen when
observing accidental changes. Observing such accidental changes in the
substance, we find that certain secondary perfections disappear and give rise
to new ones without a substantial change in the subject. And such accidental
alterations can only be possible if these accidents are really distinct from
the substance they affect. All the nine accidents are, by their very essences,
distinct from their subject. The substance is really distinct from the
accidents, being superior to them, for it is the substance that determines the
very content of things, making them to be what they are, whereas the accidents
must depend entirely upon the substance, their substratum, for their very
being.
The
act of being (esse) properly belongs to the subject of the accidents
which is the substance. Accidents also are, but are by reason of the act of
being that belongs to the substance. It is only the substance that is in the
proper sense of the term. To say that accidents have an act of being of their
own, as Suarez did, would undermine the unity of the substance-accidents
composite (that is one substance and one substance only having its own
accidents). We should also be reminded that the substance is being (ens)
in the strict sense. Accidents are only by reason of being supported by its
substratum or support which is the substance. Thus, it is only the substance
that should properly be called being; accidents instead are something belonging
to a being (ens).
Accidents
depend entirely on the substance for their being, for they do not have esse
of their own but are because of the act of being of the substance. The real
distinction between substance and accidents and their inequality do not in any
way undermine the radical unity of the substance-accident composite of being (ens).
The real distinction cannot destroy the unity of ens for a substance and its accidents are not many beings mixed up
together to form a whole; rather, there is only one being in the strict sense,
which is the substance, and all of the accidents of this particular substance
“belong to it,” receiving their very being from the substance without which
they would cease to exist. Accidents cannot be autonomous realities separated
from substance; they are rather the determining aspects of a substance,
perfecting and completing it.
We
arrive at a knowledge of the substance-accidents composite by means of our
intellect, initially through the information provided it by our senses. Our
senses are only able to directly grasp the accidents of things, and this data
is passed over to the intellect which arrives at its source and basis, which is
the substance, again by means of the accidents. It is only the intellect that
is capable of grasping the nature of the thing, its essence. In the process of
knowing a thing composed of substance and accidents we employ a constant going
back and forth from accidents to substance and from substance back to the
accidents: 1. In the beginning we have a vague knowledge of the composite of
substance and accidents. When we are in the forest for example and see a large
being approaching at a distance, its nature unknown to us, we know that the
various qualities perceived by our senses, for example, the colour, size and
shape, of the being, are not independent realities existing in themselves but
rather belong to a single substance, the being approaching at a distance. Even
at this initial stage of the knowledge process we already perceive that the
various accidents are but secondary manifestations belonging to a single
individual substance that subsists by itself, even though we are unable as yet
to determine the exact nature or essence of this substance. It should be
recalled that being (ens) is the first thing that is grasped by the
intellect, and since substance is being in the strict sense, we cannot perceive
accidents without at the same time perceiving the subject or substance in which
these accidents inhere in; 2. From the perception of the accidents by the
senses we move now to a knowledge of the nature of the substance. The accidents
do not hide the substance; rather, they reveal it. The accidents of the bear
approaching at a distance, reveal the nature or essence of the bear. Thus,
through external manifestations we arrive at a knowledge of the substantial
core of the subject in question; 3. Then, from the substance we go back to the
accidents. Having arrived at a knowledge of the nature of the thing perceived,
in this case, our approaching bear, this new knowledge gives us much more
insight into the other accidents of the animal in question as well as their
mutual relationships. Knowing the essence or nature of bears, man knows that
bears can at times, when provoked, or when protecting their young in the
vicinity, attack humans in a ferocious manner, and thus he adjusts his
behaviour accordingly with the situation.
Concerning
our knowledge of substance, Llano explains that “substance is being that is by
itself (per se): it is what is properly called being. Substance is what
has the act of being and what subsists by its own act of being. Accidents, in
contrast, are not beings in themselves, they are beings of a being (entis
entia) or – as Aristotle says – ‘buds and concomitances of beings’[145];
they inhere in substance and participate in its act of being.
“In
natural reality substance and accidents form a composite unity: the concrete
and singular being. Substance is never given without accidents, since it always
subsists accidentally determined; and accidents are never given without
substance since, of themselves, they do not have an act of being.
“The
dichotomies which the rationalist mode of thought leads to, tend to isolate
substance from accidents. But it is an error to think that substance can only
be known if it is separated from accidents: thus conceived substance
immediately becomes unknowable, because such a separation can never occur.
These rationalist oppositions lead to understanding accident as that which is
known by the senses and substance as that which is known by thought.[146]
“What
really happens is that the knowledge of the reality of substance is not
separable from the experience of the real whole, of being which is known by the
senses and by the intellect, and which includes both substance and accidents, because
it is an unum composed of both principles. The substance of material
things is not directly knowable by the senses, but the intellect knows it
immediately through the sense data in which substance appears. Substance – that
which is by itself – cannot be reduced to that which is offered directly
by sense experience, but it is discovered within the latter.
“The
knowledge of substance begins with its accidents, which make it known because
they participate in the being (esse) of the substance. The accidents do not
hide the substance, as if they were a sort of opaque crust covering it (this
crude imaginative representation of the theory is at the root of not a few
unjustified criticisms). The knowledge of the accidents, rather, entails a
certain knowledge of the substance because any accident is known as an
intrinsic reference to substance, which the intellect grasps confusedly but
immediately in any accidental determination. For example, when I know the color
white, what I grasp is not an isolated and subsisting ‘whiteness,’ but rather
‘this white thing,’ be it chalk, paper, light or whatever. Whence – as analytic
philosophy has demonstrated – things cannot be counted numerically in
adjectival terms, but only in terms of substances.[147]
“At
first, substance is known above all as the substrate of the accidents, of the
properties and the changes in things. But this approach – as Aristotle has
lucidly demonstrated[148]
– is insufficient. Subsequently, substance is known as the essence of the
thing, as that which each being is in itself, as an act from which properties
flow. Finally, the real constitutive factor of substance is attained:
subsistence. Substance is what is determinate and separate,[149]
what has being (esse) in itself, the subject of the act of being.”[150]
CHAPTER 4
THE
CATEGORIES
The
categories[151] (also
called the predicaments), are the supreme modes of being, divided into
substantial being and accidental being. The supreme genera of the categories
are composed of the substance and the nine accidents, namely: quantity,
quality, relation, action, passion, time (when?), place (where?), position (situs),
and possession (habitus). Some brief examples of each of the ten
categories will be very helpful in gaining a knowledge of these supreme classes
of being which, though like being cannot be strictly defined, can rather be
described and illustrated with examples. Here are the following examples:
“James is a man” (substance); “James weighs 200 pounds” (quantity); “James is
intelligent” (quality); “James is the son of Joe” (relation); “James is pushing
the chair” (action); “James is being mugged” (passion); “James arrived at his
house at seven in the evening” (time or when?); “James is in Los Angeles”
(place or where?); “James is sitting down” (position or situs); “James
is wearing a formal suit and tie” (possession or habitus). It should be
noted that accidents have essences of their own (essence here is understood in
the broad sense as referring to both the nature of substances and
accidents).
The
Stagirite arrived at his list of nine accidents by empirical test, while the
Aquinate derived the list of accidents upon a more systematic basis, according
to their intrinsic, or extrinsic, or partly intrinsic and extrinsic
determination of the subject (the substance). We find this procedure outlined
in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Metaphysics: “A predicate can be referred
to a subject in three ways. This occurs in one way when the predicate states
what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is
the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance,
i.e. a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.
“A
predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken
as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either
essentially and absolutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then
it is quantity; or as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality;
or it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something
else, and then it is relation.
“A
predicate is referred to a subject in a third way when the predicate is taken
from something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. In one
way, that from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the
subject; and if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after
the manner of attire (possession), as when it is said that Socrates is
shod or clothed. But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since an
extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either in
reference to time, and so it will be when; or if it is taken in reference
to place and the order of parts in place is not considered, it will be where;
but if this order is considered, it will be position.
“In
another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the
subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which
it is predicated. And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is
predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject.
But if it is from the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as
a passion; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being
acted upon.”[152]
It
should be noted that the list of accidents in its totality applies only to
material substances. Only the material substance is quantified. Immaterial beings
are not quantified. Only the corporeal substance (strictly speaking, only one
kind of it, namely, man) can have external possessions (this pertains to the
accident habitus), and only the material substance is subject to the
conditions of space and time, as well as to the circumstances of transeunt
action. This is why most of the predicamental accidents, namely, quantity,
possession (habitus), position (posture), time, place, action and
passion are given extensive treatment in cosmology (also called the philosophy
of nature, or more specifically, the philosophy of inanimate nature),
while metaphysics gives extensive treatment to the accidents quality and
relation since these accidents are to be found not just in material beings but
also in the immaterial realm (though angels certainly have accidents, note,
however, that God, being Pure Act of Being, having no potentiality whatsoever,
has no accidents).
We
can sum up Aquinas’ presentation of the nine accidents as follows: As regards
the predicament which refers to that which is the subject we have substance.
As regards the predicament which refers to that which is in the subject per
se and absolutely following upon the matter, we have quantity. As
regards the predicament which refers to that which is in the subject per se
and absolutely following upon the form, we have quality. As regards the
predicament which refers to that which is in the subject not absolutely, we
have relation. As regards the predicament which refers to that which is
outside the subject yet some way in it as principle we have action; in
it as a terminus and we have passion. As regards the predicament which
refers to that which is entirely outside the subject and not a measure of it,
we have possession (habitus); or as a measure of it as to time we
have when; as to place but not its parts we have where; as to
place and its parts we have position (posture).
1.
Quantity
Quantity
is derived from the Latin word quantum, an interrogative word meaning
“how much?” When one poses the question “how much” one is asking about
quantity. Quantity involves the notion of amount, extent, bulk, size, content,
parts and number. Examples of quantity include weight and size. It asks, in
terms of measurement, how big or little, and how much. Here are some examples
of indications of quantity: “The building is a thousand feet tall”; “The
truck weighs fifteen tons”; “The jar contains ten pebbles.” “The map
is eight by eleven.” All these predicates indicate various quantities.
Quantity
is not to be identified with the substance; rather, quantity is an accident, an
accident pertaining to everything corporeal. All material beings have a
definite quantity, and this arises from the determinable element in the
hylemorphic composite, namely the matter. Properly speaking, quantity pertains
to bodily substances. Immaterial beings like angels do not have quantity.
However, by an extension of meaning quantity may be applied to material things
which are not substances, and by analogy, we are able to apply it even to
non-material or spiritual substances and accidents. Thus, we may speak of the
quantity of time, the amount of fortitude in a person, and the number of
angels. Here we are speaking of non-literal applications of quantity. But strictly and properly speaking, quantity
refers to corporeal quantity, bodily quantity, mensurable quantity, the
material substance which has dimensions. In its literal meaning quantity is a
proper accident only of the bodily substance.
We
look at the interior of an aquarium; we see many beings presently there like
various types of fish, rocks, and pebbles. All these objects have their
respective places in the aquarium. We also observe that these various objects
are extended, filling their respective places, being “part here and part
there.” Now external quantity is the the property which extends a bodily
substance so that it is “part here, part there,” and is defined as the
property whereby a bodily substance has parts outside of parts, with reference
to its place.
However,
external quantity (also called extrinsic extension or local quantity,
actuated, in the “second act,” by which the parts are distinguished with regard
to place so that one part is not in the place in which there is another part)
is not the essence of quantity itself but rather the complement and external
manifestation of the inner, essential thing called internal quantity,
which is quantity in the strict sense, and is defined as the property
whereby an existing body has actual parts in itself. This type of quantity
is also called intrinsic extension or exigential quantity or the
demand for quantity, “in the first act,” by which parts are distinguished among
themselves so that one part is not the other. Let us take for example the rock
in the aquarium. We observe that that rock could not spread itself out to fill
its place (that is, could not have actual external quantity or local quantity)
if it did not possess some inner aptitude for such an extension. In short, that
rock must have parts in itself (that is, it must be internally
quantified) if it has parts in a place (or is externally quantified).
The inner extension or internal quantity of our rock consists in “the position
of parts outside parts in the substance.” This type of quantity, internal
quantity, is quantity in the strict sense and is the property whereby an
existing bodily substance has, in itself, parts outside of parts. On internal
quantity (intrinsic extension) as constituting the essence of quantity,
Varvello writes: “That which constitutes the essence of anything is the entity
which we first conceive of that thing when we think of it, and besides we
conceive it as the root of all the other properties of the same thing. Now the
entity which we first conceive when we think of the quantity of a body, is what
we call intrinsic extension, or the distinction of the parts in regard to
themselves, in such a way that one part is not another; and the other
properties of a body we conceive as following intrinsic extension. For the reason
why we know that a body can have distinct parts with regard to another (namely
to place) and so be impenetrable, divisible, measurable, is that we understand
it to have first parts which are distinct in an absolute sense, that is, with
regard to themselves. By granting this property (intrinsic extension) to a
body, we know that the others too can be granted; but if we deny this property,
we know that the others also should be denied, and so this property, intrinsic
extension, and not the others, constitutes the essence of quantity.”[153]
Hart
observes that followers of St. Thomas, like Sylvester of Ferrara and John of
St. Thomas, working upon texts of the Angelic Doctor, in particular, texts like
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 50, a. 2, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 76,
a. 3, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV, chapter 65, and In IV Sent., d.
10, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, hold that “the material substance possesses simply its
prime matter and substantial form which has of itself no actual integral parts.
It is thus not divisible into smaller portions, each of which would contain the
two essential principles. It has of itself a need for integral parts, a
capability for receiving them in view of its material principle. This makes a
material substance quite different from a spiritual substance, which has no
such limiting demand. The quantity confers an internal distinction of integral
parts, one outside the other within the whole, that is, an internal or
potential quantity, as an absolute accident inseparable from the substance itself.
This is the primary effect of quantity, its essence as such. The secondary
effects which follow from its essence naturally are occupation of space and
therewith actual local extension, quantitative divisibility, measurability, and
impenetrability (that is, one part cannot occupy the same place in space as
another). This actual local extension is therefore a separate additional
character but is not absolutely required for quantity as such.”[154]
Hart
then writes that this position is obviously “in harmony with the theology of
the Eucharist. The substance of Christ’s Body has the perfection of essential
quantity, that is, internal or potential quantity, with parts of the Body
distinct with reference to the whole. But the secondary effects of actual local
extension with its divisibility, measurability, and impenetrability are
prevented. The Body is therefore whole in the entire Host and whole in every
part of the Host.”[155]
Four
Properties of Bodies as Quantified. As we have seen, internal quantity (internal or intrinsic
extension) is the essential constituent of quantity itself. But what are the
properties of bodies as quantified, those characteristics which belong by
natural necessity to quantified matter? They are four, namely, 1. external
extension (or extrinsic extension) which is the property of natural bodies
by which they are extended in space and occupy place; 2. incompenetrability
(or impenetrability), that property of a natural body, consequent upon its
external extension, which prevents another body from occupying its place while
it is present there itself; 3. divisibility, that property of a natural
body, consequent upon its extension, which renders it capable of being “taken
apart” or divided into an indefinite number of parts; and 4. mensurability,
which is that property of a natural body, consequent upon its external
extension, which renders it capable of comparison with the extension of other
bodies, and so discerned as greater, or lesser, or equal. Mensurability also
renders a body capable of being comparatively numbered in the extent of
its divisible parts.
Continuous
Quantity and Discrete Quantity. Quantity is either continuous or discrete.[156]
Continuous quantity is unbroken, undivided quantity and a bodily
substance which has continuous quantity is called a continuum. A
continuum is either perfect or imperfect. A perfect continuum
has no pores or vacuoles or interstices between or among its parts. An example
of a perfect continuum would be a solid piece of hard rock. An imperfect
continuum, on the other hand, has pores, interstices or intervals, but its
own unbroken substance completely surrounds them. An example of an imperfect
continuum would be the same hard piece of rock with many holes drilled through
it.
Discrete
quantity is
non-continuous quantity, broken or divided quantity. A pebble on a table is a
continuum while five separate pebbles lying on that same table, considered as
one quantity or amount, is a discrete quantity. If the five pebbles are close
enough to come into immediate contact with one another, then the quantity is contiguous.
If not, if the pebbles are not in immediate contact with each other, then the
quantity is non-contiguous or separate. The five pebbles held closely together
in the palm of my hand is called a contiguum. The pebbles held loosely
in my open hand so that the pebbles do not touch one another is termed a discrete
separate quantity.
Quantity
is Potentially, Not Actually, Infinite. Actually infinite quantity is repugnant for “1.
All quantity, whether continuous or separated, is made up of parts which, being
parts, are finite. But it is absurd that the infinite in act should be obtained
through a multiplication of finites, just as it is equally absurd that the
unlimited be obtained through the multiplication of limits ; 2. Quantity which
is supposed to be actually infinite, should be made up of parts. Now take away
from this quantity one part. The part which remains will be either finite or
infinite. If finite, we must say that the infinite can be diminished. If
infinite, we must say that we can have an infinite greater than another
infinite. But both hypotheses are absurd; and 3. Quantity which is supposed to
be actually infinite, since it is made up of parts, can be divided into two,
three, four parts, etc. Now these parts will be either finite, or infinite. If
finite, the absurdity follows that from the multiplication of finites the
infinite can be obtained. If infinite two other absurd conclusions follow: a)
the whole is not greater than its single parts, because these also are supposed
to be infinite; b) there can be an infinite greater than other infinities,
because four parts are surely greater than three parts, three greater than two,
therefore an actually infinite quantity is repugnant.”[157]
Quantity
is Not Identified with Substance. Though Descartes admitted to a modal distinction
between substance and accidents (i.e., that some accidents affect substance
variably), nevertheless, he erroneously maintained that the nature of a
physical body was extension in three dimensions, thus identifying substance
with extension. He identified the bodily substance with quantity on the ground
that there was no clear and distinct idea of corporeal substance apart from
extension.[158] But
contrary to Descartes’ mechanism, quantity is an accident, a property of corporeal substance, and is not to be
identified with it. Quantity is something which a bodily substance has,
not something which a bodily substance is: “Extension manifests itself
as a different nature in reality from the substance of the extended thing. The
extension or size can change, while its subject retains substantial identity.
The animal remains the same animal as it grows from foal to horse. It undergoes
real change in size, but remains really the same in substantial nature. The
substantial nature, moreover, is found whole and entire in every part of its
extension. Every part of a man’s body is human, every part of the iron is
equally metal. Its extension, on the other hand, is not found whole and entire
in each part. Rather, one part is not found in another, but outside the other.
Every part of the human body will possess the same substantial nature as any
other part, but not the same extension. The parts really coincide in nature
substantially; but they do not coincide in their extension, for each part
really lies outside the others. The substance, then, is really different from
each part and so from the totality of the parts that constitute the thing’s
extension or quantity. These two facts, namely growth in plants and animals,
and identity of nature throughout really differing parts, establish
sufficiently the real difference between substance and quantity.
“A
corporeal nature just in itself, therefore, is not extended. But it is a nature
that is capable of extension in the three dimensions. The capability or
potency to extension belongs to its very essence, and distinguishes it
radically from supersensible substance. A material nature is necessarily
composed of the two physical principles, matter and form. The matter allows the
formal principle to be spread through parts outside parts without any formal
increase whatsoever. In this way it renders the nature itself potentially
extended. But that potentiality can be actuated only through an accident, the
accident of quantity. Not even prime matter, just in itself, is extended. Prime
matter is only the substantial basis of extension, insofar as it makes a
formally identical nature capable of spread by a spperadded accident through
parts outside parts. The parts may be homogeneous, as in the case of a metal
like iron, or heterogeneous as in animals where the same animal nature is
spread through bone, marrow, muscle, nerves, and other such dissimilar parts.
“Continuous
quantity, then, is an accident of corporeal nature, and not a substance. It is
not primarily what exists, but is only an accidental mode under which corporeal
substances exist. Still less does discrete quantity exhibit itself as the
substance of anything. It rather presupposes extended substances and enumerates
them. It is accordingly subsequent to continuous quantity, and so is even more
manifestly of the accidental order.”[159]
2.
Quality
The
accident quality intrinsically affects the substance in itself, making it to be
in one way or another. It arises from the form of things and is found in both
corporeal and incorporeal beings. It is the most inclusive of accidents, having
the widest scope, meaning, and application. Quality indicates what sort or kind
a thing is. It modifies or influences a substance in itself or in its
activities. In language, most adjectives express qualities. It makes the
substance which it affects either better or worse, or makes it function more
easily or less easily. Qualities have their opposites and can be listed in opposite
pairs, like knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, and health and illness.
They are also susceptible to degrees, capable of being increased or diminished
in intensity.
3. Relation
Relation[160]
is that accident whose nature is a reference or order of one substance towards
another. It is that reference of one being towards another being, the order
that a being has with respect to other beings distinct from it. Examples of
relations include paternity, sonship and filiation. Paternity, for example, is
the accident that links father to son. Although it is based on the fact that
the father gave life to his son, paternity is itself no more than a mere
relation or reference which does not intrinsically add a new characteristic or
property to the father’s substance.
Main Division of Relations: Logical Relations and Real Relations. Relations can either be
real relations or relations of reason (logical relations). For example, the
relation between subject and predicate in a proposition is a logical relation.
Real relations, on the other hand, refer to relations in extra-mental reality.
The
elements of a real relation are the following: 1. the subject, which is
the person or thing in which the relation resides; 2. the term (terminus),
to which the subject is related; 3. the basis of the order between the
subject and the terminus; and 4. the relation itself, or the bond
linking one thing to another. In the case of sonship, for example, the subject
is the son, the terminus will be the father and mother (parents), the
basis would be generation (what causes the son to be related to his parents is
their having begotten him), and the relation itself would be sonship.
Five Conditions for a Real Relation. There are five conditions for a relation to
be real, namely, a real subject, a real foundation or basis, a real term, a
real distinction between subject and term, and lastly, things related as
subject and term must be in the same order or else the relation will not be
real in the subject and term: “(1) On the part of the subject related, the
subject is real. Paternity is a real relation because the father is a real
subject. (2) The foundation of the relation is real. Thus the father generating
is the real foundation for paternity. (3) The term of the relation is real. The
offspring as the term of the relation of paternity is real. (4) The term must
be really distinct from the subject of the relation. When the subject is
related to itself, the relation is logical such as the relation between Peter
and the man called Peter. (5) The things related as subject and term must be in
the same order, otherwise the relation is not real in subject and term. For
example, the relation of hearing is not in the same order in respect to subject
and term. For the subject hears the sound but the sound does not hear the
subject. This relation of hearing is real on the part of the subject hearing.
So too creatures and the Creator are really related on the part of creatures.
Creatures depend on the Creator to be and to act. But the relation of Creator
and creature is not real because God cannot be the real recipient of the
categorical relation because He does not stand in potency to anything as Pure
Act.”[161]
Kant’s Denial of Real Relations and Mercier’s Refutation. True to his transcendental
idealism, Immanuel Kant maintained that relation was but an a priori
subjective category of the mind, not an extra-subjective really existing
accidental category or predicament. Contrary to this position Mercier defends
the existence of real relations and critiques the Kantian position: “The proof
that real relations exist lies in the fact that, whether we think or not, two
real things which each measure a yard in length are equal, that a relation of
equality exists between them; that two twin-brothers are really
alike, apart from what anybody thinks. Hence in nature itself there do exist
real relations. The universe is made up of individual beings that are not
entirely absolute but which are interconnected with one another, long before we
have any knowledge of them, by a number of relations that constitute the order
of the universe.
“Opposed
to this theory of relation stands Kant’s idealistic conception of relation as a
subjective category of the mind which appertains to phenomena only as
the mind introduces it into them. The argument he uses to support this view is
that without a subjective operation of the understanding we can never perceive
a relation, there can be no relation for us; or, in other words, because we are
never aware of a relation except by a mental action, therefore it must be that
the mind introduces into phenomena the relations and laws which govern them.
This argument, however, sins through being ambiguous and is besides erroneous.
In the first place, whilst it may be true that a relation does not ‘exist for
us,’ that we do not know it as long as we fail to apprehend its two terms and
to perceive its foundation, nevertheless there are relations the terms and
foundation of which are anterior to any thought and in consequence are not due
to the mind. In the second place, besides all the arguments that militate
against idealism in general, we may urge against this idealistic theory of
relation a special difficulty. Every relation considered a priori,
without application to anything real, is capable of being either affirmative or
negative. How then does it happen that in certain particular cases we adhere to
one of such alternatives instead of to
the other? What, for instance, makes us judge that two particular phenomena are
alike rather than not alike? Even if the faculty of judging likeness and
difference is an internal law of the mind, the particular applications of such
a generic faculty can only come from external things themselves. And if this is
so, it must be allowed that some relations have a real, objective foundation that
is independent of our minds and of its modes of knowing.”[162]
4. Action
Action
arises in the substance insofar as it is the efficient or agent principle of
change or motion in something. This predicamental accident is the producing of
an effect by an agent and is indicated
when we say, for example, that: “The dog is gnawing a bone”; “The waiter is
pushing the refrigerator”; “The electrician is cleaning the airconditioner”;
“The soccer player is kicking the ball.”
5. Passion
Passion involves the receiving or
enduring or undergoing of change. It indicates that something is affected and
thus, it is the correlative and complement of action. It is the reception of
the effect from another, in the sense of suffering, bearing, enduring, receiving,
and being acted on. In passion a being actually receives an action, the actual
undergoing of action in its effect. If action is the actual doing, passion, the
complement of action, is the actual undergoing. Passion is the opposite of
action, but it is a related opposite, an opposite which is a term or goal.
Action and passion correspond mutually to each other, a motion[163]
with an origin in the substance acting and a terminus in the substance
suffering, enduring or undergoing. In language passion is expressed by the
passive voice of the transitive verb. Examples of passion is indicated in the
following: “The soldier was shot in the leg”; “Betty endured her ordeal in the
mountains after getting lost”; “The boxer was punched in the stomach.” Passion
answers the question, “What is happening to it.”
6. When? (Time)
Time[164] regards the temporal
situation of a corporeal substance or of an event with reference to what
precedes and what follows. Time is indicated using such expressions as: “Sam
took his exam today”; “Sam has an appointment at five o’clock”;
“Sam will go to the restaurant after classes”; “Sam had the accident ten
years ago”; “Sam’s father was born in the year 1964.” Though
oftentimes used interchangeably, time is not the same as the categorical accident
when for the latter signifies existence in time; but time does not exist
in time; therefore, when is not time. Our categorical accident when
is defined as that accident resulting in a body from the time by which it is
measured. When is a determination which a body has from extrinsic
time by which it is measured.
Time
is a species of duration. Duration is defined as the
persistence of a being in existence and can be of three types, namely, eternity
(the duration of God’s existence), aeviternity (the duration of
created spiritual substances), and time (the duration of physical
bodies).
Eternity is duration without beginning, succession or ending. This type of
duration, strictly speaking, belongs to God alone, the Infinite Being, and is
identified with His essence. Boethius defines eternity as “the complete,
simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life.”[165]
Aeviternity is a species of duration with a beginning but with no end and is proper
to angels and human souls. Though subject to accidental modification (i.e.,
willing and thinking) these immaterial substances do not undergo substantial
change. They have a beginning but have no end; they cannot be destroyed except
by annihilation by God. Angels and human souls are substantially incorruptible
and immortal and thus their mode of duration is different from the eternity of
God. Their mode of duration is called aeviternity (aeviternum or aeviternitas),
a sort of intermediate state between eternity and time. The accidental
modifications of an immaterial creatural being is surely measured by a type of
time, since there is succession involved in these accidental changes, but the
time, at least as regards the angels, is discontinuous rather than
continuous.
Time,
on the other hand, is a species of duration which has a beginning and an end,
“an accident (or non-substantial reality) which affects bodily things inasmuch
as these have motion or movement which presents to the mind phases of duration,
and of before and of afterwards. Aristotle called time ‘the
number or enumeration of motion looked at from the standpoint of before and
afterwards.’ The ‘number of motion’ means ‘the measure of movements’ or of the
concrete items or moments of a continuous thing, in which the end of one
moment is the beginning of the next following.”[166]
Time is number for it distinguishes the parts of motion, and to distinguish
parts is to number them. Time is not what is counted with (abstract or
mathematical number) but rather what is counted (concrete number). Time is what
is counted, the parts of motion, thus it is concrete number.
Time
is defined by Aristotle as “the number of movement according to before and
after.”[167] “This
definition,” explains Wallace, “develops from three inductive determinations
that successively establish (1) time as something of motion, (2) time as
continuous, and (3) time as number. (1) Time is not the same thing as motion,
for many different motions can take place in the same time, and motions can be
fast or slow whereas time remains uniform in its flow. On the other hand, time
inevitably accompanies motion, for where there is no awareness of motion or
change there is no passage of time. (2) Time is continuous because it is
associated with motion that traverses a continuous magnitude. A continuum is
formally one but materially made up of parts: these parts, joined to each other
by indivisibles, constitute an order of local before and after. A motion that
traverses such a spatial continuum has also an order of before and after, as
does time’s passage, e.g., when punctuated by the sun’s rising and setting, the
moon’s phases, the ebb and flow of the tides, the position of hands on a dial.
(3) Time is a numbering of the successive ‘nows’ that serve to mark its
passage. To grasp its being one must visualize a before and after under the
common aspect of their being a now and count them as two nows, i.e., as
a now-before and a now-after. These nows, the correlates of the here-before and
there-after in motion, are the numbered terminals of the continuum that itself
is time. The numbering referred to here is not that of an absolute or
mathematical number divorced from passage. Time is rather numbered number, the
number of and in motion that is indissociable from its flux.
“It
follows from this analysis that time has the same mode of existence as motion;
as a flowing continuum, it exists by reason of its indivisible, the present,
the punctiform now that separates but links past and future. Time is the
measure of motion, and so everything in nature is in time inasmuch as it is
connected with motion. Every natural substance, precisely as a mobile being,
enjoys an existential duration from generation to corruption that is contained
within time.”[168]
Time
is not a purely mental being, the position, for example, of Descartes (a mode
of thought[169]) and Kant
(an innate subjective a priori form of sensibility, anterior to all
experience, making all things and experiences appear as occurring in time[170]).
Neither is time a real existing thing in the physical world independent of the
mind as Epicurus and Gassendi, for example, maintain.[171]
Rather, time is a conceptual entity with a foundation in reality. Time
is a mental being, with a ground, a foundation, in the reality of the movements
occurring in nature. And these movements occurring in nature are real and
objective, whether our mind is focused on them or not.
Real Time, Possible Time, Absolute Time, and Imaginary Time. Time involved in actual
movements and changes occurring in the physical world is called real time.
Time involved in possible movements and changes which can, but will never,
occur is called possible time. The sum of real time and possible time is
called absolute time. An image of absolute time fashioned as a sort of
receptacle or stream wherein all individual times, actual and possible, have a
place, is called imaginary time.
Continuous Time, Discrete Time, Intrinsic Time and Extrinsic Time.
Continuous time is the successive duration of uninterrupted motion or
movement. Discrete time is divided into corporal discrete time
and spiritual discrete time. Corporal discrete time is the
duration of interrupted motion or movement, while spiritual discrete time
(proper to the angels) is a plurality of spiritual operations (i.e., thinking,
willing), each of which has its own indivisible duration, for it is not
successive.
Intrinsic Time and Extrinsic Time. Time, as measure, is principally divided
into intrinsic time and extrinsic time. Intrinsic Time
(also called individual time or particular time) is the intrinsic
duration of motion or movement as measured, while extrinsic time (also
called general time or common time) is the intrinsic duration of
any motion or movement that is used to measure the duration of another motion
or movement, as, for example, when the motion of a race watch measures the
duration of a Formula One race.[172]
7. Place (Where?)
Place[173] is an accident that regards
the localization of the substance, that is, it is the accident which arises in
a corporeal substance because of its being here or there. It deals with the
position of a body in space, with reference to other bodies. Some examples of
propositions referring to place: “Gerard is in New York”; “Gerard is at the
street-corner”; “Gerard is at the Chinese restaurant”
Place is defined as the
innermost motionless boundary of what contains or the immediate
immovable surface (or limit) of that which contains a body. This is external, proper place, or what is
commonly understood by place. First of all we must distinguish between external
place and internal place, and between proper place and common
place. Internal place is the surface proper to any body, which
surface is considered as its receptacle, while external place (which the
ordinary man understands when one speaks of place) is the place which a body
has from the surface of another or other bodies surrounding it. The external
place of a car, for example, would be the surface of the area where the car is
located as well as the air which surrounds the car. Now external place is subdivided
into proper place and common place. Proper place is the
surface of the surrounding body in which the body located or placed is
immediately surrounded. The external proper place of the water which fills a
water glass would be the internal surface itself of the water glass holding the
water. Common place, on the other hand, is the surface of the
surrounding body in which many bodies are contained mediately. The external
common place of the filled water glass would be the internal surface of the
room where the glass is located in.
External
proper place
is defined as the concave surface of a hollow body, immediately surrounding
another body, and conceived as immovable. Varvello explains the parts of
this definition for us: “1) ‘The concave surface of a hollow body’ because
external place is admitted by all to be in the surface of the body containing
another body; but what contains another body must be hollow in order that it
may receive that other body in its hollowness ; 2) ‘Immediately surrounding another
body,’ because here we treat of the external and proper place of one and the
same body; but place of this kind is evidently constituted of the surface which
receives into its sides the located body, and which is filled up and measured
by the located body ; 3) ‘And conceived as immovable,’ although the surface of
the body locating very often is physically, that is, materially moved and
changed (as happens with the surface of water and air which surrounds a rock
placed in the sea), nevertheless the same surface considered mathematically,
that is, formally as a certain surface, is neither moved nor changed, but
always retains the same dimensions and the same distances from the other parts
of space; that is, for example, from the surface of the shore, from the poles
and center of the earth, and therefore it is said to be immovable.”[174]
It
should be noted that the categorical accident where (or ubi) is
not place. Where is defined as the accident that results from the
circumscription of a body by the circumscription of a place. It is the
intrinsic determination of a body that results from place, and is therefore a
categorical accident of a kind all its own.
How
may a thing be in a place? How may it be localized? How may something be
present? A reality is localized in four chief ways, namely, circumscriptively,
informatively, operatively, and sacramentally: “1. If the
thing localized is a bodily substance with quantity it has presence in a
place, or is localized, in the literal and proper
sense of these expressions. A body is in a place (external and proper place)
when its own dimensions are immediately circumscribed by the dimensions of the
surrounding surface. Just so the baseball of which we are speaking is literally
and properly localized by the immediately surrounding air, the exactly-fitting
pocket of air, the inner surface of which is co-dimensional with the outer
surface of the baseball. Lay a coin on a sheet of paper and, with a finely
sharpened pencil, draw a close-fitting circle arround it. You have thus
‘written around’ the coin, and the circle you have written or drawn indicates
the location of the coin in so far as it has place on the paper. Now, the Latin
circumscriptum means ‘written around.’ This term gives us the English
phrase circumscription, or circumscriptive location.
Circumscriptive location is what we call location in its literal and
proper sense. And we say that all bodily substances are located, or are in
their proper external places, circumscriptively. Only bodies can be
present in a place circumscriptively. Yet, by a figure of speech, by metaphor
or analogy, we use the language of circumscription very frequently when we
speak of non-bodily things. Thus we speak of the place of the angels in heaven,
and of the places left vacant by the rebel angels. Thus again we speak of man’s
knowledge as something that is in him; our language seems to suggest
that it is in him in somewhat the same manner as his heart or his liver is in
him. But, of course, our language is metaphorical. Non-material things have no
dimensions which can be co-dimensional with a containing surface, and hence
they cannot literally be in a place circumscriptively.
“2.
If the thing localized is a form which gives actuality (existence) to a
substance or accident, it is said to in-form such substance or accident, and to
be in that substance or accident (i.e., to be located or placed
there) informatively. Thus the substantial form of any material
substance is said to be in that substance, or to be located in
that substance, informatively. Thus the soul is said to be located in the body.
Thus the character or quality of beauty is said to be in a beautiful
face or scene.
“3.
If the thing localized is a working force, an acting power, it is said to be
present where it works in a manner that is called operatively; it is
said to be present or to be placed operatively. There are two types of
operative presence: (a) A creatural power, a finite power (substantial –
like the soul; or accidental – like the power of seeing) can be present
only in one subject at a time, and is definitely limited to that
subject, and can function only there. It is thus said to be definitively
present in the subject in which it operates. Thus the human soul is said to be
present in the body operatively and definitively; we have already seen
that the soul is in the body informatively. (b) The Infinite Power (that is,
the Divine Essence Itself) is unlimited in itself, and therefore is unlimited
in the field of its exercise. And so it is present everywhere; it is ubiquitously
present (the term is from the Latin ubique, ‘everywhere’). Thus God (and
God’s power) is present everywhere operatively and ubiquitously; and,
since God’s power is identified with His Essence, his very Being, He is present
everywhere in full essence or essentially.
“4.
The fourth mode of localization or presence (or ubication, as it is
sometimes called; a term from the Latin ubicatio or ‘whereness’) does
not lie within the proper scope of a purely philosophical discussion, but we
add it here for reasons of completeness. It is the mode of presence exampled by
Christ in the Holy Eucharist. This mode of presence is called sacramental,
and it is defined as a presence wherein a located substance has place through
the mediation of the dimensions of another substance, but without making these
dimensions its own. Thus the substance of Christ is present under the
appearances (and dimensions) of bread and wine, but the dimensions of the
transubstantiated bread and wine are not the dimensions of Christ. Christ is
present in a tiny host, not in minature, not partially, but whole and entire in
the fullness of His mature humanity as well as in the fulness of His divinity.
And, while the host we look upon is really Christ Himself, we cannot transfer
the dimensions and other accidents of the host to Christ and say that Christ is
small, or Christ is round, or Christ is white, or Christ is brittle. For Our
Lord uses the extension and other accidents of the host as the ‘veil,’ so to
speak, of His presence, but He does not make this extension and these other
accidents His own extension and accidents. He is present in the Holy Eucharist sacramentally.”[175]
8. Position (Posture)
Position (also called posture) regards the corporeal substance’s way of being
in a place, like for instance, “Gerry is standing up,” “Gerry is squating,”
“Gerry is sitting down.” This accident indicates the relative position of parts
of the same corporeal substance. Position is different from place for it refers
to the relative internal arrangement of the various parts of the localized
bodily being. Thus, a body can be in different positions at the same place.
“Since quantity extends in all static directions, it permits a thing to dispose
its parts in different order while remaining roughly in the same place. A man
can remain in the same room, and roughly in the same place, while sitting,
standing, or lying down. He really changes his posture without changing his place.
His members, of course, change place. Posture therefore presupposes the
category ‘where,’ somewhat as discrete quantity presupposes continuous
quantity, and follows upon it as a further determination of the way a thing is
in place. There is no doubt about its reality, as the above examples show.”[176]
9.
Possession (State or Habitus)
Possession
(also
called state or habitus) refers to the external adjuncts of a body. It
is a special accident expressive of material and external things immediately
adjacent to the subject. Some examples: “John is wearing his formal suit and
tie”; “John is wearing his Cartier watch”; “John is wearing his leather shoes.”
Only humans are capable, in the strict sense, of possessing things, and so this
accident properly belongs to the human species alone. “The external things with
which a man is in contact and of which he makes use,” writes Owens, “serve to
constitute him in one state or another. In the traditional examples, he may be
armed, shod, clothed. A new category is thereby set up, grounded, as can be
seen from these instances, upon quantity and action and relations like those of
proximity and ownership. This category was named by Aristotle echein ‘to
have’ and accordingly was called in Latin habitus. The Greek verb, however,
as the Aristotelian examples show, was used here in its sense of being in a
certain state or disposition. The Latin translation misses this meaning, and is
confusing on account of the use of the same term habitus to translate
the Aristotelian hexis, or ‘habit’ in the first subdivision of the
category of quality.
“State
is quite evidently a real way of being, as the examples make manifest. It is
consequent upon relations, and denominates a man from extrinsic things like
weapons, shoes, or clothes. Properly it pertains only to man, on account of his
dominion over material things, but reductively states of animals domesticated
by man are brought under it, as when a horse is ornamented, saddled, or barbed.
Though denominated from what is extrinsic, it is in the subject in the sense of
an accident’s dependence in being. Without the subject there could not be the
state. Whether the category extends to states like wealth, slavery, power, or
marriage, is not determined in Aristotelian tradition. In common with where,
posture and when, state is not an inherent actuality in its
subject, and is consequent upon relations instead of grounding them.[177]
Though
it is the substance that is the subject of the accidents, an accident can be called
the subject of another insofar as the latter inheres or resides in the
substance through the former. For example, color, which is a quality, affects
the bodily substance only insofar as the substance is endowed with quantity; a
substance without quantity simply cannot be colored. Another ordering among
accidents: an accident can be in potency with respect to another accident. For
example, a substance which has the accident quantity is in potency to be in a
place other than where it currently is. At first the substance and its accident
quantity is actually in a certain place, but is also potentially in another
place. If it proceeds to that other place, then it is actually in that place,
and not just in potency to be in that place. Lastly, certain accidents can be
considered to be the causes of other accidents. For example, the action of the
conjugal act (an accident) is the action by which husband and wife generate a
son or daughter which gives rise to the relations of paternity and filiation
between parents and offspring. Another example: having the virtue of fortitude
(an accident) gives rise to, or is the cause of, brave actions (accidents) in a
person (substance). It is to be noted that as regards a corporeal substance,
quantity is its first accident since all other accidents such as quality,
action, passion, and so forth, are rooted in the substance by means of its
quantity.
CHAPTER 5
We
arrive at an initial knowledge of the doctrine of act and potency[178]
through the observation of change or motion. Before Aristotle arrived at the
scene, there were two great errors concerning the problem of change and
stability in beings: the static monism of Parmenides and the philosophy of
becoming of Heraclitus.
Though
Parmenides was the first formulator of the principle of non-contradiction
(Aristotle and Aquinas later perfected this formulation) he, nevertheless,
denied the possibility of motion or change in the world, adopting a monistic
conception of the world, a sad consequence of his univocal conception of being.
“Parmenides of Elea and the Eleatic school reasoned more or less in the
following way: A thing either is or is not. If it is, it is being; if it is
not, it is non-being or nothing. Now when we say that a change takes place,
that which comes to be, before the change either is or is not. If it is, it is
being; if it is not, it is non-being. But we cannot say that before the change
it is; for this would mean that it comes to be what it is already, that being comes
to be being. Obviously a thing cannot come to be what it already is. On the
other hand, it is equally impossible that what comes to be is not before the
change; for this would mean that non-being comes to be, that non-being becomes
being. But it is clear that non-being cannot come to be being. Hence we are
forced to conclude that change or becoming is positively unintelligible[179]
and therefore impossible. What, then, must we say about the so-called changes which
we see happening all around us? Only one conclusion is possible: since change
is impossible, our senses deceive us when they testify to the reality of
change; for reason clearly shows that all change is a contradiction in terms.
Moreover, it follows that all reality is but one being. For whatever is
different has to differ either by being or by non-being; now what differs by
non-being or nothing is not different; while on the other hand things cannot
differ by being because being is precisely that by which they are the same. In
this way Parmenides was led to static monism – monism, because
the admitted the existence of only one thing; static, because he denied
that this one thing was subject to any change whatsoever.”[180]
Heraclitus,
on the other hand, affirmed that only change was real, stability was an
illusion, there being no fixed natures or essences in things, everything being
in a constant flux; there are no stable beings but only change or becoming.
“Rather than deny the obvious testimony of the senses for the reality of
change, he (Heraclitus) chose to deny the reality of being. According to him,
reality is not being but becoming or change. Whatever seems to be is nothing
but a deception, just as a stream may seem to be always the same, but in reality
is always changing. His theory was aptly summarized in the famous formula panta
rei, ‘everything is in a state of flux.’”[181]
It
was Aristotle who arrived at a solution to the Parmenidean and Heraclitean
errors concerning change and stability in beings (entia) with his
doctrine of act and potency. “No solution was considered to be satisfactory
before Aristotle solved the puzzle. With Parmenides, Aristotle maintained that
being is real, and with Heraclitus, he asserted that change is real. The
solution of the apparent contradiction he sees in the fact that a distinction
has to be made in being itself. Being, he says, ‘is distinguished in respect of
potency and complete reality,’[182]
or as it is usually expressed by scholastic philosophers, being is divided into
being-in-act and being-in-potency. In other words, Aristotle admits that there
is a middle ground, not between being and non-being, but between being-in-act
and non-being, and this middle ground is called being-in-potency. ‘We say that
potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the
half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even
the man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying.’[183]
Thus when we say that a thing comes to be, this does not mean that non-being
becomes being, but merely that being-in-potency becomes being-in-act, and this
does not imply any contradiction. Therefore, being and change are both
intelligible, and there is no reason to reject the reality of either.”[184]
The
change or motion that we see around us is definitely real; it is the passage
from being in potency to being in actuality. It is the successive actualization
of the potency. For example, hot water is in a state of actuality and cold
water is in a state of potentiality towards being hot water. When water is
heated with fire it slowly starts to boil. This process of water being heated
is a transition from cold water (the state of potentiality) to hot water (the
state of actuality). What is formerly in potency undergoes a successive
actualization of the potency towards a state of actuality (in hot water).
Potency is the capacity to have a perfection while act is the
perfection which a subject possesses. Act is contrasted to potency, which
is the potentiality to receive the perfection or act. Potency and act are
directly known through experience as correlative to each other. In the case of
potency its very constitution is to be directed towards some type of act.
Because they are primary and evident notions, they cannot be strictly defined
but only described by means of examples and by contrasting these notions with
one another: “Strictly speaking, these terms cannot be defined. Act and potency
are immediate divisions of ‘being.’ In order to be defined, ‘being’ would have
to be their proximate genus in the definition; but ‘being,’ as was pointed out
before, is not a strict and true genus.”[185]
Though act and potency cannot be strictly defined, since a strict definition
consists of a genus and a specific difference, and these cannot be found in the
most primary and fundamental notions of being, nevertheless, “potency
may be described by means of its relationship to act as the capacity for an
act. Act itself, however, cannot even be described in this way by means of
a relationship to potency. For instance, it would not be correct to describe
act as the actuation or fulfillment of a potency. For in doing so we should
imply that every act is a fulfillment of a potency and therefore presupposes
potency. While, as a matter of fact, it is true that most acts presuppose
potency, this is not so because they are acts, but because they are limited
acts. Act as act merely implies perfection, and not that this perfection is
limited. All we can do, therefore, to clarify the concept of act is to give
examples.[186] The act of
‘building’ is in him who is building now; but the potency of ‘building’ is in
him who is not building now, although he is capable of it; the act of ‘heat’ is
in that which is hot now, but the potency of ‘heat’ is in that which is not hot
now, although it is capable of being hot; the act of ‘animality’ is in that
which is animal now, but the potency of ‘animality’ is in that which is not
animal now, although it is capable of becoming animal; etc.”[187]
Explaining
the philosophical principles of act (actus) and potency (potentia),
Bittle has the following words to say: “According to philosophical terminology
an act (Latin, actus) means any entity of whatever kind and nature which
perfects and determines a thing in its being. Thus, the term ‘act’ includes the
power or faculty as well as the operations of that power, because
this power is a perfection for the thing which has it; it includes every accidental
modification of a being because every accident (e.g., color, heat, weight,
shape, etc.) perfects the being in some way; it includes every essential entity,
because nothing is more perfecting for a thing than its essence; it also
includes existence, because existence is a perfection for a being.
Whatever a being has or is in a positive manner is an ‘act’ for
it. Man’s substantiality, materiality, life, sentiency, and rationality, are
‘acts’; his quantity, size, shape, age, sex, color, health, are ‘acts’; his
powers of reason and of will, of locomotion, of digestion, of seeing, hearing,
feeling, etc., all these are so many ‘acts,’ perfecting and determining his
being in its respective order as ‘man.’ And so with all other beings. The term
‘act,’ therefore, has a specialized and technical meaning, much wider than its
signification in ordinary language.
“Potency
(Latin, potentia, power) is the capacity or aptitude for something.
It is the correlative term to ‘act.’ ‘Potency’ is always the capacity or
aptitude in reference to something which a being is not or has not, but which
it can be or can receive. Any being, in so far as it has not as yet received a
certain ‘act’ or perfection, but is capable of receiving it, is said to be ‘in
potency’ for this act. Hydrogen, for example, has the ‘act’ of hydrogen; and
oxygen has the ‘act’ of oxygen: but both have the ‘potency’ of water; they are
‘actually’ hydrogen and oxygen, but ‘potentially’ water. Water, on the other
hand, is ‘actually’ water; but it is ‘potentially’ hydrogen and oxygen, because
it has the aptitude to be resolved into them. Common salt is ‘actually’ salt,
but it is ‘potentially’ chlorine and sodium.
“If
we consider the relation between ‘act’ and ‘potency,’ we find that it is the
relation of the completing to the incomplete, the determining to the determinable,
the perfecting to the perfectible. Since these are relative terms, it is
obvious that an entity may be a determination and perfection for a being in one
way and thus be an act, and it may also be determinable and perfectible in
itself and thus be a potency. The intellect, for example, is a positive
perfection of the mind, and thus an ‘act,’ for man; but the intellect itself is
perfected by the actual thinking process (which is an ‘act’ for the intellect),
and it is, from this point of view, a ‘potency.’ Similarly, the power of
locomotion is a perfection, an ‘act,’ for a resting dog; but the act of running
is a perfection for this power of locomotion, and the power of locomotion is
thus seen to be a ‘potency’ with regard to this act of running. An entity,
therefore, can be both an ‘act’ and a ‘potency,’ when considered from different
viewpoints; but never with reference to the same perfection under the same
respect, because that would violate the principle of non-contradiction.”[188]
Act
and potency should be considered under two aspects, namely, the physical (which
is linked to change or motion), and the metaphysical. Regarding the physical
aspect, act and potency form the elements that make change or motion
understandable. Here, what is actual cannot be at the same time potential and
vice versa. Hot water cannot be cold water at the same time and in the same
respect. Change is the transition between being in potentiality and
being in actuality.
Regarding
the metaphysical aspect, act and potency form the stable constituent
principles of all things (finite things, that is, which excludes God who is
Pure Act without any admixture of potentiality whatsoever), so much so that the
potency, even after having been made actual, continues to be a co-principle of
its corresponding act. In all material beings, which are hylemorphic composites
of prime matter (potency) and substantial form (act), prime matter remains even
after reception of its form.
Potency
is that which can receive an act or already has it. This statement implies a
number of things: 1. that potency is distinct from act; 2. that act and potency
are not complete realities but rather principles or aspects found in things; 3.
that potency is to act as the imperfect is to the perfect; and 4. that in
itself potency is not a mere privation of act but is a real capacity for
perfection.
1.
Potency is Really Distinct from Act. This can be shown when act is
viewed as separated from its corresponding potency. For example, the exterior
sense of hearing sometimes is hearing and at other times is not. Yet no one
doubts that man has the potency or power for hearing. The exterior sense of
sight is sometimes seeing and other times is not, yet men have the potentiality
or capacity to see. A person may at times be walking, and at other times he may
be at rest, yet he still has the potentiality or capacity to walk. These
various potencies or powers of man may not be currently in use, that is, they
may not be actualized, but they still remain potencies. Thus, potency is
characterized as being the capacity to have an act or by being a receptive
subject, and is therefore distinct from act. “The constituent principles of a
reality which are called potency and act must be really distinct. For that
which perfects cannot be really the same as that which is perfectible;
otherwise the perfectible would give itself an act which it does not have, so
that being would come from non-being. Moreover, if potency and act were not
really distinct, that which limits and that which is limited would be really
the same, so that act would limit itself.
“From
the real distinction of potency and act it follows that nothing can be
potency and act in the same respect because this would imply that that
which perfects is really the same as that which is perfected or perfectible.
This assertion, however, does not mean that a higher degree of the same act
cannot be received by a subject whose potency is already partially actualized.
An intellect, for instance, which has already been actualized with respect to
the knowledge of one thing can continue to acquire more knowledge and thus
becomes more actualized. But that part of a potency which has become actualized
is no longer potency. On the other hand, in different respects a thing
may be in potency and act at the same time. For instance, the power of speech
may be considered as an act insofar as it perfects man’s nature, but insofar as
it can be perfected by the act of speech it is a potency. Thus it is quite
possible that what is an act in one order is a potency in a different order. It
is even possible for an act to be unlimited in one order and limited in a
different order.”[189]
2.
Act and Potency are Not Complete Realities but Rather Principles or Aspects
Found in Things. Act and potency are the distinct co-principles of a thing.
Act is not a subsistent being and potency is not a subsistent being; rather,
they are intrinsic principles of a finite being.
3.
Potency is to Act as the Imperfect is to the Perfect. In its strict meaning,
act means perfection, a completion, something determinate. Potency, on the
other hand, is an imperfection, a capacity for perfection. The fully finished
marble statue of the Pietà in St. Peter’s basilica is something determinate, a
perfection, something in act, while the shapeless block of marble that was the
initial material that Michelangelo would later use would be the determinable,
the imperfect, the potency, the potentiality for perfection.
4.
In Itself Potency is not a Mere Privation of Act but a Real Capacity for
Perfection. The external sense of sight, when not in use, is not a mere
privation, but is at that very moment potentially capable of being actualized
by the actual operation of seeing, which is a perfection.
Subjective Potency and Objective Potency. Also called logical
potency, objective potency is the capacity of a non-existent being
for existence, founded in the non-repugnance of a subject and predicate. For example,
man was objectively possible before he was created. Subjective potency,
which is real potency, is the capacity or aptitude of an existing being for an
act (for example, the potency by which a piece of marble can receive the act of
the form of a statue).
Passive Potency and Active Potency. Passive potency is the capacity a
thing has to be changed by another as other, while active potency is the
power to effect a change in another as other. Passive potency is the capacity to
receive while active potency is the power to do. Passive potency can be pure or
mixed.
Pure Potency and Mixed Potency. Pure potency is potency that is not
actualized in any way, being essentially and totally indeterminate. It exists
in the corporeal beings and is called prime matter. Mixed potency
is all that which is actuated in part but is still further actualizable. This
pertains to every finite being. Thus, for example, water is in act with respect
to the form of water, but is in potency with respect to heat.
Pure Act and Mixed Act. Pure act is act which admits of no potency
whatsoever. This is God Himself. Mixed act is act which is received into
potency, or it is act which is in potency to act of another order. Mixed act is
either entitative or formal.
Entitative Act and Formal Act. Entitative act is the very act of being (esse)
of a finite thing. Entitative act is a mixed act inasmuch as it is received
into a potency which limits it, not inasmuch as it is in potency to further
act, for esse is the ultimate act. Formal act, the act of essence, act
in the order of essence, is the act by which a thing is determined and
perfected in its species; v.g., substantial form.
First Act and Second Act. First act is act which does not presuppose
an anterior act, but awaits a subsequent act; v.g., substantial form. Second
act, on the other hand, is act which presupposes an anterior act; v.g., an
accident. Therefore, second act is accidental act. An example of second act
would be acts of thinking (the operative power of intelligence would, in
contrast to thought, be an active potency).
Act
has primacy over potency in a number of ways: 1. Act is prior to potency as
regards perfection; 2. Act has cognitive priority over potency; 3. Act has a
causal primacy over potency; and 4. Act has a temporal primacy over potency.
Act is Prior to Potency as Regards Perfection. Act is perfection while
potency is imperfection waiting to be perfected by act. A thing is perfect
insofar as it is in act while imperfect while in potency. Being in act constitutes the end or goal
towards which being in potency strives for. Sight, for example, is ordered
towards the goal of seeing, and without the latter activity the operative
potency would be frustrated. With regard to man, his human body is the potency
which receives the rational soul as its act and becomes subordinated to this
perfection. Therefore, act is prior to potency as regards perfection.
In line with Aristotelian metaphysics, Krapiec speaks of an ontic (or substantial) primacy of act over potency, writing: “What should we understand by the term ‘ontic’ or ‘substantial’ primacy? According to Aristotle, essence – substance – is the chief and primary manifestation of being, and as such is something perfect. Essential primacy is, therefore, synonymous with perfect primacy. The question, then, is what is more real, what constitutes the ‘reason of being’: act or potency? Also, the perfection of a thing can be apprehended in two aspects: either by reason of its form or by reason of its end.
“Form is the factor perfecting the thing. Act is essentially more perfect than potency in the formal aspect. Why? Let us consider how things arise. The form of a thing is what designates the thing’s essence; it is the basis for defining the thing; it ‘comes’ to the thing as its ultimately determining factor. Now, the form of the thing is act, for forms are acts in relation to passive potency, that is, in relation to matter with all its dispositions. If, then, form is act and form is the essential perfection of a thing, since it constitutes the thing’s essence, then act is the essential perfection of a thing, since it constitutes the thing’s essence, then act is the essential perfection of the thing; it is essentially more perfect than potency, than all the factors that dispose the thing to receive form-act.
“The essential perfection of act in relation to potency becomes still more apparent when act is analyzed as the thing’s end. The final cause ‘justifies’ all other causes, for the real motion and generation of a thing ultimately depends on its end, which as a motive force is the reason of being of action. In relation to potency, act is an end, and the end is what is more perfect in the order of causes. Consequently, act is also something most perfect, and so, in relation to potency, act is a perfection.
“Act is an end in the order of both passive and active potency. In the realm of passive potency, matter is not determined until it possesses act. The emergence of act, therefore fulfills matter and determines it, as the end determines the efficient cause to a particular kind of action. Act is likewise an end, and thus also a perfection, in relation to active potency, since such potency exists for action. The very arrangement of elements constituting this potency points to the fact that active potency is ordered to act-action, without which it is completely unintelligible. Act, therefore, lies at the basis of the understanding of passive and active potency, insofar as the understanding of a thing takes place by apprehending its formal and final causes.
“If act is essentially more perfect than potency (as is clear from the analysis of formal and final causality, with which causes act is identified), then each thing is perfect to the extent it is in act and imperfect to the extent it is in potency (unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum est actu, imperfectum inquantum in potentia). Moreover, if a thing is perfect to the extent it is act, that is, if the measure of perfection is the act or the ‘actuality’ of a thing, then pure act is all-perfect, and everything else apart from it is only relatively perfect (actus purus est omniperfectus, actus in aliquo ordine purus in eo est totaliter perfectus).”[190]
2.
Act Has Cognitive Priority over Potency. Act has a cognitive priority
over potency as the latter is ‘defined’ by the former, that is, in relation to
the former, as the ability or capacity to build is known from the act of
building, or the ability or capacity for sight is known from the act of seeing.
“Any potency is known through its act, since it is no more than the capacity to
receive it, possess it, or produce a perfection. Consequently, the definition
of each potency includes its own act, which is what differentiates it from
other potencies. Thus, hearing is defined as the power to grasp sounds, and the
will is defined as the power to love the good. The primacy of act in knowledge
is based on the very nature of potency, which is nothing but the capacity for
an act.”[191] “Cognitive
primacy,” says Krapiec, “occurs when the cognition of one thing requires the
prior cognition of another, so that the one thing may be cognized in light of
the other. Act enters into the understanding of potency; act is the reason of
the cognition of potency; and, therefore, act is cognitively prior to potency.
But why does act conceptually justify potency? Potency is real when it has
within it real dispositions in relation to some act. In other words, potency
becomes something real through its real ordination to act. Consequently, it is
found in relation to act, and this is a relation that defines potency through
act, without which potency is unintelligible. This is also why the names of a
real potency are not derived from the potency, but from the act that defines
and realizes it, the act to which the given potency is ordered.
“From
this it follows that the understanding and explanation of potency takes place
through act, while the understanding of act takes place spontaneously, by way
of ‘induction’ and through an analysis of examples (potentia innotescit et
definitur per actum, actus autem non potest definiri). Properly speaking,
neither act nor potency has a strict definition, since they are the first
elements of being and cognition; still, this very cognition we have of act and
potency is governed by a certain subordination. On the basis of a previously
cognized act, by means of intuition or a ‘quasi demonstration,’ we can cognize
the character of potency. Act expresses in itself a certain perfection, a
certain completed being, and so it can be cognized without appealing to
potency, whereas potency can never be cognized without act. Act, therefore,
‘specifies’ potency and endows it with a determinate content (actus explicat
potentiam, seu potentia sumit speciem ex actu).”[192]
3.
Act has a Causal Primacy over Potency. What is in potency does not
become actual without the influence of something already in act. For example,
fire (something in act) causes cold wood (in potency) to become hot and then to
be fire. Without that prior act cold wood would never of itself be in act.
Either it burns by fire (in act) or is heated by the sun (in act) which causes
the cold wood to be hot. Therefore, act has a causal primacy over potency.
4. Act
has a Temporal Primacy over Potency. Potency does indeed have a certain
temporal primacy over act; for example, the operative powers of intellect and
will (active potencies) come before the production of the activities of
thinking and willing (second acts). However, the operative potencies of
intellect and will point to an agent cause, the soul, which is prior in act.
Another example: an acorn (in potency) came before the full grown pine tree (in
act), but this acorn had to be, of necessity, the fruit of a prior tree (in
act). Therefore, act has a temporal primacy over potency. “In examining the
temporal primacy of act in relation to potency, Aristotle makes certain
distinctions, separately considering potency in a concrete case, where the
potency in question is ‘passive potency,’ and potency and act as such,
apprehended in their content absolutely. ‘Passive’ potency, apprehended in a
concrete case in some individual, is temporally prior to act. On the other
hand, act as act, conceived of in terms of the species, is temporally prior in
relation to potency. When we consider some individual, this here human being,
Socrates, we know that ‘this here’ human being at some previous time did not
exist. But if he now lives and exists, then before he came into existence,
before he became act, he existed in potency in his causes. The state of
potency, therefore, temporally precedes the state of act in the concrete case:
the life of a human being. Hence, potency in the order of actualization, in the
order of coming into existence, is prior to act in concrete
individuals. A similar situation occurs with every being that has arisen in
time. Real potency, however, is always realized, actualized, through some act.
That which is in potency does not of itself pass from potency to reality, or
act; it does not actualize itself. This actualization takes place under the
influence of some factor external to potency, an acting factor: act.”[193]
Regarding
the relation between act and potency as principles of being, we can state the
following: 1. Potency is the subject in which the act is received; 2. Act is
limited by the potency which receives it; 3. Act is multiplied through potency;
4. Act is related to potency as that which is participated to the participant;
and 5. The act-potency composition does not destroy the substantial unity of
being.
1. Potency
is the Subject in which the Act is Received. We look at a man, for example,
and begin to know his various perfections (acts), like the color of his hair,
eyes and skin, without ever denying that these perfections reside in that
person (potency), who is the subject of these perfections (acts).
2.
Act is Limited by the Potency which Receives It. Every act received in a
subject is limited by the capacity of that subject. The perfection of redness
in an apple is limited by the substance apple, its recipient. An apple can only
contain as much redness as the dimensions of that fruit allow. Unreceived act
is in itself unlimited, and when one finds limited instances of act, it is
because of a potency which receives and limits it.
Wippel
on Unreceived Act as Unlimited
Against
the Dutch scholar Rudi te Velde who denies that Thomas Aquinas ever taught the
principle “that act is not limited except by a distinct potency that receives
it” with regard to act of being and essence, the Thomist scholar John F. Wippel
presents texts of the works of St. Thomas where the he holds the principle. The
axiom is this: unreceived act is unlimited and when one finds limited instances
of act, especially the act of being (esse), one must account for this by
appealing to a distinct principle that receives and limits it. In the first
part of his essay entitled Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act
is Unlimited, published in The Review of Metaphysics in 1998,[194]
Wippel, an expert on the metaphysical thought of Aquinas, presents texts where the
Angelic Doctor either implicitly or explicitly holds the axiom. In the second
part, Wippel shows, against the position of Jean-Dominique Robert,[195]
that Thomas employs the axiom or principle as an argument for the composition
and distinction between essence and act of being in finite creatures. Wippel
presents a text from the early work of St. Thomas, namely the sed contra
of d. 8, q. 5, a.1 of the first book of the Commentary on the Sentences,
that supports that every creature is really composed of esse and essentia
(quod est): “Every creature has finite esse. However, an esse
that is not received in something is not finite, nay it is unrestricted (absolutum).
Therefore every creature has an esse that is received in something, and
so must have these two at least – namely, esse, and that which receives esse.”[196]
Aside from affirming that unreceived act is unlimited or infinite, Thomas
applies the principle that act is limited by a distinct potency that receives
and limits it, to esse and essence. Wippel writes concerning the text:
“Here we have a very clear expression of the first part of our axiom, to the
effect that unreceived esse is not finite, but unrestricted or infinite.
Moreover, we also have an immediate application of this to the situation of
creatures. Because every creature is finite, it must have both an act of being
that is received in something, and something that receives its act of being.
Otherwise, according to the axiom, its act of being would be unlimited.
Therefore it consists of these two at least, an act of being, and that which
receives it…According to Thomas’ thinking, act, especially the act of being, is
not self-limiting. It is not enough to appeal to an extrinsic principle or
cause to account for the intrinsic limitation within a finite entity of that
which is not self-limiting. Therefore, Thomas would conclude to the need for an
intrinsic principle therein that receives and limits its act of being. For
Thomas, of course, the act of being and the principle that receives and limits
it must be related to one another as actuality and potentiality.”[197]
For Aquinas, Wippel observes, the axiom that ‘unreceived act is unlimited and
that where one finds limited instances of act, especially the act of being, one
must account for this by appealing to a distinct principle that receives and
limits it,’ is a self-evident one.[198]
Wippel qualifies this, his view, saying “for Aquinas” because acceptance of
this axiom, at least in its application to the act of being, presupposes that
one understand that, for St. Thomas, esse is the act of acts, and
because of this, is the perfection of all perfections. His position is
unmistakable in De Potentia q. 7, a. 2, ad 9. Wippel observes that “if
this is one’s understanding of esse, and it surely is Aquinas’s, it will
only be reasonable for him to conclude that esse is not self-limiting.
To say anything else would be to account for the limitation and imperfection
(the negation of further perfection) of a given being by appealing to that
which is its ultimate principle of actuality and perfection. For Thomas,
actuality and perfection go together.”[199]
Norris
Clarke on the Limitation of Act by Potency
In
an influential essay written in 1952,[200]
W. Norris Clarke rejects what he calls the “traditional interpretation” of
Aristotle on the origin of the principle that act is limited by a potency which
receives it. He laments the fact that up until recently the influence of
Neoplatonism upon St. Thomas’ metaphysical thought had been somewhat obscured
by the idea that Thomas simply ‘baptized’ Aristotle’s philosophy. He cites the
thought of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange as an example of the traditional
interpretation that the doctrine of the limitation of act by potency in its
essentials had already been the position of Aristotle, but that it was Thomas
Aquinas who utilized this doctrine, developed and perfected it, by applying it
to the realm of essence and act of being, something that the Stagirite failed
to accomplish.
Norris
Clarke quotes Garrigou-Lagrange on the principle of the limitation of act by
potency: “Aristotle already taught this doctrine. In the first two books of his
Physica he shows with admirable clearness the truth, at least in the
sense world, of this principle. Act, he says, is limited and multiplied by
potency. Act determines potency, actualizes potency, but is limited by that
same potency…Aristotle studied this principle in the sense world. St. Thomas
extends the principle, elevates it, sees its consequences, not only in the
sense world, but universally, in all orders of being, spiritual as well as
corporeal…”[201] Norris
Clarke criticizes this interpretation, saying that it is simply not backed up
with evidence, that is, with proper quotes from Aristotle’s works, in
particular, with quotes from the first two books of the Physics. Having
consulted Garrigou-Lagrange’s book, I can say that Norris Clarke is indeed
right concerning the lack of evidence, that is, the lack of pertinent quotes
from Aristotle, to support his claim. In fact, Norris Clarke writes that he
could not find the pertinent quotations of Aristotle in any of
Garrigou-Lagrange’s works regarding his traditional interpretation: “Despite
the categorical assertion of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange in the above quotation,
neither here nor anywhere else in his numerous writings on this doctrine does
he ever quote or refer to any precise text where Aristotle himself affirms the
limiting role of potency with regard to act.”[202]
Having also consulted all the texts of the Stagirite’s works regarding act and
potency Norris Clarke relates that he could not find Aristotle teaching that
act is limited by potency anywhere at all: “A careful examination of the entire
first two books of the Physics, referred to as teaching the doctrine
clearly, reveals that nowhere in them does there occur any mention of the word
or the idea of limit in connection with potency. Nor have I been able to find
in any other Thomistic author a precise reference to any text of Aristotle
which would bear out the above position. These puzzling facts led the present
author to undertake a direct examination of all the passages in Aristotle which
deal with either act and potency or its applications. The results were entirely
negative. Nowhere could we discover any text from which one could conclude, in
accord with the accepted norms of objective historical interpretation, that
Aristotle himself ever held the doctrine that potency plays the role limiting
principle with respect to act, which if unmixed with potency would be
unlimited. This textual analysis receives strong confirmation from the fact
that if we turn to the modern scholarly studies of Aristotle as well as to his
ancient commentators we find that not one of them so much as mentions the
principle of the limitation of act by potency as forming part of the
Aristotelian teaching on act and potency.”[203]
He likewise observes that St. Thomas himself does not mention Aristotle
advocating the doctrine in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of
Aristotle, not even in book nine of the commentary which deals exclusively with
the doctrine of act and potency.
For
Norris Clarke, Aristotle teaches the opposite of Thomas’ doctrine, holding that
the principle of limit is identified with perfection or act, and the unlimited
with imperfection or potency. When the doctrine of act and potency is applied
to prime matter and substantial form Aristotle holds that the role of form
(act) is to impose a limit on the formless infinity of prime matter (taken by
itself) and thus to confer upon it determination and intelligibility.[204]
For Thomas, of course, it is the reverse: substantial form (act) is limited by
the prime matter (potency), accidents (acts) are limited by substance
(potency), and act of being (act) is limited by the essence (potency) which
receives it. Where did he get this reversal of doctrine compared to Aristotle?
The Platonic-Neoplatonic participation framework, which was alien to the
Aristotelian perspective. For Norris Clarke, the Stagirite explicitly rejected
“all ontological participation or transcendence of material forms.[205]
It is quite true that he does teach explicitly that forms of themseves are
unique and can be multiplied only by reception in matter.[206]
But nowhere does he say or imply that such multiplication involves a process of
limitation by matter of a form which by itself could be called infinite. On the
contrary, he insists against Plato that every specific form is received whole,
entire, and equally in every individual of the species. The guiding image here
is clearly not that of matter or potency as a container which contracts the
plenitude of form or act; it is rather that of form as a stamp or die, fully
determined in itself, which is stamped successively on various portions of an
amorphous raw material such as wax or clay. Such a multiplication can appear
rather as an expansion than as a limitation of the form. The two perspectives
are quite different, though, as St. Thomas has shown, by no means mutually
exclusive. It is poor history, therefore, to argue from St. Thomas’s much
richer analysis of multiplication of form in terms of participation and
limitation to the conclusion that Aristotle also must have understood his own
theory of multiplication in the same way. The fact is that there is no trace of
such an interpretation in the commentaries of Aristotle until the advent of
Neoplatonism.”[207]
What
then was the role of Aristotle’s act and potency composition, according to
Norris Clarke’s interpretation? “There is only one: as function of the problem
of change.”[208] What St.
Thomas did to effect his doctrine of the limitation of act by a distinct
potency which receives it was to harmonize the initial Aristotelian doctrine of
act and potency with the Neoplatonic doctrine of participation of finite
(composed) in infinite (uncomposed): “On the one hand was the central piece of
Aristotelian metaphysics, the doctrine of act and potency. Its weakness was
that it was geared exclusively thus far to the context of a change process. Its
strength was that it was admirably adapted to express a structure of
metaphysical composition within a being, while at the same time safeguarding
the intrinsic unity of the composite resulting from the union of two
incomplete, correlative principles. On the other hand was the central piece of
the Neoplatonic metaphysical tradition, the participation-limitation framework.
Its strength lay in its ability to express satisfactorily the fundamental
genetic and hierarchic structure of the universe, that is, the relation of
creatures to a first Source conceived at once as exemplary, efficient and final
cause of all. Its weakness lay in the fact that it habitually left vague,
unexplained, and dangerously ambiguous the unity of the composite resulting
from the superposition of participated on participant, whether of form on
matter or of higher form on lower form. The achievement of St. Thomas was to
recognize that the strength of each doctrine remedied precisely the weakness of
the other and to fuse them into a single highly original synthesis, condensed
in the apparently simple yet extremely rich and complex formula: Act is not
limited except by reception in a distinct potency. In order to effect this
synthesis, however, he had to subject both doctrines to profound modifications.
First, he had to empty the participation-limitation structure of its original
Neoplatonic content, that is, of the vast hierarchic procession of reified
universal concepts – the Porphyrian tree transplanted into reality – so
characteristic of the whole Platonic tradition (at least in its Aristotelian
interpretation), dominated by the primacy of form and the ultra-realism of
ideas. In its place he substituted as the fundamental ontological perfection of
the universe the supra-formal act of existence, participated first directly by
essential form, as limiting potency in pure spirits, then dispersed, so to
speak, in material beings, by being communicated through specific forms to
their multiple participations in matter. Secondly, he had to disengage the
Aristotelian act and potency theory from its hitherto exclusive attachment to a
change context, and to add to the already existing dynamic ‘horizontal’
function of potency a new dimension, the static ‘vertical’ function of
receiving subject, limiting a higher plenitude in a participation framework.
Furthermore – and this was the most violent wrench to the old Aristotelian
concept – this new second function could now be found in some cases entirely
separated from and even exclusive of the first, as in the case of potency as
essence of the essentially incorruptible, immutable pure spirits…The final
result of the fusion of the two theories into a single coherent synthesis can
thus be called neither Aristotelianism nor Neoplatonism. It is something
decisively new, which can only be styled ‘Thomism’…Thomas was the first thinker
in Western philosophy to be able to effectuate a successful synthesis of the
two basic insights of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic traditions and thus to
fuse into one the best elements of the two main streams of western
philosophical thought.”[209]
3.
Act is Multiplied Through Potency. The same act can be present in many
individuals which can receive it, as for example, when the specific perfection
“apple” is possessed by many individual apples because it is present in a
potency, namely, prime matter. The same substantial form is multiplied in many
individuals of the same species. Accidents (acts) are also multiplied by their
respective potencies, namely substances. The accident “red,” for example, is
multiplied insofar as there are many objects having that same color.
Concerning
the multiplication of act by potency, Gardeil writes: “If potency is the
(intrinsic) principle of limitation, it is also, and for that very reason, the
principle of multiplication. Suppose an act that is not limited by potency;
such an act is unlimited or perfect, and therefore unique. Unique, because if
two beings were equally (and infinitely) perfect, one could not differ from the
other; in fact, they would cancel each other. Wherever, then, perfection is
plural, the perfection must be limited. But we know it is not limited by
itself, hence by something not itself; and this, as we have learned, is
potency, which limits act (or perfection) by receiving it and thus makes
possible its plurification.”[210]
Krapiec
explains that “the question of the limitation of act by potency is connected
with the problem of the multiplicity of beings, an ancient problem whose roots
lie in the Eleatic school. How is the multiplicity of beings to be explained,
if act is temporally prior and ultimately this act can only be pure act? Once
again, it is not a question here of a causal interpretation (e.g., that this
multiplicity arose as a result of the causation known as creation), but of an immanent
explanation: What is the internal cause of the fact that beings are many rather
than one? If they were caused as multiple, then what in them is the inner
reason of this multiplicity?
“This
problem becomes even more acute when we consider that act itself viewed
analogically, despite the fact that it is something analogical or basically
diverse in its construction, does not express any diversity or multiplicity
when viewed from the side of act itself, from the side of the primary analogate
(i.e., in its pure form, for each transcendental analogy has a primary
analogate). Act is then absolutely identical with itself.
“What
is the reason for multiplicity in beings? If act as act expresses identity with
itself (realized only in the primary analogate of transcendental analogy), then
multiplicity is derived not from the side of act but from the side of some
potency that limits and, together with act, constitutes a being. Why?
“The
thesis of the multiplication of being is based on the prior thesis of the
limitation of act by potency. All multiplication requires limitation. If the
principle of the limitation of act by potency did not hold, then the fact of
the multiplication of beings would also not be possible – and then only one,
absolute, all-perfect being would exist. Hence, if manifold beings exist, they
presuppose limitation, and so they presuppose potency.
“St.
Thomas’ argument concerning the impossibility of the existence of many Gods, or
supremely perfect beings, will help illuminate this point. If two supremely
perfect beings existed, then they would either differ from one another in some
respect or not differ in any respect. If they did not differ in any respect,
then they would not be two beings but one and the same being. Consequently,
only one being would exist, which is contrary to the assumption of the
existence of two beings. If, on the other hand, they differed in some respect,
then one being would have a perfection not possessed by the other. The being
not possessing that perfection would already be a limited being, since it would
lack the ontic perfection possessed by the other being. Now, the cause of
limitation lies in potentiality. And so the cause of the multiplication of
being also lies in the potentiality of being. Ontic multiplicity, therefore,
necessarily presupposes ontic limitation.
“Hence,
just as the following formulation was operative in relation to the validity and
binding force of the principle of limitation, namely, that ‘act in the order in
which it is act cannot be limited,’ so, too, here we should affirm the
principle that ‘any act in the order in which it is act can be multiplied only
by passive potency.’ Ontic multiplication in this case refers to the
individuation of material beings.”[211]
4.
Act is Related to Potency as that Which is Participated to the Participant.
The doctrine of act and potency can be understood using the theory of
participation.[212]
To participate means to have something in part or something in a partial
manner. This presupposes that there are other subjects that possess the same
perfection, none of them possessing that said perfection in full. Also, in
participation, the subject cannot be identical to what it possesses; the
subject merely possesses this perfection by participation only. The subject of
participation has the perfection, possesses the perfection; he is not the
perfection, he doesn’t have the perfection by essence, that is, in a full and
exclusive manner, by being identical with it. Creatures have the act of being
while God is the Act of Being by Essence, that is, Essence and Act of Being are
identical in the Divine Being. Now, while pure actuality is act by essence, the
relationship of act and potency is one of participation. The subject (potency)
capable of receiving a perfection (act) is the participant, and the act itself
is that which is participated in by the subject.
5.
The Act-Potency Composition does not Destroy the Substantial Unity of a
Being. Act and potency are not subsistent beings (entia) in
themselves but rather constituent principles of finite beings (entia).
They are not things but rather the co-principles of a thing. Potency is by
nature a capacity for perfection, a capacity towards an act, to which it is
essentially ordered and without which it would not be able to exist at all
(prime matter [potency], for example, exists for the form [act], without which
it simply would not exist). Potency’s union with its act cannot therefore give
rise to two individual things, two separate beings.
It
was Aristotle who first provided us with an adequate explanation of the
doctrine of act and potency. St. Thomas Aquinas would later perfect the
doctrine of act and potency viewed from the metaphysical aspect (prime
matter-potency and substantial form-act; substance-potency and accidents-acts;
essence-potency and act of being-act), and advocate the axiom that where one
finds limited instances of act, it is because of a distinct limiting principle
(potency) which limits it. Both Aristotle and St. Thomas teach the real
distinction between act and potency and the priority of act over potency.
Against the monism of Parmenides, they acknowledge the reality of motion and
becoming, but at the same time teach the priority of being over becoming. They
teach that God is Pure Act while all finite beings are compounds of
potentiality and act. Thomas stresses the fact that between God and creatures
there is an infinite difference. Parmenides and Spinoza, on the other hand,
refuse to admit the notion of potentiality, for, by itself, it is wrapped in
obscurity. If all that is, is pure act or wholely act, then motion must be
illusory and unreal, teaches Parmenides. The panlogician Hegel would use act
and potency in a sense different from Aristotle and Aquinas. For him, act and
potency is transformed into the affirmation and negation of the spirit.
Heraclitus and the vitalist Henri Bergson deny the distinction between act and
potency for the reason that being is illusory. What is real is pure becoming,
pure change, and thus pure act cannot exist. This position also holds the
pantheistic view that God must possess the same nature as things. Such
thinkers, including Herbert Spencer, make pure change the fundamental category
of reality.
CHAPTER
6
ESSENCE (ESSENTIA)
Essence (Essentia)
The
substances we see around us are not simple but are composed of two principles:
essence and act of being, the former being related to esse as a potency,
and the latter being related to essentia as act. Essence (essentia)
is the proper potency of the act of being (esse) and together with this
act constitutes the substance (substantia). Essence[213]
confers upon this substance a specific manner of being and is defined as
that by which a thing is what it is. It is
“that through which and in which a being has its act of being (esse).”[214]
Essence is found truly and properly in substance while in accidents it is found
in a qualified sense. Aquinas writes: “Just as the term ens is applied
in the absolute and proper sense only to substance, and to accidents in a
secondary, derived way, essence truly and properly pertains to the substance,
and to the accidents only in a certain way, and from a certain point of view.”[215]
Therefore, when we refer to the essence of something without qualification we
refer to the essence of its substance, not to the essence of its accidents.
Essence is often times referred to as a quiddity,
a universal, or as a nature. Why is this so? Alvira, Clavell and
Melendo explain that “as the ‘specification of the mode of being of a thing,’
the essence gives rise to a series of basic properties which give us a better
understanding of essence. These properties themselves give rise to a set
of terms which refer to one and the same reality, while differing with respect
to the aspect of that reality which is considered. They are, however, sometimes
employed in an undifferentiated way in common usage.”[216]
Essence as Nature. As the principle of operations, essence is
called nature. Nature is essence from the viewpoint of its proper
activity. Nature is essence considered as the ultimate principle of operations
in a being. Nature is the essence considered as the root principle of
activities of a being. It expresses the dynamic character of being. A horse,
for example, acts in one way and not in another because it has being in a
determinate way, conditioned by its essence. Thus, each nature has a
corresponding type of specific operations. Trotting, galloping, eating grass
and neighing, for example, are natural to the horse because they are operations
which arise from horse nature or horseness itself. “Every being” explains
Dougherty, “has certain powers or faculties which dispose it to act in a
certain way, such as the faculty to know, the faculty to hear, the powers of a
plant for photosynthesis. No finite being acts immediately but rather mediately
through certain powers for certain acts. Yet the powers or faculties of a being
for acting are not adequate to explain a being’s activities. Uniform and stable
patterns of activities are proper to a species because of a basic determination
for such uniform and proper activities in the very nature of the species. It is
grounded in their very essence or nature.”[217]
Essence as Quiddity. Insofar as essence is
signified by a definition, it is called quiddity or “whatness.” Quiddity
is a term derived from the Latin word quidditas, which is the technical
noun fashioned from quid (Latin for “what”). “The reason is obvious”
observes Bittle. “When we desire to know what a particular thing really is, we
ask the question ‘What is it?’ And in answer to this question we obtain a
knowledge of its ‘whatness’; because, in being told what it is that makes this
thing to be just this being and not another, we find out its essential elements
(essence) in the definition given.”[218]
A definition signifies the essence of
something by means of its proximate genus and specific difference. It gives an
answer to the question “What is it?” The definition of man, for example, would
be “rational animal.” This is the metaphysical essence of man. “Animal” would
be the proximate genus and “rationality” the specific difference that separates
him from all other animals.
Essence as the Universal. Insofar as essence is
known, it is possible for it to be referred to many individuals, and for this
reason it is called the universal. “The essence is really present only
in individual things. However, our understanding, setting aside the
characteristics which belong to each singular thing, considers the essence as
something universal, which can be attributed to all individuals having the same
mode of being. In accordance with the way of being which the essence of this
horse has in the human mind, it becomes a universal which is applicable to
all horses. This logical consideration of the essence, that is, the essence as
a universal, is what is called secondary substance.”[219]
Essence and Esse. Though capable of being utilized in these
various senses, essence nevertheless stresses its relationship with esse,
it being the principle in which the esse of a thing is received and by
which it is restricted to a determinate form; essence is so called insofar as a
thing has esse in it and through it. Thus, essence has a meaning over
and above that contained in nature, quiddity, and universal as it directs our
attention to that which makes things be, namely, the act of being (esse):
“Essence means that through which and in which a being has its act of being (esse).”[220]
Essence
is either a physical essence or a metaphysical essence. In the
case of man, for example, his physical essence consists in the hylomorphic
composite of body and soul, while his metaphysical essence would be ‘rational
animal.’ Why do we have two main kinds of essence? It is because essence can be
viewed from two fundamentally different standpoints, namely: 1 from the
standpoint of its concrete existence in the physical world (here we get
the physical essence) and 2. from the standpoint of its abstract conception
by the thinking mind (here we get the metaphysical essence). Physical
essence is the essence existing concretely in nature, independent of
cognition of it.[221]
Metaphysical essence, on the other hand, consists in the sum of the
various grades of being which constitute a thing in the abstract concepts of
the human mind. Such ‘grades of being’ in a concrete nature are identical in
reality and separable only in the human mind.[222]
All
corporeal substances are hylemorphic composites, that is, beings composed of
matter and form. Every material or corporeal substance is an essentially single
individual being compounded of two intrinsic essential principles, namely,
prime matter and substantial form. In a material thing prime matter is
potential, passive, and determinable, while the other co-principle, substantial
form, is actualizing, determining and active. Prime matter in a material thing
is the root of receptivity and passivity. Because of it, a body can be acted
upon, moved, divided, changed, or corrupted. Because of the substantial form
the material substance maintains its own identity, possesses its own
properties, causes changes in other bodies, and makes itself known. By reason
of the substantial form the body is of a certain nature, an individual member
of a particular species. We may have ten pieces of chalk yet they have the same
substantial form, the form of chalk, that is, the bodies of the same species
have the same substantial form in different parcels of matter. Prime matter and
substantial form are the two essential co-principles of the substance. Taken by
themselves, they are incomplete substances, but taken together in the
hylemorphic composite being they form one complete substance. Matter and form
are the intrinsic causes of the substance. Prime matter is the receptive
subject of the substantial form and embodies it in concrete being. Substantial
form actualizes the matter, determining it to a specific nature. Form is the
principle of nature or species while matter is the principle of individuation.[223]
Matter is the principle which multiplies the forms. Aside from multiplying the
forms, matter also individuates or singularizes it. It is matter, in which the
form of the species is received, that makes the existence of many individuals
of the same species possible.
Norris
Clarke on the Role of Essence Within St. Thomas’ Essence-Act of Being Doctrine
In
an article published in 1974, Norris Clarke presents his theory on the nature
of essence as a principle of limitation of the act of being. He does not side
with what he calls the traditional interpretation of the nature of essence as a
positive principle, the positive subject that receives the act of being but
nevertheless limits it. Those supporters of what he calls the traditional
‘positive essence’ position, he writes, include Cornelio Fabro and Joseph
Owens. Norris Clarke gives us the position of the traditional, orthodox
‘positive’ view of essence, which he calls the “thick essence” doctrine: “It
conceives of essence as a positive receiving subject, given reality indeed by
the act of existence[224]
which actualizes it and pours into it its own perfection, but nonetheless
constituted as a distinct positive subject which exercises the act of
existence; it is the essence properly speaking which exists, is that which
exists, although by means of, or through the power of, the act of existence.”[225]
Norris Clarke disagrees with the traditional positive essence interpretation in
favour of what he calls the ‘thin essence’ interpretation, espoused by thinkers
like the late Gerald Phelan, and his disciple the late William Carlo, who
“wonder if such a conception of essence as positive subject, distinct from the
act of esse as a positive principle, is really consistent with St.
Thomas’ own deepest intuition and his great texts on esse as the
plenitude of all perfections and essence as in itself non-being.”[226]
Then
comes Norris Clarke’s defense of the ‘thin essence’ view opposing the orthodox
interpretation: “If we take seriously that esse is the intensive
plenitude of all perfections, it is hard to see how any act of esse
can allow any positive principle as distinct from it in a composition, somehow
making its own positive contribution. It is replied, of course, that the
positivity of essence is itself constituted by the act of existence cojoined
with it. But it is not clear how anything, even a metaphysical principle, can be
distinct, really distinct, from that which constitutes it intrinsically in its
most intimate positivity. It looks as though the very notion of ‘receiving
subject,’ carried over from other contexts of form and matter, substance and
accident, where it served well, here breaks through the bond even of
proportional analogy and betrays the new insight it is attempting to serve. The
new wine of esse as the intensive plenitude and core of all perfection
cannot easily be poured into the old language of essence as subject and
existence as predicate nor into the Platonic-Neoplatonic framework of
perfection and receiving subject, nor even without severe stretching into the
Aristotelian framework of act and potency, understood as positive potential
subject.”[227] Here, in this
position of Norris Clarke and company, the affirmation of the real, and not
mental, distinction of two constitutive principles of being (ens) begins
its gradual obfuscation, its process of alienation from the Angelic Doctor’s
thinking: “it is not clear how anything, even a metaphysical principle, can be
distinct, really distinct,…”[228] Essence as a really distinct receiving
principle is being gradually eliminated by this group.
Norris
Clarke continues: “It would seem then, that the only kind of principle that the
act of existence can tolerate in composition with it is an intrinsic principle
of limitation only, that makes no positive contribution of its own but merely
limits or ‘contracts,’ as St. Thomas says, what would otherwise be the de se
plenitude of existence down to a particular limited mode or level or degree –
so much of the perfection of esse and no more. All the perfection and
positivity would thus be on the side of the act of existence; essence would
provide only the intrinsic negative limiting principle, resulting in a limited
mode of existence, or better, a limited act of existence, reflecting, of
course, the limitation of His own perfection first thought up by God in a
determinate divine idea of a possible imitation of His own infinite plenitude. That
which exists in this conception would no longer properly be the essence as
positive subject which would have existence, but rather the limited
act of existence itself, which would be the subject. Finite beings would
thus be finitized-acts-of-existence, not essences which have
existence. The act of existence in any of its modes, whether that of infinite
plenitude or some finitized mode, since it is the ultimate radical principle of
concretion, immediately becomes a concrete subject in its own right, either
eternally in God, who is nothing else but Pure Act of Existence and therefore
pure Subject without anything needing to be added to it, or wherever some new
limiting principle allows a new act of esse to be present distinct from
the original Plenitude. Thus many limited acts of existence would be that which
exists, each limited and distinguished from the other through its own
intrinsic limiting principle of essence; not many finite essences which exist
through their act of esse. The difference in expression is significant,
not merely verbal. Essence thus conceived purely as an intrinsic principle of
limitation, not itself a positive subject but that which permits a new
finitized act of existence to become a new subject which exists distinct from all
others, is what I might call the ‘thin essence,’ as opposed to the ‘thick’ one
of the previous conception.”[229]
The
advocates of essence ‘conceived purely as an intrinsic principle of limitation’
propose a serious departure from the thought of St. Thomas, which would
compromise the intelligibility of his real distinction doctrine. In fact,
Norris Clarke writes that the real composition doctrine of esse and
essence is but a “secondary technical device for explaining the basic notion of
limited participation in existence, which might possibly to replaced by more
adequate technical devices…”[230]
It seems here that Norris Clarke, having made unintelligible the real
composition between act of being (which he wrongly calls the act of existence)
and essence with the Phelan and Carlo inspired ‘thin essence’ theory, is
drifting towards a mental, and not a real distinction, reminiscent of Suarez.
Surely Phelan, Carlo, and Norris Clarke, with their emphasis on existence
rather than essence, cannot be styled essentialists; rather they can be
characterized as existentialists, advocating essence as ultimately reducible to
existence. Sure enough, William Carlo’s book published in 1966, is entitled The
Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics.[231]
Norris Clarke wrote the preface for this book. Elders criticises this
existentialist ‘thin essence’ group, and I believe rightly so. He explains
that, considering the fact that for Aquinas esse is the act of acts and
the perfection of all perfections, the group of Norris Clarke, Phelan, and
Carlo do not consider essence anymore as a principle of being with a proper
positive content. For this group, essence becomes nothing but a limiting factor
that contracts the act of being, a factor thanks to which the act of being is
given a limited content. In such a perspective, essence is reduced to a sort of
empty potency. Elders warns that this reduction of essence to a potency without
a positive content would render the multiplicity and order of things
unexplainable; it would rather depend upon the blind impulse of the act of
being towards realization. The mutual causality between act of being and
essence would be deprived of its significance.[232]
Defending
the positive reality of essence, Phillips writes: “The obvious objection to the
Thomist view of the real distinction between essence and esse” observes
Phillips, “is that it is by esse and esse alone that a thing
passes from being merely possible to being real, all its reality is due to esse,
so that all the reality in an existing thing is esse. There is no
distinct reality which is essence. But this difficulty is due to a confusion of
thought, for the reality which esse confers on essence is certainly to
make it really existing, so that the reality of really existing, in an existing
thing, certainly is esse. It does not follow that all the reality in it
is esse; there may, and in fact, must be some real subject of which esse
is the act, otherwise what was and remained merely possible would exist and be
real. Just as matter is a reality, though one which without form sinks into
unreality, so essence is reality, though without esse it sinks to being
merely possible. Matter is not real without form; but with it is not the same reality
as form: essence is not real in the existential order without esse, and
yet with it is not the same reality as esse. These two are
indispensable, the one to the other; they are distinct, but not separable. What
is not a real capacity for esse cannot receive the act of being, just as
the act of being cannot actuate anything but a real capacity for receiving it.
Essence, as it were, calls out for esse its correlative, so that we see
the truth of the dicta ‘esse per se consequitur formam’ and ‘forma dat
esse,’ since substance being defined by the power to be ‘in se,’ esse
is the fulfilment of this power, the act of this potency; so that as St. Thomas
sometimes says: ‘esse…is, as it were, constituted by the principles of
essence,’[233] and so is
not added to essence after the fashion of an accident.”[234]
CHAPTER 7
ACT
OF BEING (ESSE)
The
principal element of being (ens) is
its act of being (esse). The act of
being (esse) is that which makes a thing to be.
The
act of being (esse) is an act
which is a perfection of all reality. In metaphysics, act refers not only to
transient actions and immanent operations of an agent subject but designates
any perfection of an individual being. Esse
is a universal act for it is not an exclusive property of a particular
type of being but is proper of all things that exist in reality. The act of
being is a total act for it is a perfection that includes all that an
individual being has and encompasses all that an individual being is. If
essence is that which makes a thing to be this or that, esse is that
which makes a thing to be. A
thing is, not because of its essence,
which is the principle of diversity, but because of its act of being which is
the act common to all beings. The act of being precedes every other act as no
action, property or agent subject would be
without it. Actions and immanent operations like understanding and willing are
accidents which presuppose a subsisting subject, but all presuppose esse for without esse nothing would be.
Therefore, the act of being is the principal and innermost act of a being which
gives the subject, from within the substantial being itself, each and every one
of its perfections. Esse
intrinsically actualizes every substantial being as it is their principle of
reality.
The
act of being is the most intensive act as it contains, in its pure state, all
perfections. Creatures have varying degrees of perfections as they participate
in the act of being according to their determinate essences. Individual beings
possess esse in different degrees of
intensity. Insects, for example, participate in the act of being in a much less
intense way than say, a dog. A human person participates in the act of being in
a much more intense way than a horse. God alone is Pure Act of Being, in whom
act of being and essence are identified. Only God is All-Perfect, possessing
the act of being in all its fullness and intensity, infinitely surpassing all
the perfections of the entire created universe. God, Pure Act of Being, without
potentiality whatsoever, is devoid of any imperfection and limitation. On the
other hand, all created things possess a limited and less intense participated
act of being, and the more imperfect they are, the lesser act of being do they
participate in. Therefore, the diversity of perfections of creatures created by
God (who alone is Pure Act of Being) have their foundation in the diverse ways
of possessing esse, for the source of all an individual being’s
perfection is its esse.
‘To
be’ (esse) is not exactly the same as ‘to exist,’[235]
as certain Scholastics maintain; esse expresses an act while ‘to exist’
merely indicates a thing’s facticity, that this something is really there
before us. When I affirm, for example, that a horse exists I wish to indicate
that this horse is real and not just a cognitional or intentional being, a mere
idea in my mind. Esse, on the other hand, signifies something more
interior, and not mere facticity, the fact of being there, in
transsubjective reality; rather, esse signifies the innermost perfection
of a thing, and the fount of all its other perfections. Esse, as was
said before, is the act of acts and perfection of perfections. Existence is
merely the effect of esse. ‘To be’ has an intensive usage that ‘to
exist’ simply does not have. For example, I can affirm that a dog exists and
that a man exists, but I cannot say that a man exists more than a dog. On the
other hand, one can say that a man is more than a dog or a cat or a
horse or a plant.[236]
“To
consider esse as existence,” write Alvira, Clavell and Melendo, “is a
logical consequence of identifying being (ens) with possible essence,
separated from the act of being. There arise two worlds, so to speak: the ideal
world made up of abstract essences or pure thought, and the world of realities
enjoying factual existence. The latter is no more than a copy of the former,
since it does not add anything to the ontological make-up of things. As Kant
said, the notion of 100 real gilders does not in any way differ from the notion
of 100 merely possible gilders.[237]
“The
distinction between ideal or abstract essence on one hand, and real existence
on the other, has given rise to serious repercussions in many important
philosophical questions. In the domain of knowledge especially, this has led to
the radical separation of human intelligence from the senses: essence would be
the object of pure thought, whereas factual existence would constitute the
object grasped by the senses (this gave rise to the equally wrong extreme
positions of rationalism and empiricism or positivism; in the case of Leibniz,
it gave rise to the opposition between ‘logical truths’ and ‘factual truths’).
“Another
consequence of this view is the attempt to prove the existence of the First
Cause starting from the idea of God (the ontological argument): God would be
the only essence which includes existence among its attributes, and therefore,
God should exist. This ‘proof’ ends up with a God which exists only in the
mind.”[238]
Those
who deny that St. Thomas ever defended the real distinction between essence and
act of being in finite beings include M. Chossat,[239]
P. Descoqs,[240] and the
Jesuit Francis Cunningham,[241]
who work under the influence of Suarezian essentialism. However, Suarez himself
admits that St. Thomas held the real distinction, which, in spite of this, he
denies.
The
real distinction between essence (essentia) and act of being (esse)
in finite creatures[242]
is one of the central doctrines of St. Thomas, first sketched out by the
Stagirite[243] and later
developed and perfected by the Angelic Doctor. The act of being is necessarily
really distinct from essence since act is really distinct from its potency
which receives and limits it.
Arguments
in Support of the Real Distinction Between Essence and Act of Being (Esse)
in Finite Beings
1. The
Argument Based on the Limitation Found in Creatures. Every created being
possesses the act of being in a partial manner both in extension, as it is not
the only one, and in intensity of being, as its actuality is possessed in a
limited manner. No creature possesses the perfections to the greatest possible
degree. Therefore, no created being is identical with its esse but
rather participates in the act of being in a limited way, its essence being the
receptive potency that limits the act of being.
2.
The Argument Based on the Multiplicity of Creatures. The testimony of
the senses reveal the obvious fact that there are a multitude of beings around
us. This shows that created beings are composed of act of being and essence.
Why? Because if something’s essence were its own act of being it would
necessarily be one and simple. Esse is really multiplied in many
individuals, but this would be impossible unless the act of being be united to
a potency – the essence – really distinct from it.
Seeing
that reality is manifestly multiple, made up of a multitude of beings, “St.
Thomas argues that the esse of these many things cannot be really the
same as their essence, since, if it were, they would not be multiple, but one
and unique. For a being whose very essence is to be cannot be
differentiated in any other way, and so cannot be multiple. Such a being would
be its own subsisting act of being, for its esse is its actual
substantial essence, its own substance. That it cannot be multiple is seen
first from the fact that esse, being an act, can only be limited and
multiplied by subjective potency. Now subsisting esse does not, by
hypothesis, inhere in anything, and so cannot be received in any potency; nor
can it have any potency in itself, i.e., any capacity for any other act, for
this act could only be subsistence or existence, both of which it already
possesses. Hence it cannot be multiplied, but must be unique. Secondly,
subsisting esse is absolute perfection, since it is perfect both as a
being and as a substance. Consequently it can be one only; for if there were
two such absolute perfections one of them would have to posess some perfection
which the other lacked, otherwise they would not be two, but one. That which
lacks some perfection would plainly not be absolutely perfect, so that it is
impossible that there should be two absolutely perfect beings.”[244]
3.
The Argument Based on the Similarity Found Among Beings. If two or more
creatures are similar there must be something in them that accounts for their
conformity and something that accounts for their difference. The source of
their similarity must naturally be distinct from the source of diversity. Now,
all creatures are similar because they possess the act of being, and because of
this they all exist. But they differ from one another on account of their
essences (essence is the principle of specification) which limit esse in
diverse manners. Therefore, act of being and essence are really distinct from
one another.
4.
The Argument from the Fact of Caused Being. “Finally the real
distinction can be argued from the fact of caused being. Whatever is caused by
another, the spiritual creature (angel), man, the material being of the cosmos
precisely as caused by another, it receives esse by the action of an
agent and so it cannot have esse by its own nature. A being whose
essence is to be must be of its very nature and so it essentially
or necessarily exists. It is impossible that it not exist. It cannot receive esse
from another. It is simply uncaused. Whatever is caused being, therefore, is
being whose essence is really distinct from its esse. St. Thomas says:
‘It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its act of
being…’[245]”[246]
“This
way of arguing to the real distinction of essence and esse in
creatures,” writes Dougherty, “proceeds from the very nature of the creatures
themselves.[247] Inasmuch
as they are caused by another, they are given esse by another, and so
cannot have it of themselves, of their own nature. For that whose essence is to
be, exists of its very nature and so essentially and necessarily. This
being so, it is impossible that it should not exist. Existing of itself cannot
receive esse from another, and so cannot be caused. Consequently in
things which are in reality caused, esse must in reality be distinct
from their actual essence. So, as St. Thomas says, ‘It is against the nature of
a made thing for its essence to be its act of being; because subsisting being
is not a created being.’[248]”[249]
A
General Argument Showing the Real Distinction. “These arguments,” explains Dougherty, “may
be summed up in a general argument. If a being exists so that its essence is its
esse, such a being would be pure actuality. It would possess no potency
since the act of being completes a thing as its ultimate perfection. A being
whose essence is its esse would be essentially actual or absolutely
perfect. A finite or created being by identity cannot be absolutely perfect.
Therefore, its essence cannot be really identical with its esse. Essence
and act of being in finite beings must be really distinct. As we have seen,
every finite being must have potency as its coprinciple with act in being,
precisely because it is limited, composite, mutable and caused.”[250]
Phillips
explains that “if the esse of any being were not really distinguished
from the essence of this being, such esse would be pure act, for it
could neither be received in any potency nor contain any potency in itself; in
the Scholastic phrase, it would be unreceived and unreceiving act. This esse
could not be received in any potency, since being really the same as the
essence, there would, in fact, be nothing in such a being except esse;
and so nothing for esse to be received in. Nor could it receive any
further act, and so be itself potential with regard to it; for it is plain that
esse is the act which completes the thing as a real being, so that once
the thing is there is no further perfection which can be added to it as
a being. The esse, then, of such a being, and so the whole being,
since it is esse, would be pure act. A finite or created thing, cannot,
however, be pure act, since pure act containing no potency or imperfection,
must be altogether perfect and unlimited or infinite, for potency alone limits
act. So if we look at the question from the point of view of finite being we
see that such a being cannot be pure act, from which it follows that its
essence and act of being must be really distinguished, since that being in
which they are identified will be pure act.”[251]
Aristotle
first laid the groundwork for the real distinction in the Posterior
Analytics, though a developed doctrine is nowhere to be found in his
writings. The Stagirite’s doctrine of act and potency offered a basis for the
real distinction, but it is clear that his doctrine did not teach that all the
perfections of the subject, including the subject, were in potency to the act
of being, the act of acts and the perfection of perfections. Plato suggests the
real distinction in his doctrine of participation, but it remains just that, a
suggestion which was to be developed later on by the Neoplatonists, the head of
whom being Plotinus who taught that all beings, with the exception of God, had
composition. Augustine teaches that God is Being by Essence, whereas creatures
are beings by participation and can therefore be included among the list of
those affirming the real distinction. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, with his
participation theory, should also be included in the list of the defenders of
the real distinction. Boethius holds a real distinction between esse and
id quod est, but his esse is clearly not the act of being but
rather second substance, the id quod est, in contrast, being the first
substance of Aristotle. Therefore he does not give any existential meaning to esse
and thus does not, in the final analysis, teach the real distinction between esse
and essence. Al-Farabi and Avicenna both taught the real distinction, but for
Avicenna, esse is understood to be a kind of accident to the essence.
Averroes, and later St. Thomas, criticized this interpretation. William of
Auvergne, St. Albert the Great, and St. Bonaventure, all taught the real
distinction, but it was Aquinas who perfected the doctrine. There is no doubt
that St. Thomas held the real distinction of essence and act of being in finite
creatures, as well as the identity of essence and act of being in God. To deny
the real distinction would make Aquinas’ doctrine of essence and act of being
simply unintelligible. Aegidius Romanus, or Giles of Rome, defended the real
distinction, but in such a weak way, erroneously teaching that essence and act
of being were really distinct like two things (distinguuntur ut res et res),
that his views were rejected and attacked by Henry of Ghent who denied the real
distinction. Others denying the real distinction include Averroes, Siger of
Brabant, and the Latin Averroists. Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and the
famous Jesuit metaphysician Francisco Suarez also denied the real distinction,
all being influenced by Henry of Ghent. Suarez denied the real distinction in
favour of a virtual distinction.[252]
Also rejecting the views of the Dominican Aquinas on the real distinction were
fellow Dominicans Durand de Saint Pourçain and James of Metz. Certain Jesuits,
who do not follow the lead of Suarez and defend the real distinction include
Schiffini, Billot, Mattiussi, Remer, Maurice de la Taille, Boyer, and Henri
Renard. Most of the early Thomists defended the real distinction including
Capreolus and Francis de Sylvestris.
CHAPTER 8
A
consideration of the various constitutive principles of being should naturally
have as its goal being in the fullest sense, which is the supposit, our
subsisting subject. The term subsisting subject refers to the particular
being with all of its perfections. The supposit or subsisting subject is
being in the full sense; it is being in the most proper sense of
the term, subsisting, existing in itself as something complete and finished, distinct
from all other things. The supposit designates the particular being with all of
its perfections. The supposit is defined as the individual whole, which
subsists by virtue of a single esse, and which consequently
cannot be shared with another.
Characteristic
Marks of the Supposit
The
characteristic marks of the supposit are its individuality (only
the singular exists in transsubjective reality while the universal exists in
the mind; abstract essences cannot be suppositums for they do not have esse
of its own), subsistence (we must add subsistence for not everything
that can be called individual can subsist; accidents are individual but are not
subsistent), and incommunicability or unsharedness (because of
the preceding two characteristics, namely, individuality and subsistence, the
suppositum cannot be shared by others. The suppositum cannot be participated in
by various subjects for it exists as something unique and distinct from other
subjects. A rock, for example, does not share its being with the book that is
next to it).
Elements
of the Supposit
What
are the elements that make up the supposit? The subsisting subject (suppositum)
is composed of act of being (esse, which renders subsistence to
the subject, making it be), essence (essentia, which in
corporeal beings are hylomorphically composed of prime matter and substantial
form), and accidents (which are acts that perfect the receptive subject
in potency to be perfected by them). The various names that have designated it
throughout the history of philosophy include the whole, the concrete,
the singular, the individual, the supposit or hypostasis,
and the Aristotelian first substance (primary substance), that individual something which exists in reality
with all of its perfections.
Supposit
and Nature
There
is a difference between supposit and nature. The supposit is really distinct
from its nature in finite beings in the same way that a whole is different from
one of its parts. There is a real distinction between supposit and nature in any
being to which something can be added which does not belong to its very nature.
In any finite being, at least its act of being (esse) itself does not
belong to its very nature. Thus, it follows that in every finite being there be
a real distinction between supposit and nature. When we speak of real
distinction here we don’t mean that the supposit is one thing and the nature
another thing. The real distinction in question is not adequate but inadequate,
inasmuch as the supposit includes the individual nature and adds a reality to
it. St. Thomas writes: “In every thing to which can accede something which does
not belong to the concept of its nature, the thing itself and its essence,
i.e., the supposit and nature, are distinct. For, in the meaning of the nature
is included only that which belongs to the essence of the species, whereas the
supposit has not only what belongs to the essence of the species but also
whatever else accedes to this essence. Hence, the supposit is signified by the
whole, but the nature or quiddity [is signified only] as the formal part. Now,
in God alone no accident can be found added to the essence because His act of
being is His Essence, as has been said; hence in God supposit and nature are
entirely the same. But in an angel [i.e., an unreceived subsistent form] the
supposit is not entirely the same [as the nature] because something accedes to
it which does not belong to the concept of its essence. For the act of being
itself of an angel is in addition to the essence or nature; and other things
[acts of intellect and will] accede to it, which belong to the supposit but not
to the nature.”[253]
Alvira,
Clavell and Melendo explain that the “essence, and more particularly the form,
gives the individual whole a way of being similar to that of other individuals,
thus situating it in a given species. Due to a common essence or nature, men
form part of the human race or species. As the intrinsic principle of
similarity at the level of the species, the essence can be contrasted with the supposit
or individual, which is an unshared reality (distinct and divided from all
others). Consequently, the relation between supposit and its nature is not
that which exists between two principles of being; rather, it is one that
entails a real distinction; the supposit is distinct from its nature in the
same way a whole is different from one of its parts.[254]
The real distinction between nature and supposit can be seen in two ways: a) in
every individual, there is a distinction between the individuated essence and
the whole subsisting subject; b) every individual is distinct from the common
specific nature (taken as a universal perfection which all individuals share,
and which sets aside particular characteristics).”[255]
In
this treatment of the distinction between supposit and nature, Renard explains
that “the supposit does add something not contained in the nature. It includes
everything, says everything that can be predicated of a being. The nature on
the contrary in creatures is distinct from and consequently does not contain
its ‘to be’ (esse) and its accidents. ‘These words: person, hypostasis,
and supposit designate an integral being.’[256]
A human supposit ‘is the entire being that is this man.’[257]
‘The supposit implies that which is most complete.’[258]
Therefore, it takes in the accidents whereas the nature does not. Consequently,
the nature is part of the supposit, a part which is designated as the formal
part.[259]
“Moreover,
since the ‘to be’ (esse) is the highest actuality in the order of being,
and the supposit demands the most perfect completeness in that order, it
follows that the substantial ‘to be’ (esse) by which a being subsists is
of the very essence of the supposit. It is not the supposit itself, for the
supposit includes the whole being; but we may say that it is its most important
factor: for it is that because of which and by which a being attains its
highest completion in the order of being, and by which it exists in its own
right (it subsists). ‘The to be (esse) is that in which the unity
of the supposit is founded.’[260]
‘The to be (esse) pertains to the very constitution of person.’[261]
‘Person signifies that which is most perfect in the entire nature, namely, a
being subsisting in a rational nature.’[262]
It must include, therefore, the ‘to be’ (esse) which is ‘the actuality
of all acts, and the perfection of all perfections.’[263]
Indeed the most perfect completion consists precisely in this, that a being has
its ‘to be’ (esse), which is an analogous participation in the divine
‘to be’ (Esse).’[264]
“To
repeat then – the individual nature differs from the specific nature in that it
adds to the latter the individuating principles (in actu secundo); the
supposit differs from the individual nature in that it adds the ‘to be’ (esse)
and the necessary concomitant accidents.
“The
Supposit Adds the Proper ‘To Be’ (Esse) to Individual Nature. It is,
therefore, this substantial ‘to be’ – the very act of esse (which ‘to
be’ is proportioned and due to each individual nature) – that conjoins with the
nature to establish the supposit and render it incommunicable in an absolute
sense. Thus the supposit is established by the very act of coming into
existence. Let us analyze this last statement. Since the supposit demands
perfect completion, and since the highest completion in a being consists
precisely in the actuation in the order of being by a ‘to be’ (esse)
that is proportioned to its individual nature, that is to say, by a proper ‘to
be’ (esse), it follows that an individual nature with its ‘to be’ will
establish a supposit. In other words, the supposit adds to an individual nature
its proper ‘to be’ (esse).”[265]
Act
of Being as the Source of Unity of the Supposit
Alvira,
Clavell and Melendo explain that the act of being (esse) belongs to the
suppositum and that the source of the unity of the suppositum lies in its
proper act of being (esse): “The constituent act which makes the suppositum
real is esse. What is most proper to the individual is to subsist, and
this is solely an effect of the act of being.[266]
Nevertheless, one cannot disregard the essence in explaining the subsistence of
a subject, since a being receives esse if it has an essence capable of
subsisting; that is, it must be a substantial essence, not a mere accidental
one. For instance, as man is able to receive the act of being in himself and to
be a suppositum because he possesses human nature, an essence meant to
subsist in itself (and, thus, not to inhere in something else, as in the case
of accidents).
“However,
the specific nature of a thing does not subsist unless it forms part of a
subsisting subject (the individual). That is why it is not quite correct to say
that the act of being belongs to the nature; it only belongs to the suppositum.
However, since esse affects the whole by virtue of the essence, we can
say that ‘esse’ belongs to the suppositum through the nature or substantial
essence. Nature gives the whole the capacity to subsist, although it
is the whole which does in fact subsist through the act of being.
“Since
esse is the ultimate act of a being, which gives actuality to each of
its elements (which are no more than potency with respect to esse),
these parts are united to the extent that they are made actual by this
constituent act, and referred to it. It is quite correct, therefore, to claim
that ‘the act of being is the basis of the unity of the suppositum.’[267]
No part of the whole, taken separately, has esse of its own; it is, by
virtue of the esse of the composite. To the very extent that the parts
of the whole have esse, they must be a unity, since there is only a
single act of being that actualizes them. Matter, for instance, does not
subsist independently of the form; rather, both matter and form subsist by
virtue of the act of being received in them. Operations are no more than an
expression of the actuality which a being has because of its esse, and
the same thing can be said of the other accidental modifications as well. In
spite of the variety of accidents, the unity of the suppositum can
easily be seen if we consider that no accident has an act of being of its own.
All accidents share in the single act of being of the substance.”[268]
Perfections
of a Particular Being to be Referred to the Supposit
Alvira,
Clavell and Melendo also explain why all the perfections of a particular being
must be referred to the suppositum: “We have seen that the entire actuality of
a being has its ultimate basis in the perfection of its act of being. Since the
suppositum is the natural seat of the act of being, all the perfections
of the suppositum, of whatever type they might be, have to be attributed
to the suppositum as their proper subject. Actions, in particular, have
to be attributed to the subsisting subject. Thus, it cannot correctly be said
that the hand writes, that the intellect knows, or that the will loves. In each
case, it is the entire man who acts through his powers. Only that which
subsists can act.
“It
could be further stated that the manner in which an individual acts follows
its nature, which is what determines its manner of being. It can, therefore, be
claimed that acting belongs to the subsisting hypostasis in accordance with the
form and nature specifying the kind of operations it can carry out. Thus, only
individuals act, since they alone exist. There is a certain similarity,
however, among the activities of the members of a species, since all of them
share in a common nature. Men think and laugh; dogs bark; each one of the
elements of the periodic table behaves in a particular way. This also explains
why no individual can act beyond the limits set by its own species.
“The
recognition of the individual as a single subsisting whole provides the
metaphysical basis for avoiding any kind of dualism (between matter and spirit,
between senses and intelligence) and any division of things into stagnant
compartments in which the unity of the whole would be compromised.
“This
doctrine equally denies the validity of philosophies which acknowledge the
universal as the primary reality (like in Hegelian historicism, socialism, and
marxism), thereby absorbing the individual, robbing it of its metaphysical
significance. The actus essendi, as the single act of the suppositum,
impedes any reduction of being to a mere relation or to a set of relations
within the same class or category, as these philosophical systems purport to
do.”[269]
Subsistence
Subsistence is the perfection by which
the individual complete substance becomes a supposit. In the case of the
rational supposit, the person, this perfection is called suppositality.
This perfection makes the individual complete substance entirely incommunicable
and intrinsically (not extrinsically) self-sufficient.[270]
Person
Man
is a particular type of supposit, namely, a rational supposit.
Rational supposits are called persons. A human being, therefore, is a
person. The sixth century A.D. Roman philosopher Severinus Boethius was the
first thinker to formulate an adequate definition of the person as an individual
substance of a rational nature (individua substantia rationalis naturae).
The most perfect beings that exist are persons, namely, God (who is Pure Act of
Being), as well as angels (also called the separate substances) and men (both
angels and men having particularly intense degrees of participation in esse).
“Since all perfections stem from esse, the excellence of these
substances (God, angels and men) is due either to the possession of the
fullness of the act of being (God as Esse Subsistens), or to a high
degree of participation in esse which angels and men have. In the
final analysis, to be a person amounts to possessing a likeness of the divine
esse in a more sublime way, that is, by being spiritual; it means having a
more intense act of being…ultimately, the entire dignity of the person, the
special greater perfection of his operations, is rooted in the richness of his
act of being. The latter is what makes him a person and provides the basis
of his psychological uniqueness (self-knowledge, spiritual love, etc.) and of
his moral and social value. Consequently, neither consciousness nor free-will,
neither responsibility nor inter-personal relations can constitute a person.
All these perfections are merely accidents whose being is derived from the act
of being, the only real core of personality.”[271]
Footnotes:
[1] The latin translation into
“metaphysica,” says Chroust, “probably goes back to Boethius, De
Interpretatione, book I, chap. 5 [ed. Melser, p. 74]” (A. H. CHROUST, The
Origin of “Metaphysics,” “The Review of Metaphysics,” 14 [1961], p.
601).
[2] P. MORAUX, Les listes
anciennes des ouvrages d’Aristote, Louvain, 1951.
[3] H. REINER, Die
Entstehung und ursprünliche Bedeutung des Namens
Metaphysik,
“Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,” 8 (1954) pp. 210-237 ; H. REINER, Die
Entstehung der Lehre vom bibliothekarischen Ursprung des Namens Metaphysik,
“Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,” 9 (1955), pp. 77-99.
[4] A. H. CHROUST, op. cit.,
pp. 601-616.
[5] A. H. CHROUST, op. cit.,
p. 602.
[6] ASCLEPIUS, Asclepius in
Metaphysica, praefatio, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol.
VI, part 2, Berlin, 1888.
[7] Cf. A. H. CHROUST, op.
cit., pp. 604-605.
[8] A. H., CHROUST, op. cit.,
p. 605. Cf. P. MORAUX, op. cit., p. 315.
[9] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
book 6, chapter 1; 1026a, 24.
[10] THEMISTIUS, Themistius
in Physicam, p. 1, lines 14ff., in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graecia,
vol. 5, par. 2, H. SCHENKL (ed.), Acc. Litt. Reg. Borussiae, Berlin, 1900.
[11] Scholia in Aristotelem,
C. A. Brandis (ed.), 1836, p. 520 a 26ff.
[12] J. G. BUHLE, Über die Aechtheit der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, in Bibliothek
der Alten Litteratur und Kunst (Göttingen), 4 (1788).
[13] See H. REINER, Die
Entstehung der Lehre vom Bibliothekarischen Ursprung des Namens Metaphysik,
“Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,” 9 (1955), p. 85.
[14] See: H. REINER, Die
Entstehung und ursprünliche Bedeutung des Namens
Metaphysik,
“Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung,” 8 (1954) pp. 210-237. W. JAEGER,
Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Berlin, 1912,
p. 180, placed it [the coining of the term ‘metaphysics’] as far back as at
least the second century B.C. See also Jaeger’s Aristotle, Oxford, 1934,
pp. 378-379. Paul Moraux, Les Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d’Aristote,
Louvain, 1951, p. 314, traced it to within about a century after
Aristotle’s death. Reiner, p. 235, going still farther back to the immediate
followers of Aristotle, suggests Eudemus of Rhodes as the pupil who coined the
term.
[15] J. OWENS, An Elementary
Christian Metaphysics, Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St.
Thomas, Houston, 1985, p. 3.
[16] Cf. I. DÜRING, Aristoteles.
Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens, 1966, p. 591s.
[17] Cf. J. F. WIPPEL, “First
Philosophy” According to Thomas Aquinas, in J. F. WIPPEL, Metaphysical
Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington,
D.C., 1984, pp. 55-67.
[18] H. REITH, The
Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1958, p. 10.
[19] Summa Theologiae,
I-II, q. 57, a. 2.
[20] Cf. In VI Ethic.,
lect. 5.
[21] K. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics,
Graymoor Press, Peekskill, NY, 1965, pp. 21-22.
[22] R. GOCLENIUS, Lexicon
philosophicum quo tamquam clave philosophiae fores aperiuntur, Frankfurt am
Main, 1613, p. 16.
[23] J. CLAUBERG, Ontosophia,
chapter 1, 1656.
Metaphysics operates at the third degree of
abstraction, not at the first degree which is proper to physics and the natural
sciences (where physical concepts indicate aspects that are in sensible matter
and are understood in that matter, where abstraction regards solely from the
individual matter), nor at the second degree which is proper to mathematics
(where mathematical concepts abstract from observable aspects, indicating
quantitative structures in abstract). In the third degree proper to metaphysics,
metaphysical concepts correspond to certain aspects of things understood
without sensible matter, and which are also encountered in immaterial beings.
St. Thomas writes that “there are some things whose being depends on matter,
and which cannot even be defined without matter; others, instead, although they
cannot exist outside of sensible matter, are defined without reference to the
sensible matter (…) Others, finally, do not depend on matter, either with
respect to being or with respect to the human understanding, or because they
are never in matter, such as God and the other spiritual substances, or because
they are not always in matter, such as substance, act and potency, or being
itself. Metaphysics considers these realities; mathematics occupies itself with
those that depend on matter insofar as beings, but not insofar as their being
understood; physics considers those that depend on matter both in being and in
the understanding” (ST. T. AQUINAS, In Phys., lecture 1. Cf. In
Boeth. de Trin., II, q. 1, a. 1).
The three degrees of abstraction (of which metaphysics is the third) are
called degrees of abstraction in the sense of a progressive elevation above
matter. For Aquinas, the first two are types of abstraction, but he prefers to
call the third operation “separation.” The reason for this terminology, writes
Juan Jose Sanguineti, “seems to be the detachment from Platonism. For Plato,
all that is mentally separable (abstraction) exists separated from the matter
(confusion between abstraction, which is a mental separation, and true
and real separation). For Aristotle and for Saint Thomas metaphysics, in
its inquiry on the separated (spiritual) substances, must not follow the
conceptualistic method of separating the essences, but must attempt a real judgment,
in which it is separated (or is united) that which in reality is separated or
is united, conforming to certain criteria of real separability (for example,
the criterion of spirituality)”(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic and Gnoseology,
Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1988, p. 331).
[25] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
book IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21.
[26] “The inseparable accidents
appertaining to that subject as such”(J. ANDERSON, An Introduction to the
Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Regnery, Chicago, 1962, p. 121).
[27] “Geometry deals only with
the essential properties of its objects”(Ibid.).
[28] “E.g., risibility, the
capacity for laughter, is an essential accident – an inseparable property or
attribute – of man, but in relation to animal nature as such it is, so to speak,
only an accidental accident”(Ibid.).
[29] “Thus mathematics, like all
the particular sciences, treats of some essential mode of being; it takes a
‘part’ of being and considers it under that aspect or attribute that belongs to
it essentially”(Ibid.).
[30] “VI Metaphys., I,
1147. It is for this reason that metaphysics is called the universal science,
or the common science. Logic is equally as universal in its scope as
metaphysics, for ‘all beings fall under the consideration of reason’(IV
Metaphys., 4, 547). But logic and metaphysics differ primarily in this,
that while it pertains to metaphysics to consider every and any being,
precisely as existing, actually or possibly, it is the office of logic to treat
of any and every being, precisely as known or as knowable, i.e., as existing in
the reason actually or possibly” (J. ANDERSON, op. cit., pp. 121-122).
[31] In IV Metaphys., IV,
1, 529-532.
[32] W. WALLACE, The Elements
of Philosophy, Alba House, New York, 1977, p. 85.
[33] Metaphysics is the science
of being qua being, not the science of essences or of possibles, as the
essentialists of the Wolffian rationalist tradition would have it.
[34] For the controversy
surrounding the role of the deductive method in metaphysics, see: M. KRAPIEC, An Analysis of Reasoning. The
Problem of Proof in Philosophy, in Saint Thomas Aquinas. 700th
Anniversary of His Death. Modern Interpretations of His Philosophy, Lublin,
1980, pp. 123-125 ; M. KRAPIEC, Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of
Being, Peter Lang, New York, 1991, pp. 37-47 ; L. ELDERS, La metafisica
dell’essere di san Tommaso d’Aquino in una prospettiva storica, vol. 1:
L’essere commune, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1995, pp.
40-41.
[35] Studies on the method of
metaphysics: R. J. HENLE, Method in Metaphysics, Marquette University
Press, Milwaukee, 1951 ; B. VON BRANDENSTEIN, A Note on the Method of
Metaphysics, “International Philosophical Quarterly,” 1 (1961), pp.
264-272.
[36] Studies on abstraction and
separation: L. B. GEIGER, Abstraction et séparation d’après s. Thomas In
de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, “Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques,”
31 (1947), pp. 3-40 ; M. D. PHILIPPE, Abstraction, addition, séparation dans
la philosophie d’Aristote, “Revue Thomiste,” 32 (1948), pp. 461-479 ; M. V.
LEROY, Abstractio et separatio d’après un texte controversé de S. Thomas,
“Revue Thomiste,” (1948), pp. 51-53 ; G. VAN RIET, La théorie thomiste de
l’abstraction, “Revue philosophique de Louvain,” 50 (1952), pp. 353-393 ;
P. MERLAN, Abstraction and Metaphysics in St. Thomas’ Summa, “Journal of
the History of Ideas,” 14 (1953), pp. 284-291 ; E. D. SIMMONS, The Three
Degrees of Formal Abstraction, “The Thomist,” 22 (1959), pp. 37-67 ; R. W.
SCHMIDT, L’emploi de la séparation en metaphysique, “Revue Philosophique
de Louvain,” 58 (1960), pp. 376-393 ; J. L. ESLICK, The Negative Judgment of
Separation, “The Modern Schoolman,” 44 (1966), pp. 35-46 ; J. OWENS, Metaphysical
Separation in Aquinas, “Mediaeval Studies,” 34 (1972), pp. 287-306.
[37] In I Physic., lect.
1. “Many authors affirm that the three degrees of immateriality represent
different degrees of abstraction. However, in In Boeth de Trin.,
q. 5, a. 3, St. Thomas says that only the physical and mathematical degrees of
immateriality correspond to different types of abstraction (taking abstraction
to mean a mental separation); metaphysical concepts involve a real
separation, in the sense that they are the result of separating from matter
what is really separable or separated from it. At any rate, there is no
objection to regarding the third degree of immateriality as the result of
abstraction, provided we do not take abstraction to mean grasping
partial aspects of reality (as is the case with the particular sciences), but
rather transcending materiality”(J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala,
Manila, 1992, p. 199).
[38] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 7, a. 2. Attention is drawn to the fact that according to St. Thomas
scientific knowledge on this level reaches the nature of the sensible object.
[39] Ibid.
[40] All scientific knowledge
must make some kind of abstraction, because all scientific knowledge is
intellectual knowledge, and all intellectual knowledge is obtained by means of
abstraction.
[41] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 85, a. 1, ad. 2.
[42] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 5, a. 1.
[43] H. J. KOREN, An
Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1960, pp.
2-4.
[44] For a detailed study of
mathematical abstraction, see: Y. R. SIMON, Nature and Process of
Mathematical Abstraction, “The Thomist,” 29 (1965), pp. 117-139.
[45] Cf. C. DE KONINCK, Abstraction
from Matter (II), “Laval Théologique et Philosophique,” 16 (1960), pp.
63-69.
[46] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 6, a. 2.
[47] Ibid.
[48] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 5, a. 3.
[49] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 85, a. 1, ad. 2.
[50] Ibid. The
intelligible matter retained on this level is not individual but common, i.e.,
not this or that material subject, but a material subject, as St. Thomas
explains, ibid.
[51] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 5, a. 1.
[52] Regarding the position of
modern mathematics, cf. A. VAN MELSEN, The Philosophy of Nature,
Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 1954, p. 97.
[53] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
pp. 4-5.
[54] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 6, a. 2.
[55] Ibid.
[56] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 5, a. 1.
[57] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 6, a. 1.
[58] In Boethium de Trinitate,
q. 6, a. 2. The objects considered in metaphysics can be either positively
immaterial, as God, or abstractively immaterial, as bodies, considered insofar
as they are beings, substances, possess unity, etc.
[59] H. J. KOREN, op.cit.,
p. 6.
[60] H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction
to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 4: Metaphysics, B. Herder,
St. Louis, 1967, p. 21.
[61] J. F. WIPPEL, The
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being,
Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 2000, pp. 48-49.
[62] In VI Ethic., 7,
nos. 1210-1211.
[63] I Corinthians 3:10.
[64] Proverbs 10:23.
[65] De Trinitate, XII,
14.
[66] Romans 1:19.
[67] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 1, a. 6, c.
[68] H. D. GARDEIL, op. cit.,
p. 8.
[69] J. MARITAIN, An
Introduction to Philosophy, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1956, p. 94.
[70] J. MARITAIN, op. cit.,
pp. 84-85.
[71] H. REITH, The
Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1958, pp. 8-9.
[72] F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, Ontology,
Joseph F. Wagner, New York, 1970, p. 35.
[73] F. VAN STEENBERGHEN, op.
cit., p. 36.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] A. J. AYER, Language,
Truth, and Logic, London, 1946, p. 35.
[77] J. OWENS, op. cit., p.
10.
[78] Ibid.
[79] De Torre writes: “Ens
is that which has the act of being (in Latin: ens est id quod habet esse).
There may be something which does not actually exist but is only a possibility,
but then it is not an ens since it does not have the act of being; it is
only an essence or ‘possibility of being.’ Ens, therefore, is an essence
(or manner of being) which has the act of being: id quod est or id
quod habet esse.
“This shows that ens is composite, not simple. It has a
composition of (a) subject of the act of being, and (b) act of being. The
former is the thing that is; the ‘act of being’ is reality, not just a mere possibility. The two aspects are not
the same, because to be is one thing, and the manner of being is
another. This composition is such that the esse (to be) is contracted or
limited by the essence or manner of being; the ens is only what
it can be, that is, its essence: it is not everything, but only this
type of being, this essence.
“We can say that while essence is that which the thing is, esse
is that by which the thing is. Esse, therefore, is a metaphysical
real component or constituent part of the singular concrete being. It is not
something that we grasp as a notion itself, because then it would be a noun. It
is not a ‘thing,’ but that by which any thing is. It is the actuality
of things, as distinct from their possibility. This is why we should not
confuse our concepts (abstract essences) with reality or actuality”(J. DE
TORRE, Christian Philosophy, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1980, p. 76).
[80] “Being is a real and
intelligible principle, and the knowledge of its reality cannot be separated
from the knowledge of its intelligibility. This dissociation has been carried
out in formalistic scholasticism which speaks of ‘the distinction between essence
and existence,’ instead of the genuinely metaphysical theory of the real
composition of essence and act of being. The former distinction
is made between between actual existence, considered as mere facticity, and the
essence considered merely as possible. Essence and existence are,
then, no more than two different states of mind with respect to the same thing
considered respectively as a possibility, and as actually existing. Existence,
in this case, does no more than add the concrete and irrational character of the
fact to the abstract and intelligible notes of the essence. Some
scholastics even ended up speaking about a distinction between the esse
essentiae, and the esse actualis existentiae, which corresponds to a
merely logical starting point (as a reply to the question ‘what is a thing’ – quid
est – and ‘if a thing is’ – an est – ), but this is a starting point
without any metaphysical dimension.
“The real distinction between essence and act of being is
not to be identified with the couple to be thought – to really be.
The authentic real composition of essentia – esse is not the
formal nexus of two modes of a being, but rather the structuring of two real
co-principles which make up the primary reality of being.
“This composition is the transcendental structure of reality, which
occurs in all finite beings inasmuch as they are beings. This composition of essence
and act of being (esse) is real: they are really distinct
metaphysical principles which constitute the radical unum which is
being. It is necessary to admit this composition as real (and not only ‘cum
fundamento in re’), because finite things are, but they are not the act of
being (esse), they do not exhaust being (esse) either in
intensity or in extension. They are, but without being being (esse):
they have being (esse), they participate in being (esse). The
participating principle (the potency: essence) cannot be really identified with
that which is participated (the act: being – esse). If essence and esse
were identified, the real principle of limitation (imperfection) would be the
same as the real principle of perfection, which would violate the principle of
non-contradiction. There would be no proper explanation for the real existence
of finite beings: we would be denying either their reality or their
finiteness”(A. LLANO, op. cit., pp. 116-117).
[81] C. BITTLE, The Domain of
Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1941, pp. 19-20.
[82] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 29. Owens writes:
“Since it is the whole, the genus contains its differentiae implicitly and
indeterminately. It is the whole conceived as undetermined by any of its
specific differentiae. Each differentia is likewise the whole thing, now
conceived as determining itself to its specific nature. Genus and differentia
unite therefore in the species as whole with whole. But the genus may also be
considered as the subject that is determined by the differentia. Their relation
then is no longer that of whole to whole, but of subject to quality. Regarded
in this way, the differentiae lie outside their genus and are not contained by
it.
“As one ascends through ever wider predicates of a thing, one finally
comes to the widest predicate of all, being. It can be predicated in one way or
another of everything. Is it therefore a genus, the highest genus of all?
Genera, as has been seen, are established by abstraction, which is cognition in
the order of simple apprehension. Being, on the contrary, is not known originally
through simple apprehension but through judgment. Unlike a genus, it is not
first reached by abstraction, even though it may later be conceptualized not
only in the concrete but also in the abstract. Moreover, a genus does not
contain its differentiae insofar as they are its specific qualities. But being
does contain all its differentiae even in their determining function. If they
did not exist they could not determine. Unlike a genus, consequently, being
does not have a content in inverse ratio to its extension. Since in its own way
it contains all differentiating notes, it has the richest content as well as
the widest range.
“Common being, therefore, is not a generic concept. Ratherm it is
super-generic. It is above all the supreme generam and unites them all in its
embrace. Conceptualized in the concrete, it is predicated of them all, for
everything is a being. As an act, it is predicated even of its own differentiae
in their qualitative aspect, for to differentiate they have to exist. It is the
most common predicate of all”(J. OWENS, op. cit., pp. 64-65).
[83] Cf. M. PHILIPPE, Originalité
de ‘l’ens rationis’ dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas, “Angelicum,” 52
(1975), pp. 91-124 ; J. L. FERNÁNDEZ, El ente de razón en Francisco de
Araujo, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1972.
[84] J. OWENS, op. cit.,
p. 39.
[85] J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic,
Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, p. 27.
[86] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 28, a. 1.
[87] In IV Metaphys.,
lect. 4, no. 574.
[88] H. RENARD, The
Philosophy of Being, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1950, pp. 113-115.
[89] In XI, Metaph., no.
2197.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Studies on analogy: J. M.
RAMÍREZ, De Analogia secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam, “La
Ciencia Thomista,” 24 (1921), pp. pp. 20-40, 195-214, 337-357, 25 (1922) 17-38
; J. LE ROHELLEC, De Fundamento Metaphysico Analogiae, “Divus Thomas
(Piac.),” 29 (1926), pp. 77-101, 664-691 ; G. B. PHELAN, Saint Thomas and
Analogy, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1941 ; W. ESDAILE BYLES, The
Analogy of Being, “The New Scholasticism,” 16 (1942), pp. 331-364 ; J. F.
ANDERSON, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence, B.
Herder, St. Louis, 1954 ; H. T. SCHWARTZ, Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan,
“The New Scholasticism,” 28 (1954), pp. 127-144 ; A. MAURER, St. Thomas and
the Analogy of Genus, “The New Scholasticism,” 29 (1955), pp. 127-144 ; T.
M. FLANIGAN, The Use of Analogy in the Summa Contra Gentiles, “The
Modern Schoolman,” 35 (1957), pp. 21-37 ;
G. KLUBERTANZ, St. Thomas on Analogy, Loyola University Press,
Chicago, 1960 ; R. McINERNY, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of
Aquinas, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961 ; J. F. ROSS, Analogy as a Rule
of Meaning for Religious Language, “International Philosophical Quarterly,”
1 (1961), pp. 468-502 ; M. S. O’NEILL, Some Remarks on the Analogy of God
and Creatures in St. Thomas Aquinas, “Mediaeval Studies,” 23 (1961), pp.
206-215 ; J. OWENS, Analogy as a Thomistic Approach to Being, “Mediaeval
Studies,” 24 (1962), pp. 303-322 ; R. McINERNY, Studies in Analogy,
Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968 ; R. E. MEAGHER, Thomas Aquinas and Analogy:
A Textual Analysis, “The Thomist,” 34 (1970), pp. 230-253 ; J. C. CAHALAN, Analogy
and the Disrepute of Metaphysics, “The Thomist,” 34 (1970), pp. 387-422 ;
T. A. FAY, Analogy: The Key to Man’s Knowledge of God in the Metaphysics of
Thomas Aquinas, “Divus Thomas,” 76 (1973), pp. 343-364 ; B. MONDIN, L’analogia
di proporzione e di proporzionalità nel Commento alle sentenze, “Rivista di
filosofia neo-scolastica,” 66 (1974), pp. 571-589 ; T. CHAPMAN, Analogy,
“The Thomist,” 39 (1975), pp. 127-141 ; K. NIELSON, Talk of God and the
Doctrine of Analogy, “The Thomist,” 40 (1976), pp. 32-60 ; P. LEE, Language
About God and the Theory of Analogy, “The New Scholasticism,” 58 (1984),
pp. 40-66 ; P. AUBENQUE, The Origins of the Doctrine of the Analogy of Being,
“Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal,” 11 (1986), pp. 35-46 ; R. LEE, The
Analogies of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas, “The Thomist,” 58 (1994), pp.
471-488 ; R. McINERNY, Aquinas and Analogy, Catholic University of America
Press, Washington, D.C., 1996.
[92] Explaining the analogy
of attribution and the analogy of proportionality, Wallace writes:
“(1) In the analogy of attribution,
which is sometimes referred to as two- or three-term analogy, a perfection is
predicated of each analogate, but one analogate is primary with respect to the
other(s), and the perfection of the primary is attributed to the others by
virtue of some relationship to the primary, usually that of causality. If the
perfection is predicated properly and intrinsically of only the primary
analogate and not of the other(s), the analogy is called extrinsic
attribution; an example would be ‘healthy’ as said of man and then
attributed to other subjects because of some causal relationship to health in
man, e.g., healthy food, healthy exercise, etc. If the perfection is predicated
properly and intrinsically of all analogates, on the other hand, even though
one is primary, the analogy is called intrinsic attribution; an example
would be ‘is’ or being as attributed to substance and accident, for here the
being that is primary in substance is predicated properly of accident as
dependent upon such substantial being. (2) The analogy of proportionality,
sometimes spoken of as four-term analogy, usually takes the form of a
proportion (schematically A:B::C:D) stating that a perfection found in one
analogate is similarly but proportionately found in another analogate. If the
perfection is really extrinsic to one of the analogates, the analogy is said to
be one of improper proportionality; an example would be the metaphor of
calling a king a ‘lion’ because the courage in the king is similar to the
corresponding quality in the lion. If the perfection is found properly and
intrinsically in both analogates, on the other hand, the analogy is called proper
proportionality; an example would be the proportion, ‘as vision is to the
power of sight, so simple apprehension is to the power of intellect.’
Similarly, one could say, ‘as substance is to its being, so accidents are to
their being.’ As can be seen from the latter example, the analogy of proper
proportionality can be very similar to that of intrinsic attribution. The
difference is that in proper proportionality no direct relationship of
dependence between the two analogates need be expressed, and so neither need be
seen as primary with respect to the other or defined in terms of it, whereas in
the case of intrinsic attribution such a relationship is explicitly recognized.
Both types have important applications in natural theology”(W. WALLACE, op.
cit., pp. 89-90).
[93] If the concept is
determined from without, it is purely univocal.
[94] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
pp.37-39.
[95] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
pp. 36-37.
[96] When we say “analogate” we
mean “that of which an analogous term is predicated.” The term “primary
analogate” means the analogate to which a term belongs principally, while the
“secondary analogate” would mean the analogate of which such a term is
predicated in dependence upon the primary analogate. If, for example, I predicate
“healthy” of man, climate, food and medicine, man would be the primary
analogate, while climate, food and medicine would be the secondary analogates.
This example deals with the so-called extrinsic analogy of attribution.
[97] J. J. SANGUINETI, op.
cit.., pp. 68-69.
[98] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., p. 31.
[99] Cf. Summa Theologiae,
I, q. 33, a. 1.
[100] Studies on the principle of
non-contradiction: R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, Le sens commun, la philosophie de
l’être et les formules dogmatiques, Beauchesne, Paris, 1909 ; J. H.
NICOLAS, L’intuition de l’être et le premier principe, “Revue Thomiste,”
47 (1947), pp. 113-134 ; A. MARCHESI, Il principio di non contraddizione in
Aristotele e in Kant e la funzione del “tempo,” “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,”
52 (1960), pp. 416-421 ; L. ELDERS, Le premier principe de la vie
intellective, “Revue Thomiste,” 62 (1962), pp. 571-586 ; E. BERTI, Il
principio di non contraddizione come criterio supremo di significanza nella
metafisica aristotelica, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome, 1967 ; E.
BERTI, Il valore “teologico” del principio di non contraddizione nella
metafisica aristotelica, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 60 (1968),
pp. 1-24 ; E. BERTI, Sulla formulazione aristotelica del principio di non
contraddizione, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 61 (1969), pp. 9-16
; P. C. COURTÈS, Cohérence de lêtre et Premiere Principe selon Saint Thomas
d’Aquin, “Revue Thomiste,” 70 (1970), pp. 387-423 ; M. CASULA, La prova
aristotelica del principio di contraddizione dal linguaggio, “Giornale di
Metafisica,” 25 (1970), pp. 641-673 ; P. BEARSLEY, Another Look at the First
Principles of Knowledge, “The Thomist,” 36 (1972), pp. 566-598 ; E.
WINANCE, Les propositions évidentes, “Revue Thomiste,” 72 (1972), pp.
198-232 ; G. CENACCHI, Il principio di non-contraddizione fondamento del
discorso filosofico, “Aquinas,” 16 (1973), pp. 255-277 ; M. C. BARTOLOMEI, Tomismo e principio di non
contraddizione, CEDAM, Padua, 1973 ; L. IAMMARRONE, Tomismo e principio
di non contraddizione (1), “Divus Thomas,” 79 (1976), pp. 419-433 ; G.
KALINOWSKI, Le sens du discours métaphysique et les premiers principes,
“Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 68 (1976), pp. 3-19 ; L. CLAVELL, Il
primo principio della conoscenza intellettuale, in Atti del VIII
congresso tomistico nazionale (VII), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican
City, 1982, pp. 62-73 ; F. A. SEDDON, The Principle of Contradiction in
“Metaphysics” Gamma, Pittsburgh, 1988 ; M. J. DEGNAN, Aristotle’s
Defence of the Principle of Non-Contradiction, Minneapolis, 1990 ; M. PEREZ
DE LABORDA, È possibile negare il principio di contraddizione?, “Acta
Philosophica,” 6 (1997), pp. 277-288.
[101] Summa Theologiae,
I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.
[102] H. J. KOREN, An
Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1960, p.
58.
[103] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
IV, 3, 1005b 25.
[104] ARISTOTLE, op. cit.,
IV, 4, 1006a 3.
[105] GORGIAS, Fragments,
I, 3 (DK 82 B 3).
[106] Cf. I. KANT, Critique of
Pure Reason, I, 2, 2, 2, 1 (B 189 / A 150).
[107] K. RAHNER, Geist in Welt,
p. 90, no. 27.
[108] H. BERGSON, L’évolution
créatrice, 1907, p. 270.
[109] H. BERGSON, op. cit.,
pp. 10, 366.
[110] E. LE ROY, in Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale, 1905, pp. 200-204.
[111] J. WEBER, in Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale, 1894, pp. 549-560.
[112] For a critique of Hegel’s
denial of the objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction, see: A.
DEVIZZI, Il significato del principio di contraddizione nella logica
hegeliana, “Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica,” 21 (1939), pp. 463-473 ;
E. BERTI, La critica di Hegel al principio di contraddizione,
“Filosofia,” (1980), pp. 629-640.
[113] G. W. F. HEGEL, Logic,
volume 2, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1892, §§ 87, 88, 89, pp. 162, 163, 167,
and 169.
[114] As quoted in R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE,
God: His Existence and Nature, vol. 1, B. Herder, London, 1946, pp.
173-174. Cf. G. NOEL, La Logique de Hegel, Paris 1897, pp. 23-52,
135-159.
[115] R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op.
cit., p. 174. Cf. T. M. ZIGLIARA, Summa philosophica in usum scholarum,
vol. 1, Critica, Rome, 1876, pp. 247-252.
[116] R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op.
cit., p. 174.
[117] F. WILHELMSEN, Man’s
Knowledge of Reality, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1956,
pp. 47-49.
[118] G. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft
der Logik, volume 1, Stuttgart, p. 404.
[119] R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op.
cit., pp. 174-175.
[120] F. WILHELMSEN, op. cit.,
pp. 49-51.
[121] Koren: “The expressions
‘analytic principle’ and ‘analytic proposition’ should not be misunderstood. In
Kantian philosophy a proposition is analytic if the predicate is contained in
the essence of the subject; hence an analytic proposition is purely
explicative. In Thomistic philosophy, a proposition is analytic if there is a
necessary relation between the subject and the predicate. Thus the proposition
‘man is capable of speech’ will not be analytic according to Kant, whereas in
Thomistic terminology it may be called analytic”(H. J. KOREN, op.cit.,
pp. 58-59).
[122] Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
IV, 3 ; ST. T. AQUINAS, In IV Metaphysic., lect. 6, nos. 607ff.
[123] R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern
Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 2, The Newman Bookshop, Westminster, MD, 1935,
p. 35.
[124] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
pp. 58-60.
[125] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
IV, 4.
[126] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
XI, 5.
[127] R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, op.
cit., p. 168.
[128] Studies on substance: R. JOLIVET, La notion de substance, (Essai historique et critique sur le développement des doctrines d’Aristote nos jours), Beauchesne, Paris, 1929 ; F. S. MOSELEY, The Restoration of the Concept of Substance to Science, “The New Scholasticism,” 1936, pp. 1-17 ; R. MARKUS, Substance, Cause, and Cognition in Thomist Thought, “The New Scholasticism,” 1947, pp. 438-448 ; A. FOREST, La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, Vrin, Paris, 1956 ; R. J. McCALL, The Reality of Substance, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1956 ; T. E. EVERSON, Separability and Substance in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Baltimore, MD, 1973 ; J. E. ROBERTSON, The Distinction Between Substance and Non-Substance in Aristotle’s “Metaphysics,” Texas, 1975 ; A. GRAESER, Aristoteles und das Problem von Substantialität und Sein, “Freiburger Zeitschr. Für Phil. u. Theol.,” 25 (1978), p. 120 s ; E. H. GRANGER, A Problem in Aristotle’s Ontology. Substance as Both Simple and Complex, Austin, Texas, 1977 ; C. SEAD, Divine Substance, Oxford, 1977 ; R. HEINAMAN, Substance and Knowledge of Substance in Aristotle’s “Metaphysics,” Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1978 ; J. M. LOUX, Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, “Philosophical Studies,” Series in Philosophy 14, Dordrecht-Boston, London, 1978 ; D. A. MILLER, Aristotle on Sensible Substance, Rochester, 1979 ; L. DEWAN, Laurence Foss and the Existence of Substances, “Laval théologique et philosophique,” 44 (1988), pp. 77-84 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas on Substance as a Cause of Proper Accidents, in Philosophie Im Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen (edited by J. Beckmann et al.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1987, pp. 201-212 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas on Substance as a Cause of Proper Accidents, in Philosophie Im Mittelalter: Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen (edited by J. Beckmann et al.), Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1987, pp. 201-212 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Substance in Aquinas’ Metaphysics, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 61 (1987), pp. 2-16 ; R. MASIELLO, A Note on Substance and Quod Quid Erat Esse According to St. Thomas, “Doctor Communis,” 40 (1987), pp. 285-288 ; M. L. GILL, Aristotle on Substance, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1989 ; F. A. LEWIS, Substance and Predication in Aristotle, Cambridge-New York, 1991 ; L. DEWAN, The Importance of Substance, Jacques Maritain Center: Thomistic Institute, Notre Dame, IN, 1997.
[129] C. BITTLE, op. cit.,
pp. 246-247.
[130] R. DESCARTES, Principia
philosophica, I, no. 51.
[131] B. SPINOZA, Ethica,
I def. 3.
[132] Studies on individuation:
G. M. MANSER, Das thomistische Individuationsprinzip, “Divus Thomas,” 12
(1934), pp. 221-27, 279-300 ; E. HUGUENY, Résurrection et indentité corporelle
selon les philosophies de l’individuation, “Revue des Sciences
Philosophiques et Theologiques,” 23 (1934), pp. 94-106 ; J. B. WALL, The
Mind of St. Thomas on the Principle of Individuation, “Modern Schoolman,”
1940-1941, pp. 41ff. ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il pensiero di San Tommaso sul
principio di individuazione, “Divus Thomas,” 45 (1942), pp. 35-81 ; U.
DEGL’INNOCENTI, De Gaetano e il principio d’individuazione, “Divus
Thomas,” 26 (1949), pp. 202-208 ; J. BOBIK, La doctrine de Saint Thomas sur
l’individuation des substances corporelles, “Revue Philosophique de
Louvain,” 51 (1953), pp. 5-41 ; J. BOBIK, Dimensions in the Individuation of
Bodily Substances, “Philosophical Studies,” 4 (1954), pp. 60-79 ; J.
KLINGER, Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von Aquin, “Münsterschwarzacher Studien (II),” Vier Turme Verlag, Münsterschwarzacher,
1964 ; U.
DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il principio d’individuazione dei corpi e Giovanni di S.
Tommaso, “Aquinas,” 12 (1969), pp. 59-99 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il
principio d’individuazione nella scuola tomistica, Pontificia Università
Lateranense, Rome, 1971 ; S. P. SFEKAS, The Problem of Individuation in
Aristotelian Metaphysics, New York, 1979 ; J. OWENS, Thomas Aquinas:
Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle, “Mediaeval Studies,” 50
(1988), pp. 279-310.
[133] See the third and eleventh
questions of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae.
[134] C. HART, Thomistic
Metaphysics, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1959, p. 194.
[135] J. LOCKE, Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, II, 23, 2.
[136] J. LOCKE, op. cit.,
II, 23, 1.
[137] D. HUME, A Treatise of
Human Nature, Section VI (Of Modes and Substances).
[138] Cf. In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.
[139] Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3.
[140]
Cf. Ibid.
[141]
Cf. De Ente et Essentia ch. 7.
[142] Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3.
[143] C. BITTLE, op. cit.,
pp. 259-260.
[144] Cf. De virtutibus in communi, q. 1, a. 3.
[145] ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean
Ethics, I, 6, 1096a 22.
[146] In this line we find the
absolute Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon (Kant carries out
a logical-transcendental analysis of substance and accidents, limited to the
knowledge of the phenomenal). In the Kantian theory of the object there is no
place for the constitutive reference from what appears, to what is. There is an
irreparable rupture between these two dimensions. But the truth is that being
and phenomenon are fundamentally correlated; there is an essential homogeneity
between that-which-manifests-itself and that-which-is-manifested. Being shows
itself in the phenomenon, which is nothing other than ‘being-for-us.’ The
phenomenon is a dimension of being, through which being becomes evident. The
phenomenon is nothing other than the limited manifestation of being to a
knowing subject (Cf. A. LLANO, Fenómeno y trascendencia en Kant, EUNSA,
Pamplona, 1973, pp. 274-275).
[147] Cf. P. GEACH, Reference
and Generality, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1962, pp. 38-40.
[148] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
VII, 3, 1029a 9-27.
[149] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
VII, 3, 1029a 28.
[150] A. LLANO, op. cit.,
pp. 118-120.
[151] Studies regarding the
categories: M. SCHEU, The Categories of Being According to Aristotle and St.
Thomas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D. C., 1944 ; L.
M. DE RIJK, The Place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle’s Philosophy,
Assen, 1952 ; C. NEGRO, La dottrina delle categorie nell’omonimo trattato
aristotelico, Pavia, 1952 ; L. LUGARINI, Il problema della categorie in
Aristotele, “Acme,” 8 (1955), pp. 1-109 ; R. J. BLACKWELL, The
Methodological Function of the Categories in Aristotle, “The New
Scholasticism,” 31 (1957), pp. 526-537 ; A. TRENDELENBURG, Historische Beiträge
zur Philosophie, I. Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, Olms, Heldesheim,
1963.
[152] In V Metaphys.,
lect. 9, nos. 891-892.
[153] F. VARVELLO, op.cit.,
p. 60.
[154] C. HART, op. cit.,
p. 218.
[155] Ibid. “The essence
of quantity consists in internal extension. For the external extension
of a body is consequent upon its internal extension; a body cannot have parts in
a place unless it have parts in itself; therefore, internal extension and not
external extension is the root and essence of quantity. Now, while the essence
of quantity (which is an accident) is found in internal extension, the
essence of the quantified substance (that is, of the body which has quantity)
is not constituted by extension, internal or external. Indeed, the
essence of bodily substance is, in itself, independent of extension (for it is,
in itself, integrally one and non-composed), although it has a natural
requirement for extension; extension is a condition required for the
natural existence of a body in the world of actual substances. When the body
actually exists in the natural way, it has internal extension; it has integral
parts which are parts of itself; the bodily substance itself constitutes
these parts (that is, the parts consist of the substance), and this is saying
that the substance itself is the formal cause of its integral parts.
“In the world around us, we see that bodies have external as well as
internal extension. External extension renders bodies impenetrable, mensurable,
divisible, and determines their location. Now, as we have noticed, external
extension is a secondary effect of quantity; a body must have internal
quantity in the first place or it cannot be externally extended in the second
place. But it is at least conceivable that the secondary effects of quantity
might be prevented or removed without destroying the actuality or the primary
effects of quantity in its essence. In other words, a body might conceivably
exist with its internal extension (that is, its internal quantity) even if it
had no external extension. Nature, of course, offers us no instances of such a
thing, and our natural knowledge of bodies is always bound up with their
external extension. But reason sees no contradiction, no impossibility, in the
existence of a bodily substance without external extension. Philosophy has
nothing further to say on the point; it merely indicates the truth that such an
existence is not intrinsically impossible or unthinkable. Implicitly,
philosophy concludes that, if a bodily substance is to have existence and
internal quantity without external extension, more than natural power or
forces will be required to give it actuality. For purposes of illustration we
may borrow from our Faith an actual example of the thing of which we are
speaking. In the Blessed Sacrament, Christ is present, – not only as God, but
as Man with His true Body. The Body of Christ in the Eucharist has actuality;
it has integral parts internally extended; that is, the Body has internal
extension or quantity. But the Body has no external extension or quantity. The
parts of the Body are not codimensional with corresponding external parts of
the host; we cannot say that part of Christ’s body is in one part of the host,
and another part of the Body in another part of the host, and so on. Nor can we
say that the Body is dwarfed, or held in miniature, within the actual external
dimensions of the host. Nor can the Body of Christ be locally confined by the
quantity of the host, nor measured or divided with the measurements or
divisions of the host. The entire Body of Our Lord is present (in mature and
perfect being) in each host and in each part of each host. In the Eucharist,
the secondary effect of quantity, – that is, external extension, – is blocked
out by supernatural power, and the Body of Christ, with its true internal
quantity, is here present without external extension or external quantity. It
is plain, then, that the essence of quantity lies in internal extension,
and that the actual extension of a bodily substance in a place is a secondary
effect of quantity and not its essential expression”(P. GLENN, op. cit.,
pp. 63-65).
[156] “Quantity as corporeal is either
a matter of size or a matter of number. Quantity of size is
called continuous quantity; its parts are united; the line which marks
the end of one part is the same identical line which marks the beginning of the
next neighboring part. By reason of this quantity a body is said to have
magnitude, size, bulk. Quantity of number is called discrete quantity;
its parts are severed, discrete, separated. These parts may be, indeed, more or
less perfectly contiguous (one lying close to another, so that the line
which marks the end of one part is right against the line which marks
the beginning of the next neighboring part), but they are not continuous. The
quantity of a grain of sugar is quantity of size, continuous quantity;
but the quantity of a pound of sugar in a sack (the whole being regarded as one
quantity) is discrete quantity; it is the quantity of a number of grains
taken together. Other examples of continuous quantity: an apple, a horse, a
man, a tree, a stone. Examples of discrete quantity: a peck of apples, a herd
of horses, a group of men, a clump of trees, a pile of stones. Of the first
examples we say that they are of such and such size; of the others, we
say that they exist in such and such number (or multitude)”(P.
GLENN, op. cit., pp. 258-259).
[157] F. VARVELLO, op. cit.,
p. 59.
[158] Cf. R. DESCARTES, Principles
of Philosophy, II, 4-9.
[159] J. OWENS, op. cit.,
pp. 166-167.
[160] Studies on relation: N. D.
GINSBURG, Metaphysical Relations and St. Thomas Aquinas, “The New
Scholasticism,” 1941, pp. 238-254 ; C. G. KOSSEL, Principles of St. Thomas’
Distinction Between the Esse and Ratio of Relation, The
Modern Schoolman,” 1945-46, pp. 19-36, 93-107 ; C. G. KOSSEL, St. Thomas’
Theory of the Causes of Relation, “The Modern Schoolman,” 1945-1946, pp.
151-172 ; C. G. KOSSEL, The Problem of Relation in Some Non-Scholastic
Philosophies, “The Modern Schoolman,” 23 (1946), pp. 68-81 ; S. BRETON, L’“esse
in” et l’“esse ad” dans la métaphisique de la relation, Angelicum, Rome,
1951 ; A. KREMPEL, La doctrine de la relation chez St. Thomas d’Aquin,
Vrin, Paris, 1952.
[161] K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit.,
p. 192.
[162] D. MERCIER, op. cit.,
pp. 502-503.
[163] “Single Motion in Agent
and Patient. There is but one single motion involved which is at once the foundation
in reality for both action and passion. This does not occasion any difficulty
since the single motion can be viewed from two distinct formalities, as that
from which the motion arises (action) and that in which it terminates
(passion). This difference is sufficient to separate the two predicaments of
action and passion. Hence St. Thomas notes: ‘Although movement is the common
act of mover and moved, yet it is one operation to cause movement and another
to receive movement; hence we have two predicaments: action and passion’(De
Potentia Dei, q. 7, a. 9, c.). If there is but a single motion involved as
arising in the agent and terminating in the patient, then it follows that the
agent must be, in a true sense, in the patient, either immediately or through a
medium. Hence the axiom: Actio est in passo. It is evident that, with
these two correlative predicaments and the consequent relation, we are
describing finite efficient causality”(C. HART, op. cit., pp.
231-232).
[164] Studies on time: J. A.
GUNN, The Problem of Time, London, 1929 ; A. MANSION, La théorie
aristotélicienne du temps chez les péripatéticiens médiévaux Averroés, Albert
le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin, “Revue néo-scolastique de Philosophie,” 36
(1934), pp. 275-307 ; M. F. CLEUGH, Time and Its Importance in Modern
Thought, London, 1937 ; L. R. HEATH, The Concept of Time, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1936 ; J. SIVADJIAN, Le Temps, Paris, 1938 ;
M. JOCELYN, Discrete Time and Illumination, “Laval Théologique et
Philosophique,” 2 (1946), pp. 49-57 ; J. F. CALLAHAN, Four Views of Time in
Ancient Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1948 ; H.
REICHENBACH, The Direction of Time, University of California Press,
Berkeley, CA, 1956 ; J. M. DUBOIS, La signification ontologique de la définition
aristotélicienne du temps, “Revue thomiste,” 60 (1960), pp. 38-79, 234-248
; M. BORDONI, Tempo, quantità, anima nel pensiero aristotelico-tomista,
“Aquinas,” 4 (1961), pp. 293-323 ; A. GRÜNBAUM, Philosophical
Problems of Space and Time, New York, 1963 ; J. M. DUBOIS, Les
présupposés originels de la conception aristotélicienne du temps, “Revue
thomiste,” 63 (1963), pp. 389-423 ; M. BORDONI, Senso metafisico della
durata temporale, “Aquinas,” 7 (1964), pp. 29-50 ; R. M. GALE (ed.), The
Philosophy of Time, Doubleday, New York, 1967 ; W. DESAN, Totality and
Time, “The Thomist,” 39 (1975), pp. 696-711 ; P. DAVIES, The Physics of
Time Asymmetry, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1977 ; J. B.
BOLZAN and A. A. BRABOSCHI, La perceptión del tiempo, “Anuario
filosófico,” 11 (1978), pp. 19-37 ; W. H. NEWTON-SMITH, The Structure of
Time, Routledge and Kegan, London, 1980 ; I. PRIGOGINE, From Being to
Becoming: Time and Complexity in Physical Sciences, W. H. Freeman, New
York, 1980 ; J. WHITROW, The Natural Philosophy of Time, The Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1980 ; A. MORENO, Time and Relativity: Some Philosophical
Considerations, “The Thomist,” 45 (1981), pp. 62-79 ; J. T. FRASER, The
Genesis and Evolution of Time, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982 ; H.
HOLLINGER and M. ZENZEN, The Nature of Irreversibility, Reidel,
Dordrecht, 1985 ; P. KROES, Time: Its Structure and Role in Physical
Theories, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985 ; J. T. FRASER, Time: The Familiar
Stranger, Tempus Books, Stroud, Gloucestershire, 1988 ; R. FLOOD and M.
LOCKWOOD (eds.), The Nature of Time, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986 ; G. A.
KENDALL, Space-Time and the Community of Being: Some Cosmological
Speculations, “The Thomist,” 51 (1987), pp. 480-500 ; I. PRIGOGINE and E.
BELLONE, I nomi del tempo, Boringhieri, Turin, 1989 ; J. WHITROW, Time
in History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990 ; J. R. PAMBRUN, Ricoeur,
Lonergan, and the Intelligibility of Cosmic Time, “The Thomist,” 54 (1990),
pp. 471-498 ; P. COVENEY and R. HIGHFIELD, The Arrow of Time: A Voyage
Through Science to Solve Time’s Greatest Mystery, Fawcett Columbine, New
York, 1991 ; H. D. ZEH, The Physical Basis of the Direction of Time,
Springer, Berlin, 1992 ; R. LE POIDEVIN and M. MACBEATH (eds.), The
Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993 ; J. HALLIWELL,
J. PÈREZ MERCADER and W. ZUREK, Physical Origins of Time Asymmetry,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994 ; P. DAVIES, About Time:
Einstein’s Unfinished Revolution, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995 ; S.
HAWKING, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes,
Bantam Books, New York, 1998 ; E. MARIANI (ed.), Aspetti del tempo,
Quaderni dell’I.P.E., Naples, 1998 ; M. CASTAGNINO and J. J. SANGUINETI, Tempo
e universo. Un approccio filosofico e scientifico, Armando, Rome, 2000 ; S.
HAWKING and R. PENROSE, The Nature of Space and Time, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000 ; D. BRADSHAW, Time and Eternity in
the Greek Fathers, “The Thomist,” 70 (2006), pp. 311-366.
[165] BOETHIUS, De
consolatione, I, 5.
[166] P. GLENN, op. cit.,
p. 278.
[167] ARISTOTLE, Physics,
IV, 11, 220a 25. Explaining the parts of this definition of time, Bittle
writes: “It is the ‘number’ of movement, because we measure time by numbering
the parts of the movement. These parts are not actual and separated, but
potential, because the movement is continuous; consequently, the number of
these parts is itself not actual, but potential. It is the number of
‘movement,’ insofar as this movement is successive and continuous in its
passage from a starting point to a goal; time is found only in this kind of
movement. It is the number of movement ‘according to before-and-after.’ This is
obvious from the fact that the movement, which we call ‘time,’ is gradual and
successive and is realized bit by bit, so that the parts of the movement follow
each other in a steady flow; in other words, these parts stand to each in the
relation of ‘before’ and ‘after.’ That is why St. Augustine says: ‘If nothing
went by, there would be no future time: the present, however, if it always
remained present, would not be time, but eternity’(ST. AUGUSTINE, Confessions,
XI, 14)”(C. BITTLE, op. cit., p. 208).
[168] W. WALLACE, op. cit.,
pp. 53-54.
[169] “Exposition of
Descartes’ Theory: Leibniz idealizes temporal relations while still
professing belief in the reality of their terms. Descartes is even more of an
idealist. He suppresses also that objective aspect of time, and reduces time to
a ‘simple mode of thought.’ ‘Duration,’ according to him, ‘is identical with
the substantial existence of things, it expresses the manner in which we
represent a being maintaining its existence’(DESCARTES, Principles of
Philosophy, I, 55). Time, he continues, which we distinguish from duration,
is a mode of thought. As a matter of fact we predicate the same duration of
movement as we do of immobile objects. Take two bodies engaged in different
movements which traverse space during one hour. We regard the duration of such
movements as being equal, even though their quantity be unequal. What then is
time? In measuring the duration of earthly objects we compare it with the
duration of the apparent movement of the planets. Time, therefore, is an
extrinsic measure, a mode of evaluation which adds nothing to the reality of
beings and modifies this reality in no manner whatsoever. In other words, it is
a mode of thought (Cf. DESCARTES, op. cit., I, 57).
“General
Criticism of Descartes’ Theory: In constructing his system of philosophy
Descartes has voided the laws of logic. After identifying duration and the
substantial existence of beings – a fundamental principle in the Thomistic
theory, it was quite logical to conclude that, since permanent duration is
identical with substantial existence, changing duration or time must be concreted
in successive existences, i.e., continuous movements. Reasoning of this sort
has led to the scholastic theory of time.
“But the opinions of the French philosopher on the reality of accidents
led him to idealism. In Cartesian metaphysics accidents have no individual
reality or existence; the distinction between accidents and substance is purely
in the ideal order. Therefore, substantial existences, the only kind of
existences, are permanent and endowed with absolutely indivisible duration, and
the concept of a continuous succession is a fiction of the intellect, a mode of
thought, having no real connection with contingent beings.
“The Cartesian definition clearly savors of idealism. If, as Descartes
says, temporal duration is the measure of contingent existences gauged by the
movement of the planets, time is absolutely extrinsic to these existences and
reducible to a simple mode of representation. But Descartes’ purely subjective
conclusion is not the only alternative. For although the measurement used by
ordinary men and scientists does not correspond adequately to the reality
measured, i.e., to the continuous movements, each movement constitutes a real
succession displaying all the characteristics of real time. The fact that we
constantly must have recourse to this common standard of measurement, and that
its use to gauge successions of different intrinsic values necessarily involves
imperfections, does not warrant us in denying the existence of the real times
characteristic of every movement which the scholastics call intrinsic times.
Extrinsic time, therefore, does not preclude the idea of intrinsic and real
time. Descartes believes in the existence of only the first of these two; his
complete rejection of the second forces him into idealism”(D. NYS, Cosmology,
vol. 2, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1942, pp. 333-334).
[170] General Criticism of the
Kantian Subjectivist Position on Time: “According to Immanuel Kant, the a
priori form of time leaves its impress directly only on the subjective acts
of sensitive life. Indirectly it affects also the objects of these acts,
inasmuch as they are represented in internal actions. Matters cannot be
otherwise if all data relating to time are derived from the same source, the a
priori form of time.
“Now what does experience say about this fundamental principle of the
Kantian theory? Many times we exhaust the apparent reality of the objects
surrounding us only by means of several sensitive representations. In order to
take a pastoral scene in completely, we must regard each and every one of its
constituent parts: the trees, the bushes, the flowers, the mountains, the
brooks, and the animals. So that while the scene, despite the multiplicity and
the complexity of its parts, appears to be one permanent and coexistent whole,
the sensations which render us aware of it, succeed one another, or at least
become more confused and more vague in proportion as they come closer to being
coexistent. Permanence and coexistence, mobility and succession are the
antithetical characteristics which differentiate the object of our sensitive
representations.
“How explain this radical difference? If the a priori form of
time or the intuition of our inner sense affects directly only the acts of
internal sensibility, and if it influences the objects represented only through
the intermediary of these acts, both the subjective representations and the
objects of these representations must be subject to the same temporal
relations. It is inconceivable, therefore, that the ones be successive, and the
others simultaneous or coexistent. In other words, the perception of any form
of simultaneity by means of successive and continuous representations cannot be
effected in the Kantian hypothesis. Moreover, the fact that the same external
objects appear coexistent in time, and successive at another is incompatible
with this a priori form which is unique and always the same. On the
other hand, the fact is easily explained when we argue that the difference in
our subjective impressions has its true source in the different states of
external objects. This is an additional proof of the empirical origin of the
concept of time (D. NYS, op. cit., pp. 329-331).
[171] “‘Time’ is not a real being
which exists in nature independent of the mind. Time, as we conceive it,
extends without limit in the past and in the future. Since God is
eternal, no limit can be assigned in the past or in the future in which God
could not create bodies. Bodies, however, exist ‘in time.’ Hence, if time is a
real entity, it must possess a positive eternity. Now, if time is
without limit in the past and future, i.e., eternal, it must consist of an infinite
number of present moments, because it consists of a series of successive
present moments which flow continuously from the future through the present
moment into the past. But an infinite number is impossible. Therefore ‘time,’
as a real being, is impossible.
“Again, if time were a real being, it would be an entity existing in
itself and for itself; in other words, it would be a substance and,
since it is not spiritual, a material substance. Now, a material
substance is a body. Time, however, is conceived as being in a
continuous process of movement and change; hence, it would be a continuously
moving and changing body. But moving and changing bodies are acknowledged by
everybody to be ‘in time.’ Hence, ‘time,’ since it is a moving and changing
body which exists ‘in time,’ demands another absolute time in which to exist as
‘in time.’ This second absolute time, for the same reason, demands a third
absolute time; and this process must be repeated through an infinite regress.
That, however, again necessitates an infinite number, which is a contradiction
in terms. ‘Time,’ therefore, cannot be a real being… It is a philosophic error
to consider ‘time,’ as we conceive it, to be a real being existing as such”(C.
BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 199-200).
[172] “Individual time is
manifold; general time is one and uniform. By individual
(particular, intrinsic) time we understand the succession inherent in any
concrete movement taken by itself. This time is independent of any comparison
with a standard unit of time such as a minute, an hour, a day, a year. If no
creature existed but a single body, and if this body underwent a successive
change, time would be there in this movement, although in this case no
measurement of it could be made by comparison with other movements. And the
same applies to any movement of any being in the world: it has its own individual
(particular, intrinsic) time by the mere fact that it is a continous movement,
irrespective of the existence or movements of other beings.
“By general (common, extrinsic) time we mean the successive
movement of one thing taken as a standard according to which we measure
the individual (particular, intrinsic) time of another thing. This standard of
measurement is a matter of selection on our part. Such a standard must, of
course, be one and uniform in character and not subject to appreciable
variations; otherwise it would defeat its purpose. With us, this standard of
measurement is the rotation of the earth on its axis once a ‘day’ and around
the sun once in a ‘year.’ This is a natural division of general time, while the
division of the year into twelve months, of the day into 24 hours, and of the hour
into 60 minutes, is arbitrary. Since the rotation of the earth on its axis and
in its orbit around the sun is practically always the same, general time is
uniform. The individual time inherent in a being is the reason why it can be
measured and also the reason why it can be used as a standard to measure other
individual times”(C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 207-208).
[173] For an in-depth study on
Aristotle on place, see: T. R. LARSON, Aristotle’s Understanding of Place,
“The Thomist,” 67 (2003), pp. 439-462.
[174] F. VARVELLO, op. cit.,
p. 82.
[175] P. GLENN, op. cit.,
pp. 266-269.
[176] J. OWENS, op. cit.,
p. 206.
[177] Cf. In V Metaphys.,
lect. 17.
[178] Studies regarding act and potency: A. FARGES, Theorie fondamentale de l’acte et de la puissance du moteur et du mobile, Paris, 1893 ; A. BAUDIN, L’acte et la puissance dans Aristote, “Revue Thomiste,” 7 (1899), pp. 39-62, 153-172, 274-296, 584-608 ; G. MATTIUSSI, Le XXIV tesi della filosofia di S. Tommaso d’Aquino, Gregorian University, Rome, 1925 ; G. MANSER, Das Wesen des Thomismus. Die Lehre von Akt und Potenz als tiefste Grundlage der thomistischen Synthese, Paulus Verlag, Fribourg, 1935 ; P. DESCOQS, Sur la division de l’être en acte et puissance d’après Saint Thomas, “Revue de Philosophie,” 38 (1938), pp. 410-430 ; V. A. BERTO, Sur la composition d’acte et de puissance dans les créatures, “Revue de Philosophie,” 39 (1939), pp. 106-121 ; P. DESCOQS, Sur la division de lêtre en acte et puissance d’après Saint Thomas. Nouvelles precisions, “Revue de Philosophie,” 39 (1939), pp. 233-252, 361-70 ; C. FABRO, Circa la divisione dell’essere in atto e potenza secondo S. Tommaso, “Divus Thomas,” 42 (1939), pp. 529-552 ; A. SANDOZ, Sur la division de lêtre en acte et puissance d’après Saint Thomas, “Revue de Philosophie,” 40 (1940), pp. 53-76 ; VAN ROO, W. A., Act and Potency, “The Modern Schoolman”, 18 (1940), pp. 1-4 ; C. GIACON, Atto e potenza, La Scuola, Brescia, 1947 ; J. D. ROBERT, Le principe: ‘Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam subjectivam realiter distinctam,’ “Revue philosophique de Louvain,” 47 (1949), pp. 44-70 ; W. NORRIS CLARKE, The Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?, “The New Scholasticism,” 26 (1952), pp. 167-194 ; E. BERTI, Genesi e sviluppo della dottrina della potenza e dell’atto in Aristotele, “Studia Patavina,” 5 (1958), pp. 477-505 ; C. FABRO, La determinazione dell’atto nella metafisica tomistica, in Esegesi tomistica, Pontificia Università Lateranense, Rome, 1969, pp. 329-350 ; H. P. KAINZ, Active and Passive Potency in Thomistic Angelology, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972 ; C. A. FREELAND, Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality and Potentiality, Pittsburgh, 1979 ; F. KOVACH, St. Thomas Aquinas: Limitation of Potency by Act. A Textual and Doctrinal Analysis, in Atti del VIII Congresso Internazionale dell’Accademia Pontificia di San Tommaso d’Aquino (V), Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1982, pp. 387-411 ; G. VERBEKE, The Meaning of Potency in Aristotle, in Graceful Reason. Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens CssR, edited by L. P. Gerson, Toronto, 1983, pp. 55-74 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom ‘What is Received is Received according to the Mode of the Receiver, in A Straight Path: Essays Offered to Arthur Hyman, edited by Ruth Link Salinger, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. 279-289 ; J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited, “The Review of Metaphysics,” 51 (1998), pp. 533-564.
[179] Positively unintelligible
is that which is seen not to be possible; negatively unintelligible is that
which is not seen to be possible. For example, a square circle is positively
unintelligible, but a trip to the moon in one hour is negatively unintelligible
because we do not yet see how it can be done.
[180] H. J. KOREN, op.cit.,
pp. 105-106.
[181] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
p. 106.
[182] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
IX, 1, 1045b 34.
[183] ARISTOTLE, op. cit.,
IX, 6, 1048a 31.
[184] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
p.107.
[185] C. BITTLE, op. cit.,
p. 56.
[186] Cf. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
IX, 6, 1048a, 35ff ; AQUINAS, In IX Metaph., lecture 5, no. 1827.
[187] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
p. 120.
[188] C. BITTLE, op. cit.,
pp. 56-58.
[189] H. J. KOREN, op. cit.,
pp. 116-117. Kreyche explains the difference between a logical distinction
(including the virtual distinction) and a real distinction (major and minor)
and shows that act and potency are really distinct by a minor real distinction
between metaphysical, not physical, principles of being: “In general, there are
two types of distinction – logical and real. Formally considered,
a logical distinction is a lack of identity, not in the order of things, but in
the order of our concepts of things. Thus, if we conceive one and the same
thing from two different points of view (for example, six and a half dozen
eggs), the distinction in question is not a real, but a logical one. (Some
logical distinctions are purely logical, as is the example given in the
text; others are said to be virtual. A virtual distinction is a logical
one that has some basis in the thing itself). By contrast, a real distinction
is one that exists in the order of things themselves – that is, independently
of our knowledge of them. Thus the distinction, let us say, between two
parakeets exists apart from any consideration of the mind.
“The example of the parakeets is an illustration of a real
distinction between one thing and another. This type of distinction is
known in philosophy as a ‘major’ real distinction, and the nature of such a
distinction is obvious. Less obvious, however, is the distinction that exists,
not between two things, but between two or more parts of a single thing, called
a ‘minor’ real distinction. We may exemplify this latter by the difference that exists between an arm
and a leg. Though really distinct, an arm and a leg are not, properly speaking,
‘things.’ Yet they are distinct, really distinct, because an arm is
not a leg, nor is a leg an arm. The example in question is a minor real
distinction between physical parts. Most important of all for our own
purposes is the distinction that exists, not between physical parts, but
between metaphysical principles of being. This too is a minor real
distinction, and it is the distinction that exists between potency and
act.
“From what we have just said it should be evident that potency and act
are not merely distinct in our thinking about them – that is, not distinct by a
type of logical distinction. They are really distinct in things
themselves by a minor real distinction. It should hardly be necessarty at this
point to ‘prove’ that potency and act are distinct, meaning really distinct.
This is an immediate deduction from the nature of potency and act: in the
measure in which it is in act it is perfect. To deny that potency and act are
really distinct is to admit in effect that something could be perfect and
imperfect from one and the same point of view, and this a plain contradiction.
“Finally, it must be noted that any attempt to discount the real
distinction between potency and act would render impossible any genuine
solution to the very problems that give rise to this distinction. Thus, if
potency and act are not really distinct, then the problem of change or becoming
becomes insoluble. Further, if potency and act are not really distinct, there is
no genuine solution to the problem of limitation. In conclusion, if these
principles are in any sense real, it must be allowed that they are really
distinct”(R. J. KREYCHE, op. cit., pp. 100-103).
[190] M. KRAPIEC, op. cit.,
pp. 252-253.
[191] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., p. 80.
[192] M. KRAPIEC, op. cit.,
p. 251.
[193] M. KRAPIEC, op. cit.,
p. 252.
[194] J. F. WIPPEL, Thomas
Aquinas and the Axiom that Unreceived Act is Unlimited, “The Review of
Metaphysics,” 51 (1998), pp. 533-564.
[195] J. D. ROBERT, Le principe:
‘Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam subjectivam realiter distinctam,’
“Revue philosophique de Louvain,” 47 (1949), p. 51-52.
[196] ST. T. AQUINAS, In I
Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 1, sed
contra.
[197] J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit.,
pp. 557-559.
[198] J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit.,
p. 562.
[199] J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit.,
p. 562.
[200] W. NORRIS CLARKE, The
Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?, “The New
Scholasticism,” 26 (1952), pp. 167-194.
[201] R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, Reality:
A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1950, pp. 43-44.
Norris Clarke cites two authors sharing similar views: P. DEZZA, Metaphysica
Generalis, Rome, 1945, p. 124 ; C. GIACON, Atto e potenza, Brescia,
1947, p. 46.
[202] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., p. 170.
[203] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., pp. 170-171. He further notes that “this is true even of a few direct
and detailed studies of the Aristotelian doctrine done by Thomists: e.g., A.
BAUDIN, L’acte et la puissance dans Aristote, “Revue Thomiste,” 7
(1899), pp. 39-62, 153-172, 274-296, 584-608.”
[204] Cf. W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., p. 179.
[205] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
A, 6 and 9.
[206] ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics,
Lambda, 8, 1074 a 33 ; Z, 8, 1034 a 5-8.
[207] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., pp. 180-181.
[208] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., p. 181.
[209] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., pp. 190-193.
[210] H. D. GARDEIL, op. cit.,
pp. 196-197.
[211] M. KRAPIEC, op. cit.,
pp. 260-261.
[212] Studies on Thomistic
participation metaphysics: C. A. HART, Participation
and the Thomistic Five Ways, “The New Scholasticism,” 26 (1952), pp.
267-282; W. NORRIS CLARKE, The Meaning of
Participation in St. Thomas Aquinas, “Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association,” 26 (1952), pp. 147-157 ; L. B. GEIGER, La participation dans la philosophie de St.
Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 1953; G. LINDBECK, Participation and Existence in the Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas, “Franciscan
Studies,” 17 (1957), pp. 1-22, 107-125; C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, S.E.I., Turin, 1961 ; La nozione metafisica di partecipazione,
3rd ed., S.E.I. Turin, 1963; Elementi
per una dottrina tomistica della partecipazione, “Divinitas,” 2 (1967), pp.
559-586 ; The Intensive Hermeneutics
of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation, “The Review of
Metaphysics,” 27 (1974), pp. 449-491; Partecipazione
agostiniana e partecipazione tomistica, “Doctor Communis,” 39 (1986), pp.
282-291 ; H. J. JOHN, Participation
Revisited, “The Modern Schoolman,” 39 (1962), pp. 154-165 ; J. ARTOLA,
Creación y participación, Publicaciones
de la Institución Aquinas, Madrid, 1963; P. C. COURTÈS, Participation et contingence selon Saint Thomas d’ Aquin, “Revue
Thomiste,” 77 (1969), pp. 201-235; J. CHIU YUEN HO, La doctrine de la participatión dans le Commentaire de Saint Thomas sur
le “Liber de Causis”, “Revue philosophique de Louvain,” 27 (1972), pp.
360-383; T. FAY, Participation: The
Transformation of Platonic and Neoplatonic Thought in the Metaphysics of Thomas
Aquinas, “Divus Thomas,” 76 (1973), pp. 50-64; O. N. DERISI, Participación, acto y potencia y analogia en
Santo Tomás, “Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica,” 65 (1974), pp. 415-435; La existencia o esse imparticipado divino, causa de todo ser
participado, “Sapientia,” 31 (1976), pp. 109-120; El fundamento de la metafisica tomista: El Esse e Intelligere Divino, fundamento y causa de
todo ser y entender participados, “Sapientia,” 35 (1980), pp. 9-26; Del ente participado al Ser imparticipado,
“Doctor Communis,” 35 (1982), pp. 26-38; La
participación del ser, “Sapientia,” 37 (1982), pp. 5-10, 83-86, 243-248; La participación de la esencia, in Cinquant’anni di Magistero Teologico.
Scritti in onore di Mons. Antonio Piolanti, “Studi tomistici” (26),
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, 1985, pp. 173-184; P. LAZZARO, La dialettica della partecipazione nella
Summa contra Gentiles di S. Tommaso
d’Aquino, Parallelo, Regio Calabria, 1976 ; K. REISENHUBER, Participation as a Structuring Principle in
Thomas Aquinas’ Teaching on Divine Names, “Studies in Medieval Thought,” 20
(1978), pp. 240-242; A. BASAVE, La
doctrina metafisica de la participación en santo Tomás de Aquino, “Giornale
di Metafisica,” 30 (1979), pp. 257-266; A. L. GONZÁLEZ, Ser y participación, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1979; P. MAZZARELLA, Creazione, partecipazione, e tempo secondo
san Tommaso d’Aquino, “Studia Patavina,” (1982), pp. 308-335; J. F. WIPPEL,
Thomas Aquinas and Participation, in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Catholic
University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 117-158 ; C. P.
BIGGER, St. Thomas on Essence and
Participation, “The New Scholasticism,” 62 (1988), pp. 319-348; T. TYN, Metafisica della sostanza. Partecipazione e
analogia entis, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna, 1991, pp. 18-20,
523-583, 813-933 ; R. A. TE VELDE, Participation
and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, Brill, Leiden, 1995.
[213] Studies on essence: J. E.
HARE, Aristotle’s Theories of Essence, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 1975 ; C. BIGGER, St. Thomas on Essence and Participation,
“The New Scholasticism,” 62 (1988), pp. 319-348.
[214] De Ente et Essentia,
chapter 1.
[215] De Ente et Essentia,
chapter 2.
[216] T.ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., p. 90.
[217] K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit.,
p. 119.
[218] C. BITTLE, op. cit.,
p. 117.
[219] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., p. 91. Owens writes: “The essence can exist in
reality and in the human intellect. In reality it exists in individuals, as
humanity exists in millions of men. The same essence, humanity, is found
separately in every one of these many individuals. It is common to them all.
The same essence, moreover, can exist in your intellect or in the intellect of
anyone else who thinks of it. In this cognitional existence it is no longer
individual but specific. It is the universal species ‘man,’ or human nature in
its universality. As a universal, it represents all individual men in the one
concept. It has a unity of its own as universal, just as in any particular man
it has a unity that is individual”(J. OWENS, op. cit., p. 133).
[220] De Ente et Essentia,
chapter 1.
[221] “Physical essence is
an essence as it exists concretely in nature, independent of the mind’s
thinking. Such an essence is taken objectively, and thereby we mean the sum of
those fundamental elements which, in the natural order of the world, constitute
the object’s innermost being, no matter how our mind may conceive them in its
thoughts. Man, for instance, consists of two essential principles in his
physical nature, namely, body and soul. The same is true of animals and plants;
they, too, consist of a body and a life giving principle. These various classes
of living beings are composed of the same chemical materials (matter) as the
determinable element of their physical being; that plants and brutes and men
differ so greatly among themselves is due to their determining life principle
(form, soul) which uses this common material according to the needs of its
specific nature. These elements or principles constitute the essence of a thing
in the concrete physical order, irrespective of any mind that may
contemplate them, and hence such an essence is called a ‘physical’ essence.
“If such a physical essence is simple, i.e., constituted by a single
substantial principle, and not by two or more substantial part-principles, it
is a simple physical essence. God’s essence and that of pure spirits are
one in nature and not compounded by two or more substantial parts. But if this
essence is composite, i.e., if it consists of two or more substantial
part-principles (like body and soul), which together constitute one complete
nature, it is a composite physical essence (C. BITTLE, op. cit.,
pp. 118-119).”
[222] “Metaphysical essence
is the sum of the various grades of being which constitute a thing in the
abstract concepts of the mind. Here we do not consider an object as it
exists concretely in the physical world, but according to the manner in which
it is conceived by the mind. An example will clarify this. In the physical
order of existence, man is a compound of body and soul; notwithstanding this
composition, he is a single being or essence. When the mind conceives man as a
corporeal, living, sentient, rational substance,’ the mind is fully aware of
the fact that he does not consist of one physical part which is his
‘substance,’ and of a second physical part which is his ‘body,’ and of a third
physical part which is his ‘vegetant life,’ and of a fourth physical part which
is his ‘sentiency,’ and of a fifth and final physical part which is his
‘rationality.’ Man is a substance, and this substance is at one and the same
time corporeal and living and sentient and rational – one reality expressed in
five objectively different concepts, like a set of photographs taken of the
same person from five different angles. The five concepts, taken alone by
themselves, give but a partial and inadequate idea of the one essence; taken
together, however, they supplement each other and give a correct and complete
idea of man’s essence. The mind must represent the one reality by means of five
objectively different concepts, because it is incapable of expressing it in a
single all-comprehensive concept.
“Such parts of an essence which are the ‘grades of being’ of one
concrete nature (in reality identical and inseparable in thought) are called metaphysical
parts; and the essence which is conceived by the mind as consisting of such
metaphysical grades of being is called the metaphysical essence of the
thing. Needless to say, it is possible to express a number of such metaphysical
grades of being by means of a single term. A corporeal substance is termed a
‘body’; a living corporeal substance is termed a ‘plant.’ A sentient, living,
corporeal is termed an ‘animal.’ A rational, sentient, living corporeal
substance is termed a ‘man’; and a man is often termed a ‘rational animal.’ A
glance shows us that this latter mode of expression is the definition of man
according to his proximate genus and specific difference. Whichever way we
express the essence of a thing, whether by an enumeration of the single grades
of being or by a definition according to the proximate genus and specific
difference, in either case we express the metaphysical essence of that
thing”(C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 119-120).”
[223] Studies on individuation:
G. M. MANSER, Das thomistische Individuationsprinzip, “Divus Thomas,” 12
(1934), pp. 221-27, 279-300 ; E. HUGUENY, Résurrection et indentité
corporelle selon les philosophies de l’individuation, “Revue des Sciences
Philosophiques et Theologiques,” 23 (1934), pp. 94-106 ; J. B. WALL, The
Mind of St. Thomas on the Principle of Individuation, “The Modern
Schoolman,” 1940-1941, pp. 41 ff. ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il pensiero di San
Tommaso sul principio di individuazione, “Divus Thomas,” 45 (1942), pp.
35-81 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, De Gaetano e il principio d’individuazione,
“Divus Thomas,” 26 (1949), pp. 202-208 ; J. BOBIK, La doctrine de Saint
Thomas sur l’individuation des substances corporelles, “Revue Philosophique
de Louvain,” 51 (1953), pp. 5-41 ; J. BOBIK, Dimensions in the Individuation
of Bodily Substances, “Philosophical Studies,” 4 (1954), pp. 60-79 ; J.
KLINGER, Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von Aquin, “Münsterschwarzacher Studien (II),” Vier Turme Verlag, Münsterschwarzacher,
1964 ; U.
DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il principio d’individuazione dei corpi e Giovanni di S.
Tommaso, “Aquinas,” 12 (1969), pp. 59-99 ; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, Il
principio d’individuazione nella scuola tomistica, Pontificia Università
Lateranense, Rome, 1971 ; S. P. SFEKAS, The Problem of Individuation in
Aristotelian Metaphysics, New York, 1979 ; J. OWENS, Thomas Aquinas:
Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle, “Mediaeval Studies,” 50
(1988), pp. 279-310.
[224] Norris Clarke use the term existence
instead of act of being, yet another inheritance from Scholastic
formalism.
[225] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., p. 111.
[226] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., p. 112.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Italics mine.
[229] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., pp. 112-113.
[230] W. NORRIS CLARKE, op.
cit., p. 113.
[231] W. CARLO, The Ultimate Reducibility
of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics, Nijhoff, The Hague,
1966. See also: W. CARLO, The Role of Essence in Existential Metaphysics,
“International Philosophical Quarterly,” 2 (1962), pp. 571-590.
[232] Cf. L. ELDERS, La
metafisica dell’essere di san Tommaso d’Aquino in una prospettiva storica, vol.
1: L’essere commune, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Vatican City, p. 248.
[233] In IV Metaphys.,
lecture 2 (ed. Cathala no. 558).
[234] R. P. PHILLIPS, op cit.,
pp. 200-201.
[235] Cf. J. NIJENHUIS, ‘To
Be’ or ‘To Exist’: That is the Question, “The Thomist,” 50 (1986), pp.
353-394.
[236] De Torre writes: “‘To
exist’ is not quite the same as ‘to be.’ It comes from the Latin existere,
which literally means to ‘stand out’ From there comes existentia in Latin,
and ‘existence’ in English, and it means the fact of being, not the act
of being. ‘Fact’ comes from the Latin factum, which means ‘made’ or
finished. Existence signifies the fact of being; when something is
already there, has come to the act of being, then it exists, it ‘stands
out of,’ it is no longer a possibility (in German, while ‘being’ is Sein,
existence is Dasein or being-there).
“There is a great tendency in modern philosophy to equate existence with
being. But ‘being’ refers to the act or actuality of being. The fact that all
the things we see have acts of being which are limited by their essences
indicates that their being is caused or received. Therefore, someone has made
them come to be (though not necessarily in time). And this one cannot
have come to be, and so it is pure act of being without any essence that
will limit it, or, in other words, with an essence which is precisely to be.
What is the essence of God? To be, which is not the essence of anything
else. Nothing else is by essence, only God.
“That is why being is not identical with existence. Existence is the
fact of being, ‘fact’ meaning ‘what is made.’ In other words, while esse
is a metaphysical principle, ‘to exist’ is the result of having esse.
One is the principle, and the other is the result. Esse is a principle,
because nothing can be without the act of being. Existere or to exist is
the result of having esse”(J. DE TORRE, op. cit., pp. 76-77).
[237] Cf. I. KANT, Critique of
Pure Reason, B 628 (A 600).
[238] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
[239] Cf. M. CHOSSAT, Dieu, in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, vol. 4, pt. 1, col. 1180 ; L’Averroisme de saint Thomas. Note sur la
distinction d’essence et d’existence à la fin du XIII siècle, “Archives de Philosophie,” 9 (1932), pp. 129(465)-177(513).
[240] Cf. P.
DESCOQS, Thomisme et Suarézisme,
“Archives de Philosophie,” 4 (1926), pp. 131-161 ; Thomisme et scholastique à propos de M. Rougier, “Archives de
Philosophie,” 5.1 (1935), pp. 156-159.
[241] Cf. F. CUNNINGHAM, Distinction According to St. Thomas,
“The New Scholasticism,” 36 (1962), pp. 279-312 ; Textos de Santo Tomás sobre el esse y esencia, “Pensamiento,” 20 (1964), pp. 283-306 ; The ‘Real Distinction’ in John Quidort,
“Journal of the History of Philosophy,” 8 (1970), pp. 9-28 ; Essence and Existence in Thomism: A Mental
vs. The “Real Distinction”, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1988.
[242] Studies on the real
distinction between essence and act of being: H. RENARD, Essence and Existence, “Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association,” 21 (1946), pp. 53-65 ; H. RENARD, Being and Essence, “The New
Scholasticism,” 23 (1949), pp. 62-70 ; C. FABRO, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione, 2nd ed.,
S.E.I., Turin, 1950, pp. 218-219; U. DEGL’INNOCENTI, La distinzione reale nel ‘De ente et essentia’ di S. Tommaso,
“Doctor Communis,” 10 (1957), pp. 165-173 ; W. L. REESE, Concerning
the “Real Distinction” of Essence and Existence, “The Modern Schoolman,” 38
(1961), pp. 142-148; M. W. KEATING, The
Relation Between the Proofs for the Existence of God and the Real Distinction
of Essence and Existence in St. Thomas Aquinas, Fordham University, New
York, 1962 ; L. SWEENEY, Existence/Essence
in Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings, “Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association,” 37 (1963), pp. 105-109 ; J. BOBIK, Aquinas on Being and Essence, Notre
Dame, IN, 1965, pp. 162-170 ; J. OWENS, Quiddity
and Real Distinction in St. Thomas Aquinas, “Mediaeval Studies,” 27 (1965),
pp. 1-22 ; H. P. KAINZ, The Suarezian Position on Being and the Real
Distinction: An Analytic and Comparative Study, “The Thomist,” 34 (1970),
pp. 289-305 ; B. NEGRONI, Essenza ed
esistenza nell’omonimo opuscolo di S.Tommaso d’Aquino, in Atti del Congresso Internazionale Tommaso
d’Aquino nel suo VII Centenario (6), Rome-Naples, 1974, pp. 238-289; A.
MAURER, St. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and
Essence, Toronto, 1968, pp. 21 ff ; T. E. Dillon, The Real Distinction Between Essence and Existence in the Thought of
St. Thomas Aquinas, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 1977 ; M.
KOSUGI, Esse and Essentia in St. Thomas
Aquinas, “Studies in Medieval Thought,” 21 (1979), pp. 155-163; J. WIPPEL, Aquinas’s Route to the Real Distinction. A
Note on the “De ente et essentia”, c. 4, “The Thomist,” 43 (1979), pp.
279-295 ; J. OWENS, Stages and
Distinction in “De ente”: A Rejoinder, “The Thomist,” 45 (1981), pp. 99-123
; J. WIPPEL, Essence and Existence in the
“De ente”, ch. 4, and Essence and
Existence in Other Writings, in
Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America
Press, Washington, D.C., 1984, pp. 107-161; S. MacDONALD, The Esse/Essentia Argument in Aquinas’s “De ente et essentia”,
“Journal of the History of Philosophy,” 22 (1984), p. 158 ff ; L. DEWAN, Saint Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the Real
Distinction Between Being and Essence, “The Modern Schoolman,” 61 (1984),
pp. 145-156 ; W. PATT, Aquinas’s Real
Distinction and Some Interpretations,
“The New Scholasticism,” 62 (1988), pp. 1-29 ; M. BROWN, Aquinas and the Real Distinction: A
Re-evaluation, “New Blackfriars,” 67 (1988), pp. 170-177 ; F. A.
CUNNINGHAM, Essence and Existence in
Thomism: A Mental vs. the “Real Distinction?”, University Press of America,
Lanham, MD, 1988; M. BEUCHOT, La esencia
y la existencia en Tomás de Aquino, “Revista de Filosofia,” (Mexico), 22
(1989), pp. 149-165; L. DEWAN, St. Thomas
and the Distinction between Form and Esse in Caused Things, “Gregorianum,” 80 (1999), pp. 353-369.
[243] Alvira, Clavell and Melendo
note that, “according to some authors, the real distinction between the act of
being and essence was made even before St. Thomas Aquinas. Its origin could be
traced back to Aristotle who said in that famous passage of the Posterior
Analytics (II, 7, 92b ff.) with regard to man, that the τò
δὲ̀ τί
(essence) is not the εі̃ναι (act of being). Some
authors have considered this distinction to be merely a distinction of reason,
not a real one. But Aristotle further explained that ‘the act of being of a
thing is not its own essence, for the act of being does not belong to any
genus.’ Despite this contribution, however, one does not find in his works a
complete development of this doctrine”(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, op.
cit., pp. 109-110).
[244] R. P. PHILLIPS, op. cit.,
pp. 198-199.
[245] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 7, a. 2, ad 1.
[246] K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit.,
p. 131.
[247] Cf. In I Sent., d.
8, q. 4, a. 2 ; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 22, 43 ; Summa Contra
Gentiles, II, 52.
[248] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 7, a. 2, ad 1.
[249] R. P. PHILLIPS, op. cit.,
p. 199.
[250] K. DOUGHERTY, op. cit.,
p. 131.
[251] R. P. PHILLIPS, op. cit.,
pp. 199-200.
[252] Suarez and the Suarezian
school “hold for a mental distinction between essence and existence. For it is by
existence that a thing becomes real from a state of possibility. All its
reality is due to its existence. There is no distinct reality such as essence.
Essence cannot be without existence.
“The Thomist concedes that essence cannot be isolated from esse as
if essence could really be apart from esse as oxygen can be physically
separated from hydrogen as components of water. The difficulty is in
understanding the meaning of a real distinction which cannot be locally
distinct.
“Essence and esse are not parts of a being in the same way as
integral parts that can be locally separated. They are entitative components of
the finite. The reality which esse confers on essence is to make an
essence really existing. But it does not follow from this that all the reality
in the finite being is esse. There must be a real subject of which esse
is the act. This real subject is a real potency that receives esse.
Reality is not purely the actual in finite being. There is also the reality of
potency. So too matter is a real potency distinct in a thing from the
substantial act, the form. Essence is not real in the existential order without
the act of being and yet it is not identical with the act of being. Essence and
act of being are coprinciples of the being of finite things. Finite reality is
not purely esse but a compound of potency and act, an imperfect mode of
existence.
“What results from the union of essence and esse is the existent,
the individual existing thing, the supposit. Essence and esse complement
one another as potency and act, as what is existing and the act of being in the
constitution of finite being ultimately outside its causes. Esse is not
related to essence as another substance nor as an accident but rather as the
ultimate actuality of the essence.
“The doctrine of the real distinction between essence and act of being
is a basically integral part of the Thomistic synthesis. It is not a more or
less accidental corollary attached to the metaphysics of St. Thomas. It is a
fundamental application of the doctrine of potency and act to the understanding
of finite being. For essence stands to esse as potency to act. The real
distinction between potency and act is resolved in the relation of the
entitative parts of finite being. ‘It must be considered that as esse and
what is differ in simple things according to intention so in composite things
they differ really’(In Boethium de Hebdomadibus, lecture 2)”(K.
DOUGHERTY, op. cit., pp. 131-132).
[253] Quodlibet. 2, a.
4.
[254] The distinction between nature
and suppositum is of paramount importance in theology. St. Thomas Aquinas made
use of this doctrine to express with precision the mystery of the Incarnation:
the human nature of Christ – despite its being singular and its full perfection
as nature – cannot be a suppositum, for it does not include in itself the act
of being.
[255] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 120-121.
[256] Compendium Theologiae,
ch. 211.
[257] Ibid.
[258] In III Sent., d. 5,
q. 3, a. 3.
[259] Cf. Quodlibet II, q.
2, a. 4 ; Summa Theologiae, III, q. 2, a. 2.
[260] Quodlibet IX, 3, ad
2m.
[261] Summa Theologiae,
III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 4m.
[262] Summa Theologiae, I,
q. 29, a. 3.
[263] De Potentia Dei, q.
7, a. 2, ad 9.
[264] Cf. Quodlibet, XII,
q. 5, a. 5.
[265] H. RENARD, op. cit.,
pp. 230-231.
[266] St. Thomas Aquinas always
maintained this doctrine, as can be verified from his early writings as well as
the later ones (cf. In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2 ; Quodlibet,
IX, a. 3, and Summa Theologiae, III, q. 17, a. 3, c.). This was
explicitly defended by Capreolus, one of the commentators of the Angelic Doctor
(cf. Defensiones Theologicae divi Thomae Aquinitatis, T. Pégues Ed., V,
Tours, 1907, pp. 105-107). Later on, Suarez and Cajetan regarded the essence
(and not esse) as the ontological basis of the subsisting subject.
[267] Quodlibet, IX, a. 3,
ad 2.
[268] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 121-122.
[269] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
[270] “In the order of activity this
self-sufficient being is also the ultimate principle which acts, and to which
all actions are ultimately attributed. The nature is the ultimate principle through
which or by which activity is exercised, but the supposit is the ultimate
principle which exercises the activity. For instance, this person,
Peter, is the ultimate principle which exercises through his
rational nature the act of thinking; this supposit, Fido, is the ultimate
principle which performs through its canine nature the act of
barking. Hence the axiom: ‘Actions belong to the supposits.’
“Subsistence adds to individuality autonomy of independence. This
autonomy of independence is an analogous concept and increases the higher we
climb on the scale of beings. While on the lowest grade of being hardly any
difference between the individual and the supposit is discernible, precisely
because there is very little independence, this independence becomes more and
more striking as we climb highwer on the scale of beings. Minerals, for example,
can merely exist in themselves and act upon others in virtue of inherent
powers; plants, in addition, have an intrinsic principle of growth and
reproduction; to whatever self-sufficiency a plant has animals add the power of
guiding themselves by means of sensation in their activity; man surpasses
animals in autonomy because he has also the power to determine for himself for
which purpose he is going to act. Thus subsistence adds to individuality an
increasing degree of self-sufficiency”(H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp.
201-202).
[271] T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T.
MELENDO, op. cit., pp. 123-124.